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1. INTRODUCTION: NEW(ISH) CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES
There appears to be a broad consensus that persons worldwide
increasingly now purchase and earn under the rules and patterned
practices of a "new [global] economic order."' Though it has been
decades in coming, the new regime is conventionally marked as
having crystallized over the course of the 1980s and 1990s with the
rough establishment of three foundational pillars.
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Global product market liberalization, formally embraced as an
international-legal ideal after World War II in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")2 of 1947, gradually pro-
gressed through subsequent decades under both the GATT rubric
and various bilateral and regional arrangements, reaching a critical
point with adoption of the Uruguay Round Agreements and con-
sequent establishment of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
in 1994.3 Liberalization of the global trade in services and other
"advanced sectors" is expected to follow that of trade in "basic"
(product) sectors at an accelerated pace following the adoption of
additional Uruguay Round agreements on trade in services and in-
tellectual property.4
Global capital market liberalization, ambivalently embraced as
an international aim by the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944,
5
progressed tentatively to 1971 and at last emerged as a fully func-
tional reality over the 1980's and 1990's with the opening of the
world's largest stock exchanges, and the unleashing of financial in-
termediaries, to largely unrestricted cross-border participation and
competition.6 In effect, the world is soon likely to have a single
"virtual" capital market. 7 Relatedly, liberalization and standardi-
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
3 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiotiations (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO].
4 See GATT: General Agreement on Trade in Services, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including
Trade in International Goods, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). See generally RAJ BHALA
& KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW 1-157, 1009-333 (1998).
5 See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/
pubs/ft/aa/index.htm; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. 5929, 606
U.N.T.S. 294.
6 See generally Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to 'Mission-Creep': Defend-
ing the IMF's Emerging Concern with the "Structural" Prerequisites to Global Financial
Stability, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Hockett, From Macro to
Micro].
7 For further discussion of this trend, see id.; see also ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM
SADKA, LABOR, CAPITAL, AND FINANCE: INTERNATIONAL FLOWS 3-27, 83-160 (2001).
For more on capital markets, see BRUNO SOLNIK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS (3d
ed. 2001); INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS (John Eatwell & Lance Taylor eds.,
2002); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1996); HAROLD JAMES, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS (1996); RICHARD W. EDWARDS, Jr.,
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zation of direct foreign investment also are proceeding (albeit halt-
ingly) under the rubric of the GATT and WTO agreements. 8
Finally, international labor market liberalization, though of
course not yet as near to completion as product and capital market
liberalization, has progressed rapidly since the 1980s as globally
mobile firms have come increasingly to exploit cross-border cost
differentials and extract concessions from once-more organized
and influential labor forces. Immigration patterns likewise have
fostered integration of the world labor market.9
All of these developments have been and continue to be mutu-
ally reinforcing, and they have been and continue to be signifi-
cantly facilitated by - while facilitating in turn - both technological
developments (most notably information-technological develop-
ments) and changing governmental roles in national economies.
Communications and related information-technologies, for exam-
ple, have enhanced capital mobility, which in turn has encouraged
the further "globalization" of production, which in turn has placed
competitive pressures upon capital and labor alike to enhance pro-
ductivity, and upon governments to refrain from hampering na-
tional economic "competitiveness."10 Consequent improvements
in productive and transport technologies have promised greater re-
turns on investments in less developed countries and greater
product and labor mobility, which in turn have encouraged further
capital movement and again placed greater pressure upon man-
agement, labor, and government in a manner of "feedback loop.""
The upshot of these mutually reinforcing processes jointly con-
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION (1985); DONALD E. MOGGRIDGE,
MAYNARD KEYNES: AN ECONOMIST'S BIOGRAPHY (1992).
8 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 33 I.L.M. 108 (1994);
see also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 132-39 (noting the attempts by the
GATT-WTO system to encourage foreign investment).
9 See RAZIN & SADKA, supra note 7, at 3-27, 31-80; Gordon, supra note 1, at
1530-31 (explaining how the labor law regime is currently parcel to the New Eco-
nomic Order). With a view to legal significance, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note
4, at 1-157. For popular accounts, see WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR
NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997); EDWARD LuTrwAK,
TURBOCAPITALISM: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1999).
10 See, e.g., GREIDER, supra note 9, at 103-21 (showing how technology compe-
tition leads to output of goods at a rate faster than the global market place can
take); LUTTWAK, supra note 9, at 102-09 (noting the underpinnings of the world-
demand and technology cycle); Gordon, supra note 1, at 1524 (describing how
world trade agreements have led to the increase in world trade).
11 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1533 (explaining the cycle of feedback loop).
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stituting the new global economic order has been a marked im-
provement in efficiency and aggregate wealth of the sort familiarly
predicted by neoclassical price theory. Competition is vigorous,
comparative productive advantages and economies of scale are
sought and exploited, resources flow more regularly to their most
(or at any rate more) money-valued uses, and ultimately more
goods and services, in greater variety and of higher quality, are
made available at lower real prices to more people than ever be-
fore.12
Not all of the benefits attending the new economy are so
widely distributed, however; and there are well-known concen-
trated costs. The profits flowing to successfully competing firms
accrue, of course, primarily to owners; and these owners, when
sorted by the magnitudes of their ownership stakes, represent sur-
prisingly small shares of the populations even of the most affluent
countries.' 3 Costs, in the forms of lost investment in specific hu-
man capital, occupational transition expenses and depressed real
wages, fall disproportionately upon those who rely more upon la-
bor and less upon nonhuman capital as sources of income.14 The
risks of incurring such costs have been significantly magnified by
the very information technologies that have played such key roles
in fostering the benefits brought by the new economy. By facilitat-
ing more rapid (indeed, "light-speed") capital movement and occa-
sional "overshot" in the price-adjustment process, these technolo-
gies have rendered financial markets more volatile than ever
before, and employees, in consequence, more vulnerable to cyclical
unemployment.'5
12 See RAZIN & SADKA, supra note 7, at 3-8; Gordon, supra note 1, at 1520
("Consumers have the advantage of more diverse goods of higher quality and
lower price."). The predicted outcomes of course are rehearsed in most of the
standard texts on price theory. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 149-81 (1990) (determining equations of efficiency and
equity); ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 307-43, 545-74 (1995)
(noting equations in Pareto optimality and competitive equilibrium); HAL R.
VARIAN, MICROECONoMIC ANALYSIS 215-29, 314-35, 404-12 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (solving such problems at profit-
maximization, market equilibrium, and Pareto efficiency). For more information
on price theory, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 226-35 (1986); GEORGE
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 68-75 (3d ed. 1973).
13 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1522-23, 1534-38 (noting how wage increases
were undercut even among the top group of wage earners); see also Greider, supra
note 9; Luttwak, supra note 9; sources cited infra note 16.
14 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1522.
15 A conspicuous recent case in point is, of course, the "Asian Financial Cri-
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The distribution of the new economy's benefits and burdens
raises critical questions of distributive justice, questions that seem
seldom if ever to be explicitly noted, let alone addressed, save in a
preliminary, intuitive, pre-theoretic manner.16 If the new econ-
omy's distribution of benefits cannot be attributed to the benefici-
aries' bona fide contributions, virtues, or merits, and its distribu-
tion of burdens to wealth-diminishing behavior, vices, or faults, the
distribution in aggregate will by definition be unjust, not merely
unequal. 17 And no society, global or local, may rightfully tolerate
truly eliminable or mitigable injustice.
Should protracted perceptions of unfairness become wide-
spread or notably intense, the costs and benefits of the new eco-
nomic order will also raise important questions of practical wis-
dom, as no perceivedly illegitimate order would seem likely to
remain orderly or stable for long.' 8 Societies wishing to lock in and
sis" of the late 1990s. On this, as well as on what it showed about the global fi-
nancial market and the role that information technologies played in it, see Hock-
ett, From Macro to Micro, supra note 6; PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE
CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF (2001).
For more on the justice-significance of cyclical unemployment, see infra Sections
2.4 and 3. For more on the sheer speed of capital market changes, in addition to
Hockett, From Macro to Micro, supra note 6 and the sources cited supra notes 7 and
9, see more generally infra Sections 3, 5, and 6 and MICHAEL PETTIS, THE VOLATILITY
MACHINE: EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE THREAT OF FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2001);
STAN DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER MEYER, BLUR: THE SPEED OF CHANGE IN THE CONNECTED
ECONOMY (1998). More formal treatment of the dynamics of financial market vola-
tility can be found in the sources cited infra note 267.
16 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and Inequality: Past and Present,
12 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1997) (listing statistics, but nothing on
whether/in what sense the cited inequalities are unjust); Gordon, supra note 1, at
1520 (citing growing gaps in income, passing reference to justice concern); see gen-
erally Kwan S. Kim, Income Distribution and Poverty: An Interregional Comparison, 25
WORLD DEV. 1909 (1997); Lant Pritchett, Divergence, Big Time, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(1997); George J. Borjas & Valerie A. Remy, The Relationship Between Wage Inequali-
ties and International Trade, in THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN AN OPEN
U.S. ECONOMY (J.H. Bergstrand et al. eds., 1994).
17 For elaboration upon the conceptual ties between justice, equality, and
merit, see infra Section 2 and Robert Hockett, Market-Able Justice: A Unified The-
ory of Distributive Equity, Productive Efficiency and Market-Completion, with
Particular Reference to Contingent Claims (2002) (forthcoming) (manuscript on
file with the author) [hereinafter Hockett, Market-Able Justice]. The work gener-
alizes the theory sketched infra Section 2.3 and shows how it can cover other
forms of risk, notably health and handicap, as well as income risk.
18 The link is often drawn, though, perhaps more frequently on the basis of
intuition than of macro-oriented empirical research. See, e.g., ROBERT NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 158 (1974) ("No doubt people will not long accept a
distribution they believe is unjust."); Klaus R. Scherer, Issues in the Study of Justice,
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continue fostering the benefits of the emergent economic order,
then, must look for means of justly distributing those benefits and
their attendant costs. In so doing, societies must avoid simply re-
placing one maldistribution with another. It is desirable, that is, to
hold up at least as a guiding ideal that state of affairs in which
those who truly are "earning" the advantages wrought by the new
economy, and who face equal opportunities to earn them, continue
to enjoy those advantages to the extent (and only to the extent) that
they actually are earned and the opportunities to earn them are
equally distributed. All (and only) truly undeserved, "windfall"
disadvantages, by contrast, should be shared equally by popula-
tions at large.
While the informational, econometric, and indeed moral-
theoretic task posed by a truly complete person-by-person account-
ing of all earned and unearned benefits and burdens wrought by
the new economy might be so ambitious as to border upon mania-
cal (particularly in the face of "hidden knowledge"), 19 it is not un-
in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 3 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992) ("[N]o
sociopolitical system... can afford to neglect the maintenance of perceived justice
and the need for corrective action in situations of perceived injustice, at least for
any length of time."); AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 1 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter SEN, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY] ("That a perceived sense of inequity is a common
ingredient of rebellion in societies is clear enough ..."); Gordon, supra note 1, at
1520 (observing that "political consensus" is threatened). There has been a good
deal of empirical research at the micro-experimental level. The findings reported
in this literature strongly support the intuitive tie. See, e.g., NORMAN FROHLICH &
JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL
THEORY 120-47 (1992) (explaining the distributions on the level of working envi-
ronment); THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY
AND CHANGE (M.J. Lemer & S.C. Lerner eds., 1981) [hereinafter SOCIAL BEHAVIOR];
TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 153-78 (1997) (discussing
different types of behavioral responses to injustice); Jerald Greenberg, Employee
Theft as a Reaction to Underpayment Inequity: The Hidden Cost of Pay Cuts, 75 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 561 (1990); Leo Montada, Injustice in Harm and Loss, 7 Soc. Jus.
RES. 5 (1994); Edward N. Muller & Thomas 0. Jakam, Discontent and Aggressive Po-
litical Practice, 13 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 159 (1983). I exploit some of the findings re-
ported in this and related literatures both in developing an "informationally en-
riched," "more complete social-contractual" account of justice and in arguing,
pursuant to that theory, that justice and efficiency, mediated by incentive struc-
tures, are much more closely associated (both conceptually and practically) than
seems commonly to be appreciated, at infra Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6. For an unusu-
ally sensitive and nuanced exploration of the psychological relations between per-
ceived disenfranchisement on the one hand, resentment on the other, see David
Singh Grewal, Network Power and Global Architecture (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
19 For a non-maniacal explanation of how this might theoretically be accom-
plished via price information, see Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17. I
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reasonable to begin to attempt at least the humbler mission of iden-
tifying certain general classes of risk that most would agree cannot
be mitigated by diligent behavior and that therefore should fall
equally upon all. It should be positively useful, then, to evaluate
the prospects of various means by which such concededly social
risk might be efficiently parsed, priced, and shared by society at
large. Such an evaluation should begin with current market-
offered means, proceed thence to not-yet-existent markets which
might offer such means, and finish with governmental or other
private organizational supplementation or facilitation, or outright
establishment of such markets where the prospects of spontaneous
development appear dim. It may be possible to find, through such
inquiry, that many or some of the very technologies, modalities,
and integrative developments that have fostered the new global
economic order and its attendant ills can be harnessed to the ame-
liorative task.
This Article is an attempt to carry out (or perhaps to begin to
carry out, and to motivate) one part of that humbler mission. It
aims to present an illustrative exploration, as well as a moderately
sophisticated justice- and efficiency-grounded evaluation, of one
family of means theoretically available (and that might be made
practically available). to price and insure against individual in-
come-risk wrought by the new global economy (and therefore, pre-
sumably by any effectively neoclassical economy). 20 Through suit-
propose means of exploiting theoretically designable market mechanisms in order
to parse out such information in infra Sections 5 and 6. For "hidden knowledge"
in particular, see infra Sections 2 and 4.
20 By "neoclassical" I simply mean any economy more or less conforming to
the assumptions upon which mainstream microeconomic theory as expounded in
most standard texts is predicated. These include the private ownership of prop-
erty, competitive markets with free entry, and no uncorrected externalities. See
generally infra Section 2.3 and sources cited supra note 12. Strong emphasis should
be given in this connection that the inquiry that follows would be as applicable to
a "non-globalized" as to a "globalized" neoclassical economy. The "globaliza-
tion" angle, however, should be emphasized for three reasons: 1) globalization is
the theoretical endpoint (the logical extremum) of neoclassical economic dynam-
ics themselves; 2) current trends toward globalization therefore render the poten-
tial pathologies of neoclassical economic integration more exigent; and 3) the po-
tentials for certain salient features of our neoclassical economy (in particular, its
new information technologies and consequent potential to generate new risk-
trading markets) to be harnessed in mitigating such an economy's potential harms
themselves are most fully exploited by exploiting global integration and that inte-
gration's offering of new macro-correlates to which to tie the values of new finan-
cial instruments. See also infra Section 3. I would like to thank Jerry Mashaw for
pressing me on global integration's relevance to the argument.
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able exploitation of familiar insurance and hedging devices, im-
proved by the development of new information and trading tech-
nologies as well as new financial instruments which themselves
either constitute or exploit some of the defining mechanisms of the
new economy itself, as well as a number of hitherto unexplored
and/or unexploited statistical correlations, this Article argues, new
markets offering simultaneously more just and efficient systemic
income-risk-sharing can and should be brought into being.
The Article accordingly aims first to describe the new economy
and its attendant income-risks in a manner adequate to render ap-
preciable precisely that sense in which some such risks truly are
"systemic" or "social" in nature, i.e., appropriately seen as being
justly (and as it happens, in large part efficiently) borne by all.
Obviously, this will require consideration of the theory of distribu-
tive justice-both as a philosophic and as an economic matter. Sec-
tion 2 therefore begins the inquiry by assessing two particularly-
indeed, two near-duopolistically- influential approaches to justice
and then proposes a superior, informationally more textured, syn-
thetic account that both incorporates what is worth keeping in
those leading approaches and better accords with what I take to be
our experientially grounded, legally informed, considered under-
standings of fairness. Three salient advantages of this theory are
that it a) renders appreciable the degree to which justice and effi-
ciency actually can be complementary (rather than always and eve-
rywhere constituting a simple "trade-off"), b) more generally, ren-
ders perspicuous a number of important analytical relations that
obtain between justice, efficiency, what I call "more complete social
contracting," contingent claiming and certain familiar institutions
(norms of reciprocity and exchange, incentive structures, reward-
ing mechanisms and information-gathering and -impounding
markets), and thus c) sets the stage for an illustration of how new
markets can facilitate more effective justice- and efficiency-
accounting - as well as more just and efficient insurance - through
the production of both price and price-sensitive information.
Section 3 then catalogues three broad classes of income-risk
wrought or exacerbated by the global economy and its new infor-
mation technologies that are appropriately regarded under the
newly proposed theory of justice as essentially social in nature, i.e.,
as justly (and in the large efficiently) borne by all in equal measure.
These are risks that both: a) operate as a drag upon factor-morale
and -mobility (as well as upon socially optimal individual risk-
bearing by potential consumers of other goods); and b) are not at-
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 115
tributable to productive vice or fault. They are therefore risks
whose broader pooling will result in considerable justice and effi-
ciency gains to society.
The Article then considers the economic theory of insurance
and its relation to the theory of justice, in an effort to reach a gen-
eral understanding of when markets unaided by deliberately con-
certed action might be expected both justly and efficiently to dis-
tribute social risk, and when they might be expected to require
some degree of supplementation, facilitation or correction by con-
certed (often but not necessarily governmental) action in order to
attain to one or both of those goals. This is the subject of Sections 4
and 5, which examine: a) the prerequisites to efficient risk-
markets; b) currently existing risk markets; and c) such markets'
limitations.
From there the Article proceeds to evaluate, in more detailed
and comparative fashion, in light of the preceding inquiry -and
thus, again, with a view to both justice- and efficiency-
significance- the prospects of what looks to be an especially prom-
ising- particularly via its exploitation of the informational, trad-
ing, and organizational techniques and technologies of "globaliza-
tion" itself -but as yet untried, means of modulating income risk
in a neoclassical market economy. The Article progresses from
variations on this form of market-based insurance involving little,
to variations involving greater, concerted public (or public-
minded) effort. Specifically, the work moves from private hedging
strategies in existing markets to new, quasi-publicly or publicly fa-
cilitated or created hedging markets in new, macroeconomic-
aggregate-associated instruments which can make such strategies
more meaningful. Such is the substance of Section 6.
Section 7 concludes the Article with the recommendation that a
variety of strategies be further modeled, refined, and trial-tested.
We should feel at liberty to explore along more than one front, and
then to develop appropriately designed and phased implementa-
tion strategies for approaches that appear likely to bear fruit.
While I should have liked to present an encyclopedic array of such
strategies in exhaustive programmatic detail, that, it seems, will
have to await the sequel -and perhaps the further efforts of others
along the same lines. For the complex conceptual distentangling
and reweaving attempted in the present "think-piece" has itself,
alas, turned out to require a full essay's worth of pagination as
things stand.
With a view to facilitating "flow" throughout these many pages
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and among what might at first appear, in light of our now century-
old division of academic labor, to be some customarily more segre-
gated subjects that I here bring together in synthesis, I have en-
deavored to operate at as high a level of conceptual generality as
possible within the text, relegating further technical detail, argu-
mentation and pertinent aside to the footnotes. I hope that in so
doing, the analysis has done as much as reasonably can be hoped
by way of having things both ways -textual readability and broad
conceptual synthesis on the one hand, sufficient detail and sup-
porting argument to make a solid case for plausibility on the
other.21
21 There are perhaps two things that lawyers do best, even if not always si-
multaneously. Sometimes, a lawyer attempts deliberately to be suggestive and
thought-provoking, or rather to make quite clear why these thoughts have been
so very much provoked by what seem a number of significant relations among
several disciplines, sub-disciplines and concept-families that are not (yet) gener-
ally brought together. With terms like "justice," "virtue," "efficiency," "account-
ing," "information," "reciprocation," "exchange," "incentive-structuring," "con-
tracting," "relational contracting," "incomplete contracting," "contingent
claiming," and other terms not only in those more familiar (and familiarly segre-
gated) respective contexts of moral philosophy, social and developmental psy-
chology, anthropology, and sociology and "law & social norms" theory, evolu-
tionary game theory, experimental economics, welfare economics,
organizational/institutional economics, general equilibrium theory, and financial
economics in which most of them tend separately to find their homes, but in all
such contexts, familiar or otherwise, this Article treats as important for newly exi-
gent purposes that they now all find one home.
In addition, a number of terms-e.g., "productive virtue and vice," "the jus-
tice ledger," "justice-accounting," "social contracting," "incomplete and more
complete social contracting," "relational social contracting" - are newly coined
here in an effort to capture and render perspicuous the conceptual linkages that
both: a) are deeply (in both a positive and a normative sense) important; and b)
have been there all along, awaiting explicit recognition as signposts along the
road to solving several longstanding and newly exigent theoretical puzzles and
practical problems. Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that one principal reason
that illuminating conceptual arbitrage among contiguous disciplines does not
proceed as rapidly as does arbitrage in our financial markets is that the disciplines
do not, as Henri Poincar6 might have said, "speak the same language." Their "in-
formation networks" are severed in a manner reminiscent of that separation
which characterized the world's national capital markets prior to the "big bangs"
of electronic and legal desegregation of the post-1980's. Poincar6 was referring to
competing schools of thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
endeavoring to provide mathematics with "foundations." See Jules Henri Poin-
care, Les Mathdmatiques et la Logique, 14 REV. MtTAPHYSIQUE ET MORALE 294 (1906).
But this Article takes the point to be generalizable. Again, however, in hopes of
avoiding a purchase of smoother interdisciplinary flow at the exorbitant expense
of bumpier reading, this Article has attempted to confine apologetics and discus-
sion on such points as much as possible to the footnotes.
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Be that as it may, if this Article's animating purposes, consid-
ered premises, and derived-though admittedly provisional-
theoretical and practical conclusions be correctly and adequately
conceived and reasoned, then notwithstanding its bringing to-
gether of some unaccustomed bedfellows and its tentative coinage
of some new, trans-disciplinary terminology, its ultimate product
should be a sense of considerable optimism, if not of outright re-
solve. For it then will be clear that the "new economy" -including
the global, financial, and information economies -not only ought to
be rendered more just in the production of "winners" and "losers,"
but indeed can, by means of some of that economy's own new fea-
tures, efficiently be so rendered-and that we therefore stand at the
threshold of what can prove to be a most promising new era of
theoretical development, programmatic innovation, and, dare I say
it, actual prosperity for all.
2. JUSTICE AS INSURANCE & AS "MARKET-OUTPUT": INFORMATION,
AVERSION AND TRADE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE, ILLFARE,
RESOURCE, AND RISK
The second half of the Twentieth Century has been particularly
fertile in reassessing and reformulating the theory of distributive
justice.22 Philosophers informed by the insights and methodologies
22 A quick sampling of noteworthy or oft-cited (alas, not always both) mono-
graphs should likely include BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (1995) [hereinafter BARRY,
IMPARTIALITY]; BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE (1989) [hereinafter BARRY,
THEORIES]; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1986); 1
KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING FAIR (1993); 2
KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: JUST PLAYING (1998);
GERALD A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (1995) [hereinafter
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP]; RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE]; JON ELSTER,
LOCAL JUSTICE: How INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY
BURDENS (1992); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); SERGE-
CHRISTOPHE KOLM, JUSTICE AND EQUITY (Harold F. See trans., 2d ed. 1997) (1971);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, VIRTUE]; DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999) [hereinaf-
ter MILLER, PRINCIPLES]; DAVID MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter MILLER,
SOCIAL JUSTICE]; KAI NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: A DEFENSE OF RADICAL
EGALITARIANISM (1985); NOZICK, supra note 18; DEREK PARFTr, REASONS AND PERSONS
(1984); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN
JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter
RAWLS, JUSTICE]; NICHOLAS RESCHER, FAIRNESS: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (2002); JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
(1996) [hereinafter, ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE]; JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF
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of modem welfare economics, as well as economists who have
mastered the results and techniques of modem, "analytic" moral
philosophy, have enriched our understanding both of justice's
general normative call upon us and of its specific requirements.
What is perhaps surprising, however, is the degree to which con-
sensus continues to elude us upon some of the subject's finer de-
tails, notwithstanding the fact that many modem contributors to
the discipline profess to be attempting to do justice to our shared
and considered, pre-theoretic judgments of right and wrong.23
As the current Article is not meant primarily to constitute a
stand-alone work of moral philosophy, 24 this will not be the place
OPPORTUNITY (1998) [hereinafter, ROEMER, OPPORTUNITY]; MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMIS OF JUSTICE (1992); THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE
TO EACH OTHER (1998); SEN, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 18; AMARTYA K. SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT]; LARRY S.
TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1994); SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
ELISHA PAZNER (Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 1985) (collecting, inter alia, six
groundbreaking papers by Elisha Pazner, some co-authored with David
Schmeidler or others, on "envy-freeness" as a criterion of fairness in allocating re-
sources).
Many of these works compile or survey "classic," oft-cited or what I think to
be particularly important journal articles originally appearing in the philosophic
or economic literatures since the 1950s. Roemer succinctly summarizes some of
the important work of Richard Arneson, which has yet to appear in other than ar-
ticle form. See ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 263-72; see also
EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Stephen Darwall
ed., 1995) [hereinafter EQUAL FREEDOM] (collecting important essays by Cohen,
Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Sen, and others). Some of my choices here, such as
those of Baumol, Hurwicz, Rescher, and Young, are arguably eccentric; I hope,
however, that I have shown these selections justified by the end of the last foot-
note to infra Section 2.2 and the end of Section 2.3 in its entirety.
23 Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17, attempts to account for and
correct this state of affairs by showing that many theorists actually are in all like-
lihood agreed at bottom but simply talk past one another either from different
planes of abstraction or from unnecessarily reductive "Archimedean points." See
also FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 18, at 4-5 (discussing disagreement be-
tween chief exponents of utilitarian and deontological justice theories - Harsanyi
and Rawls -due to those authors' adoption of improper methodology). The the-
ory of justice ultimately elaborated in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17
and sketched out at infra Section 2.3, might be seen in part as an attempt at a com-
prehensive (and, one hopes, coherent) conceptual synthesis of the partial truths
contained in the principal theories currently on offer, along with additional truths
that most of us would affirm but that the leading theories accord inadequate im-
portance or leave out of account.
24 Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17, is intended to be philosophi-
cally more complete.
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comprehensively to survey and critique all - or even most of the
most often cited -current contributions to the field. What we can
do, however, is a) schematically sort the two leading general ap-
proaches to the subject currently (and almost exclusively) dis-
cussed in the pertinent philosophic and economic literatures, b)
briefly highlight those approaches' principal strengths and short-
comings, then finally c) sketch the outlines of a new contribution to
the enterprise which both avoids the shortcomings of the afore-
mentioned and accords, I believe, both with their strengths and
with what most of us intuitively would take justice to require. As
we shall see, it happens that this new theory allows us to integrate
the theory of justice quite nicely-and at no cost to egalitarian
scruple -with a) the economic theories of insurance, financial mar-
kets, and financial engineering, and b) general equilibrium theories
of market processes more generally. The new theory also shows
justice and efficiency to be rather closer to full extensional equiva-
lence than is commonly realized, and thereby points the way for-
ward to new means of harnessing informationally efficient markets
to do the work of justice.
2.1. Consequentialist "Justice": Presumptive Zero Risk-Aversion and
Aggregative Wealth or Welfare Information Alone
From the early nineteenth century to the early 1970s, many if
not most leading theorists - or, perhaps more aptly, exponents - of
justice, particularly in the Anglo-American world, could be classi-
fied as "utilitarian," or somewhat more precisely, "welfarist-
consequentialist." 25 Unfortunately, in light of the severe informa-
25 For reasons that will soon become apparent, the Article uses the term "jus-
tice" a bit loosely in modifying it by such terms as "consequentialist" or "utilitar-
ian." More strictly speaking, one should probably say that utilitarians and other
consequentialists shared (or share) the space inhabited by justice theorists -that is,
they were the dominant theorists prescribing the contours of good or appropriate
social policy. Insofar as justice is the "first virtue of social institutions," utilitari-
anism as a prescription for social policy might be loosely considered a theory of
justice. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 22 ("The main idea [of utilitarians] is
that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all
the individuals belonging to it.").
The term "consequentialism" was coined by G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern
Moral Philosophy, 33 J. OF ROYAL INST. OF PHIL. 1, 12 (1958) [hereinafter Anscombe,
Modern Moral Philosophy]to embrace the sundry teleological theories, i.e. end-state-
oriented ethical theories that had come to be proposed by academic philosophers
by the late 1950s. The seminal essay is republished in 3 G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, THE
COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G. E. M. ANSCOMBE: ETHICS, RELIGION &
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tional constraints that utilitarian inquiry placed upon the norma-
tive evaluation of actions, policies, and consequent states of af-
fairs, 26 its influence ultimately hampered the sophisticated, suffi-
ciently fine-grained, multivariate consideration of distributive
justice in policy deliberation and policy discussion that justice itself
would seem to demand; but more on that presently.
In its essence, utilitarian justice was, and is, a simple teleologi-
cal welfare-maximizing (i.e., a univariate or single scale maxi-
mand-optimizing) imperative, sometimes subject to a distribu-
tional constraint. At its crudest, the utilitarian "theory" appeared
in certain Benthamites' catchy but, strictly speaking, incoherent in-
junction to seek "the greatest good for the greatest number."27 As
POLITICS 26 (1981) [hereinafter ANSCOMBE, COLLECTED PAPERS]. The idea is that the
morality of actions, actors, intentions, habits, rules, institutions, and so on is in all
cases reducible to the goodness or otherwise of the states of affairs that the latter
ultimately produce or tend to produce. For more on the "structure" of consequen-
tialism (and the infinite evaluative regress to which it lends itself), see Bernard
Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism [hereinafter Williams, Utilitarianism], in J. C.
C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 82-93 (1973)
[hereinafter FOR AND AGAINST]. See also CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Sam-
uel Scheffler ed., 1988); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL
CONCEPTIONS (1982); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY
(1985) for a general discussion on consequentialism.
The term "welfarism" appears to originate with Professor Sen and designates
a particular approach to the evaluation of consequentialists' end-states, namely, in
terms of the (generally subjective, often hedonic) "welfare" or "utility" associated
with them. See Amartya K. Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463 (1979)
[hereinafter Sen, Welfarism] (providing "a critique of utilitarianism without dis-
puting the acceptability of consequentialism."); see also AMARTYA K. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 89-130 passim (1970) [hereinafter SEN,
CHOICE] (providing formal and informal analyses of the theory of collective
choice); Amartya K. Sen, On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in So-
cial Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1539 (1977) [hereinafter Sen, Weights &
Measures] (analyzing alternative approaches to social welfare evaluation).
26 See Sen, Weights & Measures, supra note 25. The sorts of information that
ought not to have been left out of account, as argued infra Section 2.2, includes
personal boundaries, rights, responsibility, and ultimately fair distribution. Both
the theory of justice and the institutions that are proposed in this Article are de-
signed to take account of, and aid in discovering, such information.
27 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion, in JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS
65, 86-89 (Alan Ryan ed., 1987) (1789) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER
ESSAYS] (arguing how the value of a pleasure or pain should be measured by its
intensity, its duration, its certainty or uncertainty, and its propinquity or remote-
ness). While Bentham's own exposition of the utilitarian imperative(s) shares the
same incoherence as the maxim, the latter itself is thought to have originated with
the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, an inspirer of Bentham. See I. M. D.
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it is not possible, absent certain carefully specified and tightly re-
strictive conditions, simultaneously to optimize two separate op-
timanda, utilitarians came variously to divide themselves into pri-
marily maximizing and primarily equalizing camps, each camp
effectively relegating the optimand of the other to second-order
status at best.28 (Hence, either equalize subject to maximization, or
maximize subject to equalization.)29 Strict maximizers then were
faced with the embarrassment of hypothetical "utility monsters" -
creatures so talented at or physiologically suited to transforming
goods into happiness that the maximizing imperative would man-
date the channeling of grotesquely disproportionate quantities of a
society's resources to them, notwithstanding the consequent rela-
tive impoverishment of everyone else, in order to ensure that ag-
gregate happiness was indeed maximized.30 It was and is difficult
LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 8 (2d ed. 1957) (noting Hutcheson's in-
fluence on Bentham).
28 Actually it is not clear that the "greatest number" component of the
Hutcheson/ Benthamite maxim was intended to incorporate an egalitarian desid-
eratum; it might simply have stated a preference in favor of maximizing total
rather than average utility (the words seem open to either interpretation). See in-
fra note 29 and accompanying text.
29 A canonical maximizer is J. C. C. Smart. See J.C.C. Smart, An Outline of a
System of Utilitarian Ethics, in FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 25, at 3, 4 (discussing "a
system of ethics which is free from traditional and theological associations"). A
classic egalitarian utilitarian is Robert Hare. See ROBERT M. HARE, FREEDOM AND
REASON 112-36 (1963) (discussing utilitarianism and cases where the inclinations
of parties differ). It should be pointed out that many early utilitarians were egali-
tarian in spirit, even if, as noted, utility-maximization did not of itself, absent cer-
tain axiomatic assumptions, entail equalization of utilities. Bentham himself was
egalitarian in disposition (but see the simple summing language in Bentham, Prin-
ciples of Morals and Legislation, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 27,
at 88 (discussing the process for estimating the tendency of any act or event but
warning that the process should not be strictly applied to every moral judgment,
or to every legislative or judicial operation), as were John Stuart Mill, Utilitarian-
ism, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 27, at 272, 335-36 (arguing
that the "Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle" is based on the assumption
that "one person's happiness is counted for exactly as much as another's") and
HENRY SIDGWICK, METHODS OF ETHICS 416-17 (7th ed. 1981) (1907) ("[Ilt must be
reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no rea-
son apparent for treating him differently.").
30 See NoZICK, supra note 18, at 41 ("Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the
possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater gains in utility from
any sacrifice of others than these others lose .... [T]he theory seems to require
that we all be sacrificed in the monster's maw, in order to increase total utility.").
See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Formal Theories of Social Welfare, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 276-78 (Philip P. Weiner ed., 1973) [hereinafter Arrow, Social
Welfare], reprinted in 1 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J.
ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 115, 117-18 (1983) [hereinafter 1 ARROW,
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for non-utilitarians - probably most of us - to imagine anyone save
such "monsters" themselves wishing to live in a society that dis-
tributed its resources in this fashion. Surely no one but the most
risk-cavalier (not to mention the most justice-cavalier, if utility-
monstrosity were a mere accident of birth, a case of good brute
luck) would "contract" into such a society without first knowing
either that she was such a creature or, at the very least, that such
creatures' degrees of utility-monstrosity, statistical incidence
throughout the population, or both were rather low. 31
Maximizers- even equalizers, if they recognized maximization
as at least a second order goal-also faced the question whether it
was total or average utility that should be maximized.32 If the an-
swer was average utility, then no particular populational impera-
tive followed absent prior knowledge of the utility functions of
prospective persons not yet born. But if the answer was total util-
ity, utilitarians would be bound to advocate the procreation of
ever-growing numbers of people until conditions grew just
crowded enough that total utility began to drop.33 The "total or
COLLECTED PAPERS] (stating that the slight difference in sensitivities of two persons
can render distribution of all goods to one, but none to the other, socially "opti-
mal"). Though Nozick was not what one would call an egalitarian, it should be
noted that the "utility monster" scenario highlights the potential affront to equal
concern that aggregative utilitarianism represents. More on this infra notes 76 and
79. Please note also that while it might at present seem a bit eccentric to describe
the "utility monster's" derivation of pleasure from resources as a "talent," it will
become plainer in what follows that "consumption talent" is precisely what we
should describe such a creature as possessing. For the essential challenge to jus-
tice, we shall see, is to formulate means of distinguishing innate endowments -or
"talents" - from efforts. See infra Section 2.3. Note also that the character going by
the name of "Manic" in ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 46 passim, is a "utility mon-
ster" with inordinate consumption talent. Ackerman's "Depressive," again at 46
passim, might symmetrically be labeled a "utility handicap" or "utility invalid."
31 John Harsanyi, however, in effect argued that they would. (As, less fully,
did William Vickrey.) See sources cited infra note 60. The gist of the argument is
that, under conditions of uncertainty, choosers of a society or social distribution
rule will seek to maximize expected utility, and that this in turn entails choice of a
society or distribution rule that maximizes aggregate (or, in one of the arguments,
average) utility. Both of Harsanyi's theorems turn out, upon closer scrutiny, to be
formally invalid. See infra note 60. On the distinction between aggregate and av-
erage utility, see infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
32 See Smart, supra note 29, at 27-28 ("Another type of ultimate disagreement
between utilitarianians... whether we should try to maximize happiness of hu-
man beings... or whether we should try to maximize the total happiness or
goodness.").
33 Id. See also PARFrr, supra note 22, at 81-91 (referring to this as "the repug-
nant conclusion"). The (potentially) repugnant conclusion of the total utility
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 123
average?" question highlighted that a) utilitarianism as a simple
maximizing imperative offered no reason not to treat total utility as
that which was to be maximized, notwithstanding the consequent
immiseration of entire populations that this might, given some
possible utility functions, entail (those wishing to advocate the
seemingly more common-sensical and pleasure-protective average
utility option could not do so on the basis of utilitarianism itself);
34
and b) that being the case, pure utilitarianism really amounted to a
curious form of fetishism, apparently bent upon filling the uni-
verse with a mysterious substance called "happiness" -or, in the
case of some large populations with some possible utility func-
tions, mere "willingness to go on living"-while treating human
beings as little more than receptacles in which to collect or ma-
chines through which to produce that peculiar substance.
35 In the
absence of some further, normatively supplementary information,
then, utilitarianism looked either to be quite radically incomplete
or, again, to be a distribution rule likely to be favored only by util-
ity-monsters.
Another problem faced by utilitarians (and indeed any welfa-
rist), obliquely implicated by the last two questions, was the nature
of the maximand (or, in the case of egalitarian utilitarians, the
equalisandum): What, precisely, was to be optimized? How does
one know when-and by how much-"good," "utility," "welfare,"
"well-being," or "happiness" are being "increased" or "decreased,"
or when they have been "equalized" across persons? Relatedly,
are individuals' utilities the sort of thing that can be compared,
summed, or both?36 And if not, are we not faced with yet another
maximizing imperative, given some possible utility functions is that total utility
might in fact turn out to be maximized by growing the global population so large
that billions of crowded people are just infinitesimally more happy than they
would be at that point at which they would be indifferent between continuing
their lives and ending them.
34 See, e.g., Smart, supra note 29, at 28 ("I myself cannot help feeling a prefer-
ence for [maximizing total rather than average utility]. But if someone feels the
other way I do not know how to argue with him."). On the possible immiseration,
see infra note 60. Note that John Harsanyi derived both total and average utility
maximization as appropriate social decision rules, via illicit Bayesian proofs
grounded in von Neuman-Morgensternian axioms governing rational choice un-
der uncertainty. See infra notes 37, 60, 61.
35 More on the justice-significance of this matter infra notes 74-76. On "some
large populations with some possible utility functions," and "willingness to go on
living," see generally sources cited supra note 25.
36 See cites to Professor Sen's work, supra note 25 and infra note 299; Amartya
K. Sen, Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare [hereinafter Sen, Interpersonal Compari-
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crucial information-deficit in our ethical and policy deliberations?
Owing to the rather ghostly nature of "happiness," "good,"
"welfare," or "utility" as optimanda, and the informational diffi-
culties-both conceptual and empirical -attendant upon utility-
measurement, interpersonal utility-comparison and-aggregation,
sundry proxies came to be suggested by those theorists wishing to
pursue cardinal measurement and comparison of outcomes, rang-
ing from the flatly mythical or metaphysical (such as the "utils" or
increments of willingness to take risk assumed by some theorists,
who speculated that these simply had to exist but merely awaited
discovery through some as yet unknown technology37) to the
pseudoempirical (such as the presence of pleasure-associated C-
fibres or endorphins in the brains of those whose happinesses were
to be generated). 38
At length the most convenient proxy turned out to be that pro-
posed by a number of British and American economists, who, prac-
ticing a discipline which shared its principal modern founding con-
tributors-Adam Smith and David Hume conspicuous among
sons], in ECONOMICS AND HUMAN WELFARE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OR TIBOR SCITOVSKY
(1979); Amartya K. Sen, Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability, 38
ECONOMETRICA 393 (1970), "corrected" version reprinted in SEN, CHOICE, supra note
25, at 89 (discussing individual welfare measures and comparability); see also
sources cited infra note 76. For collections of essays arguing various positions on
measurement and interpersonal comparability questions, see Williams, Utilitarian-
ism, supra note 25; INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John
Roemer eds., 1991).
37 See, e.g., FRANCIS YSIDRo EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS, AN ESSAY
ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATHICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 81 (Augustus M.
Kelly ed., 1967) (1881) (suggesting that a "hedonometer" might directly measure
peoples' psychic states of pleasure and pain); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 17 (3d ed. 1964) (1944)
("Even if utilities look very unnumerical today, the history of the experience in the
theory of heat may repeat itself, and nobody can foretell with what ramifications
and variations."); see also infra notes 43, 44 and accompanying text (describing at
greater length, that the other response was to avoid the measurability conundrum
altogether by shifting attention to ordinal utility, which sufficed both to prove the
existence of and to analyze general equilibrium in a competitive economy).
38 See Tom M. Scanlon, Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A Forced
Marriage?, 97 ETHICS 111 (1986) (noting Roemer's implicit assumption of welfarist
premises); John Roemer, Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare, 101 Q. J.
ECON. 751 (1986) (describing seductive attraction of endorphins as proxies for util-
ity [or whatever it is that is to be optimized] even over those who would not wish
to be labeled consequentialist, welfarist, or utilitarian). Professor Roemer has ac-
knowledged the force of Scanlon's objection. ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra
note 22, at 259-61.
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them -with utilitarianism itself,39 essentially incorporated (or re-
tained) utilitarianism's traditional teleology with a new maximand
in practicing that discipline whenever the discipline was admitted
to bear normative implications. That proxy, of course, was "opu-
lence," or (money-valued) wealth.40 While it seems that we cannot
as of yet measure or compare individuals' levels of happiness,
utils, or generally even endorphins for purposes of practicable pol-
icy, we can, in at least a rough and ready way, measure personal
income and gross domestic product. And few seem ready to deny
that greater product or income is, ceteris paribus, better than less,
even if there be disagreement over what goal should prevail when
distributional considerations are placed alongside strict maximiza-
tion as candidates.
41
39 See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1069 (3d
ed. 1976) ("[M]odern welfare economists merely revive the Benthamite tradi-
tion."); see also other sources cited supra note 27 and accompanying text; Harsanyi,
infra note 60; J.A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in FOR AND AGAINST,
supra note 25, at 63; Vickrey, infra note 60.
40 The loci classici are David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, repub-
lished as POLITICAL ESSAYS (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1994) (1754); ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan
ed., 1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS]. The best known later
exponents are of course Hicks and Kaldor, cited infra note 47. It should be noted
that neither Hicks nor Kaldor takes care to distinguish between welfare (or "indi-
vidual satisfactions") and wealth (or "money," "real income," "physical product,"
etc.). There is a tendency throughout their work to conflate the two things, as if
they were eager to escape the interpersonal comparability problem and opera-
tionalize (for purposes of actual policy) the concept of welfare that they simply
assumed them to be interchangeable. This gives rise to some difficulties cited in-
fra, notes 48 and 50.
41 There has, nevertheless, been some lively controversy on this point. It has
famously-and persuasively- been doubted whether wealth can coherently be
considered a social value at all apart from distributional considerations. Where
distribution is left out of the account, wealth can seem no less the object of a bi-
zarre fetish than "happiness" in the system of total utility maximization. See
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980), reprinted in
RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
PRINCIPLE]; Ronald M. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Efficiency], reprinted in DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra at 267.
Dworkin's immediate targets are Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, who in
varying degree, defend aggregate wealth's status as a value in itself. See Guido
Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1979-1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), revised and reprinted in RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48 (1981) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE]; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1979-1980), revised and reprinted
in POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra at 43.
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The substitution of wealth for happiness as maximand in some
renditions of single-scale consequentialist ethics lent itself to (and
perhaps therefore was effected in part by desire for) the ready op-
erationalization of a property which successful policies could be
said to possess in greater measure than unsuccessful policies-
"efficiency."42 In its original, Paretian rendition, efficiency was
said to be that state of the world in which no change could be
brought which would render one person "better off" without si-
multaneously rendering another person (or other persons) "worse
off." 43 Pareto-efficiency as a criterion of social choice naturally cir-
cumvented the utility-measurement and utility-comparability
problems (all that was needed was a single person's ordinal prefer-
ence schedule among options), but it did so at a price.44 Any hypo-
42 The term "efficiency" in this context becomes potentially misleading, as
will become clear in what follows. It has come to mean little more than simple
maximization. See text following and notes and articles cited supra notes 40-41
and infra notes 43-44. Coleman in particular does a serviceable job of sorting
things out. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophical Aspects
of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980). See also Hockett, Mar-
ket-Able Justice, supra note 17 (sorting out forms of "efficiency," explicating their
conceptual links, and illustrating how the careless importation of the conceptual
implications of one form into thought upon another form can produce error).
43 See 4 VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF
SocIETY 1459-74, 1465-69 (Arthur Livingston ed., Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans.,
1935) (1907) [hereinafter PARETO, MIND & SOCIETY]; VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 391-491 app. (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S.
Schwier trans., 1971) (1906). On the Pareto reading, efficiency's relation to the
word's ordinary meaning-maximum output at given input or minimum input
for given output -is more or less transparent. A move from a Pareto inferior to a
Pareto superior state involves an increase in well-being at no cost-a sort of in-
crease of welfare-output for given input. Use of the Pareto criterion also, of
course, circumvents the interpersonal utility-comparison conundrum, though not
the intrapersonal ("better off"?/"worse off"?) one until a further move, from car-
dinal to ordinal utility -the latter operationalized through hypothetical choice-
rankings by those whose utility is to be measured -is made. Pareto saw this as
liberating economics from "metaphysical" elements. Id. See also 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICrIONARY OF ECONOMIcS 716-18 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987)
(providing the significance and history of the term "ophelmity"). Once that latter
move was made Paretians could conveniently remain in a certain sense (the ordi-
nal preference-satisfying sense) welfarist rather than having to convert to wealth-
maximizers. And, of course, many theoretical economists have so remained.
It should be noted in passing, as well as in anticipation of the discussion of
Rawlsian justice infra Section 2.2, that the ideal of Pareto efficiency can be read as
showing more respect for the interests/rights of individual persons-none of
whom is to be rendered worse off-than does the maximand of a simple aggrega-
tive utilitarianism indifferent to distribution. For this reason it is sometimes (and
somewhat misleadingly) called the "unanimity rule."
44 There is also some irony in the story of ordinal utility's triumph. See Ar-
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thetically "worse off" person (or persons) would, of course, effec-
tively and automatically, so to speak-that is, by definition-
exercise a veto over social decision-making.
45 As the practical dif-
ficulties attendant upon avoiding any actual policies' yielding "los-
ers" therefore rendered Pareto-efficiency, Pareto-improvement,
and Pareto-optimality little more than pragmatically unrealizable,
purely theoretical ideals, 46 our more operationally-minded welfare
economists lit upon an alternative ideal state toward which policy
could more realistically strive, so-called "Kaldor-Hicks" effi-
ciency.47 Under this conception, one policy was adjudged superior
to another if it rendered compensation of losers by winners theoreti-
cally possible-i.e., if it yielded greater aggregate wealth, rather
than welfare, than another48-the idea being that under such cir-
cumstances something very like Pareto optimality would be at
least theoretically attainable, even if no compensating in the end
were actually done. "Efficiency," on this understanding, subtly al-
lides from being the name of a desideratum governing the trans-
formation of inputs into outputs, to being a synonym for simple
wealth-maximization itself. In a single stroke we have operational-
ized both aggregative welfarist "utility" and a seeming analogue to
row, Social Welfare, supra note 30, at 276, 278 ("The ordinalist position ... only be-
gan to spread widely in the 1930s and became orthodox, ironically enough, at a
moment when the foundations for a more sophisticated theory of cardinal utility
[in terms of willingness to take risks], proposed by Frank Ramsey, rediscovered in
essence by von Neumann & Morgenstern, and ultimately rooted in the approach
pioneered by Bernoulli had been laid."); see also sources cited infra note 172.
45 Arrow's celebrated "impossibility theorem" can be characterized as a
manner of partial corollary, at least in the sense that, absent the "weak Pareto" cri-
terion which figures among Arrow's initial axioms, the theorem does not hold.
See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) [hereinafter
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE]; SEN, CHOICE, supra note 25, at 21-55; ROEMER,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 22-38.
46 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991).
47 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Valuation of Social Income, 7
ECONOMICA 105 (1940); see also Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in
Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941); Tibor Scitovsky, A Reconsideration of the
Theory of Tariffs, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 89 (1942); Tibor Scitovsky, The State of Welfare
Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 303 (1951) [hereinafter Scitovsky, Welfare Economics].
48 For it is wealth, not welfare, that is interpersonally transferable in a
manner giving content to the notion of "compensation." Insofar as the
compensation criterion is construed in a welfarist manner, Kaldor-Hicksian
compensation retains the interpersonal comparability problem that it was
designed to circumvent, and is afflicted by the difficulty flagged. See discussion
supra note 40.
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"efficiency," and have done so in a manner that permits both car-
dinal measurement and interpersonal comparison. We are thus
left with a new and seemingly more useful, less informationally
patchy species of -or analogue to -total utility (aggregative) con-
sequentialism, in which dollars or Deutschmarks "buy" happiness,
as it were. This apparently felicitous development carries with it at
least two significant costs, however.
First, simply increasing the number of dollar bills or Deutsch-
marks in existence (or more specifically, the total market valuation
of all goods and services), with no thought to their distribution or
the happiness that money "buys," looks to be yet more overtly fe-
tishistic than does aggregative utilitarianism itself. At least "util-
ity" is meant to represent some form of human flourishing.49
And second, the question remains, just as in the case of hypo-
thetical societies that would have directed grotesquely dispropor-
tionate resource-portions to "utility monsters," whether anyone not
actually bought off in a Kaldor-Hicksian world would willingly con-
tract into or consider that world just.50 For it once again seems
rather doubtful, to say the least, that anyone not at least initially af-
forded equal opportunity (including physiological, social, and
educational opportunity) to produce wealth (i.e., to add value to an
exogenously given endowment) would voluntarily contract into a
world that channeled more of everything to those who through
genetic or some other unearned traits (e.g., the families or the cities
into which they were born) just happened to be able to produce more
from what they were given and then entitled to keep all of the re-
sultant product for themselves.51 Who but the most risk-loving or
49 In fairness to Kaldor and Hicks, it should be pointed out that their concern
was with policies, which produced "winners" and "losers" in terms of some form
of satisfaction. Their paradigmatic example is the repeal of the U.K. corn laws in
the mid-nineteenth century, which opened the door to grain importation and
benefited consumers in the aggregate while harming British growers. They
judged it likely that, over time, all people would sometimes win and sometimes
lose.
50 Scitovsky was perhaps a bit more forthright about the distributional impli-
cations of the compensation criterion than were Kaldor and Hicks themselves. See
Scitovsky, Welfare Economics, supra note 47, at 306 ("The economist.., who favors
prosperity and advocates a policy of full employment makes an implicit value
judgment. He implies that the gain of those millions who benefit by prosperity is
in some sense greater or more important than the loss of real income suffered by
those few whose money incomes are fixed."). On Harsanyi's attempt to portray
distribution-ignoring maximization as a choice that would be made by rational
choosers under uncertainty, see infra notes 60, 61, and 62.
51 Wealth here is, of course, the analogue to utility. The utility monster is
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 129
risk-indifferent, as well as the most justice-loathing or justice-
indifferent, would contract to live in such a world prior to knowing
what her unearned place in it would likely be? And who, then,
save at most the very fortunate, could be thought to have been
justly treated and not simply put upon in such a world?
2.2. Rawlsian Justice: "Presumed Infinite" Risk-Aversion, "Primary
Goods," Primal Choice Information & Incomplete Social Contract-
ing
A particularly troubling aspect of consequentialist justice, cer-
tainly of classical utilitarianism, welfarism, and thus of traditional
welfare economics, was that it left the notion of individual deserts
tied to individual rights and responsibilities out of account.52 There
was no room for or ability to read such ethically decisive informa-
tion in a consequentialist evaluation; the theory was simply blind
to it. In theory, if robbing Peter to pay Paul rendered the aggregate
greater than in the preceding state of affairs, then the robbery
now a wealth monster -one whose innate talents render him a better wealth pro-
ducer than everyone else. And if he simply keeps all of his added product, it is
not at all clear why he ought to be given more from which to produce. Indeed,
some might say, "from everyone who has been given much, much will be de-
manded .... " Luke 12:48. Or they may say, "from each according to his ability, to
each according to his need." 19 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, COMPLETE WORKS
20 (1975). This, of course, is the significance of Dworkin's "Derek and Amartya"
hypothetical in DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22. Wealth, apart from
distribution in accordance with our efforts as distinguished from our accidental,
morally arbitrary features is not a value, any more than is maximized, deserts-
indifferent "utility." For more on this, see infra Section 2.3.
52 In the terms of supra notes 25 and 29 and accompanying text, consequen-
tialism in general and utilitarianism and welfare economics in particular were,
from an ethical point of view, informationally impoverished. A conceptually re-
lated problem should also be flagged here -that of traditional utilitarianism's
blindness to objectionable sources of utility (preferences), such as those of the
"broken slave" or "tamed housewife," who had adjusted her expectations and
wants to the injustice of her station; or the sadist, who derived satisfaction from
others' dissatisfactions. Such preferences are of course formed either with con-
tempt for, or in acceptance of violations of, basic rights. Taking preferences as ex-
ogenous, utilitarians thus ruled yet another class of arguably justice-implicative
information-types out of court. See, e.g., works by JON ELSTER cited infra, note 76
(SOUR GRAPES in particular); AMARTYA K. SEN, THE STANDARD OF LIVING (1987)
[hereinafter SEN, STANDARD OF LIVING]; Sen, Welfarism, supra note 25; RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 (1977) (describing "external prefer-
ences"); Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
177 (1981), reprinted in DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 41, at 335 (discussing rea-
sons why even absent traditional political speech rationales, pornographic speech
should be legal).
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would be "just," irrespective of Peter's and Paul's basic human
rights or what Peter and Paul themselves had done by way of
bringing about or acting to avoid their fates.53 This failed to accord
with many, probably most people's more complex, informationally
nuanced senses of fairness and propriety, which tied justice at least
in part to personal inviolability, consent, and inalienable rights as
well as to individual choice and responsibility.5 4
The philosopher John Rawls accordingly sought to re-theorize
distributive justice in a manner tying it to the basic rights and
likely "constitutional" choices of those whose allotments are jus-
tice's proper subject.55 An avid pupil of Kant, Rawls also (and re-
latedly) argued, in effect, that central to the concept of distributive
justice was the condition of moral equality, or impartiality56 (hence
53 Indeed, for precisely that reason, Pigou, in ARTHUR PIGou, THE ECONOMICS
OF WELFARE 87-97 (Transaction Publ'g 2002) (1920) and Lerner, in SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR, supra note 18, at 35-36, among others, advocated simple redistribution
from wealthy to non-wealthy citizens without regard to how those citizens had
become wealthy or non-wealthy, simply on the grounds that, in light of the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of income, transfers would result in greater utility-gains to
the recipients of transferred income than utility-losses to the taxed. Likewise
Dworkin's "Derek and Amartya" hypothetical in DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, su-
pra note 22 (stating that the book is simply taken from him who would have paid
less - because unable to pay more - and given to him who would have paid more,
and rights/deserts-indifferent value is thereby maximized.)
54 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 24-25 (stating that the "convictions of
common sense" are such that "[ejach member of society is thought to have an in-
violability founded on justice or, as we say, on natural right, which even the wel-
fare of every one else cannot override."); DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note
22, at 6 (stating that of two basic principles of ethical individualism, one, the"principle of special responsibility," "demands that government work,... so far
as it can achieve this, to make [persons'] fates sensitive to the choices they have
made."). For empirical data on the existence of a widely shared, non-culture-
specific pre-theoretic sense of fairness, see, e.g., FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra
note 18, at 2 passim ("The universal identifiability of the unfair is strong presump-
tive evidence for the existence of a common moral sense."); TYLER ET AL., supra
note 18, at 232-35, and sources cited therein. See also Hockett, Market-Able Justice,
supra note 17.
55 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 10-15. My use of the word "accordingly"
here is potentially overbroad. It should be borne in mind at the outset that Rawls
himself did not derive his theory of justice even in part from an ordinary under-
standing of moral desert. He is rather more concerned with what he takes for
rights, which he radically distinguishes from the concept of moral desert and
which I do not. Rawls takes certain rights to be dictated by his rational-
contractualist choice procedure, on which more presently, and then reduces moral
deserts to institutionally determined entitlements derived from institutions which
are just insofar as they are compatible with the likely outcome of that procedure. I
believe the deserts-reductionism to constitute error. More on this infra Section 2.3.
56 And/or perhaps "mutual advantage." On the putative distinction between
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his conception of "justice as fairness," and the frequent labeling of
Rawls as "egalitarian"57 ). That is, he maintained that an adequate
theory of justice would not sanction the unfettered allotment of
anything, at least in the way of those basic rights- and resource-
endowments from which people fashion their lives, to anybody on
the basis simply of her morally arbitrary, accidental characteris-
tics- her genetic endowment, the family and subculture into which
she had happened to be born, etc., in a word, anything resulting
from the "birth lottery." 58 (This, of course, would condemn simple
justice as impartiality and justice as mutual advantage, see BARRY, THEORIES, supra
note 22, at 6-8 ("Under the first approach the agreement is allowed to reflect the
fact that some people have more bargaining power than others .... The second
approach, however, is not constrained by the requirement that everyone must
find it to his advantage to be just."). In essence, on the "mutual advantage" read-
ing, justice "is simply rational prudence pursued in contexts where the coopera-
tion of other people is a condition of our being able to get what we want," id. at 6;
while on the "impartiality" reading, a just state of affairs "is one that people can
accept not merely in the sense that they cannot reasonably expect to get more, but
in the stronger sense that they cannot reasonably claim more," id. at 8. Much of
Rawls's language suggests that he is motivated by the impartiality concern; while
some passages, and possibly the very procedure by which he (via the choices of
his bargaining souls behind the veil of ignorance) derives his principles of justice
are suggestive of justice as mutual advantage. (After all, insofar as people truly
are impartial, they have no need of a veil; the veil is an (artificial) form of imposed
impartiality.) I frankly find the distinction, though figuring importantly in some
of the literature, a bit overblown much of the time -the very mutuality of "mutual
advantage" resulting in, even if not resulting from rational bargainers' attitudes
of, some form of impartiality. Only where we are concerned with attitudes and
motivation need we distinguish between these modes of attaining what is, after all
(or so I shall argue at Section 2.3), the same end-equal division of an exoge-
nously given endowment.
57 For Rawls on "justice as fairness," see RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 11.
Those who have labeled Rawls as "egalitarian" include Elizabeth Anderson, Mat
is the Price of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egali-
tarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989); Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (2003).
58 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 64 ("There is no more reason to permit
the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural
assets than by historical and social fortune." Distribution on such bases is "arbi-
trary from a moral perspective."). On Kantian impartiality (in the form of true
ethical precepts' avowed universal applicability), see, e.g., ALAN PATON, THE
MORAL LAW (1948) (translating Immanuel Kant's GRUNDLEGUNG ZOR METAPHYSIK
DER SITrEN (1790)). Note that Kantian morality also imposes informational con-
straints (e.g., on the identities of persons), just not as many as utilitarianism. The
differences among moral systems (or at any rate theories of justice) can be seen
always to be a question of what information is morally arbitrary or irrelevant, of
how much ignorance must be imposed behind the "veil" where just distribution
choices are made. On the "veil," read on through infra note 62 and accompanying
text.
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aggregative utilitarianism -as well as Kaldor-Hicksian consequen-
tialism - outright as inherently unjust.59) Rather, rights- and re-
source-allotments were thought best made upon the basis of the
distributive risk choices that a hypothetically ideal rational chooser
would make, in assembly with other, similarly situated choosers
deciding what the "basic structure" of their society would be, from
behind a hypothetical "veil of ignorance." 60 That is, the just distri-
bution was in significant part the product of that formula which a
rational actor would select, from this "original position," for the
making of allotments while not knowing what her position in the
resulting society would be. In an important sense, then, Rawlsian
justice, as a problem of rational choice under uncertainty, could be
thought of as the answer to an insurance problem. 61 Indeed an ear-
59 Utilitarianism might be thought to be impartial, too, in that everyone's util-
ity counts for the same in the aggregative process. That thought would be mis-
taken, however, in that utilitarianism actually does favor those who are born bet-
ter endowed with a natural asset-i.e., consumption talent-and does not attend
to their morally decisive choices. Counting each for one without attending to the
luck of their endowments is not treating all as equals, at least not in any morally
relevant sense. As noted above, utilitarianism directs resources to those who
more efficiently transform such resources into happiness (hence, disproportion-
ately to "utility monsters"). Beneficiaries of utilitarianism thus assuredly are not
treated as equals in regard to policy's sensitivity to their basic rights as persons,
their responsibilities, their projects and aspirations or their personal integrities.
60 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 118-23. It should again be pointed out
that the utilitarian philosopher-economist John Harsanyi likewise employed
something very much like a veil of ignorance, to arrive at rather different results
than did Rawls. See supra note 34; see also John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Wel-
fare Economics and in the Theory of Risk Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953) [hereinaf-
ter Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility]; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individual Ethics,
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955) [hereinafter
Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare]. See also JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND
BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 22-83 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR]; and Harsanyi cite infra note 77, criticizing
Rawls. Ignorance of future prospects-in this case, those of a prospective immi-
grant to a strange land-also figures into William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and
Social Decision Rules, 74 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1960).
61 Interesting in this connection is Christian Gollier, who employs a veil in
modeling portfolio-selection under uncertainty. See CHRISTIAN GOLLIER, THE
ECONOMICS OF RISK AND TIME 312 (2001) ("The notion of [a] veil of ignorance trans-
form[s] an interpersonal, distributional problem into a standard problem of deci-
sion [under] uncertainty... [This] problem.., is technically equivalent to the se-
lection of a portfolio of contingent claims .. "); see also Vickrey, supra note 60, at
508 (noting the "[d]ifficulties with cardinal measurement of utility, and particu-
larly with interpersonal comparisons"); Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility, and Cardinal
Welfare, supra note 60. The connection also surely accounts in part for the attrac-
tion, to Dworkin, of a "hypothetical insurance market" as a heuristic device in ex-
plicating what a fair division of resources taking account of unearned talents
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lier, utilitarian economist-John Harsanyi-who employed a veil-
like device in deriving utilitarianism (two distinct forms of it!) as
the outcome of a sort of hypothetical choice under uncertainty, cast
his own work in overtly insurance-associable terms.
62
Rawls believed that rational choice theory (adequately con-
ceived) provided a unique, determinate answer to the decisive
"justice problem" (and again, what I shall call an "insurance prob-
lem") as he posed it -namely, that any rational chooser behind the
veil would light upon "the difference principle," operationalized in
the "maximin" formula, whereby one policy is adjudged superior
to another if and only if it renders the least well-off class of the re-
sulting society better off than the other policy would do.63 Accord-
ingly, a distribution of wealth under which, e.g., 99 members of so-
ciety each received 10n units and one member received n units
would be more just, not just more wealthy, than a distribution un-
der which each of 100 members of society received m<n units.
Things were essentially that simple.64 (Note that we have here al-
should look like. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22. For more on that
brilliantly insightful program and its ultimately fatal theoretical and practical in-
adequacies, see infra Section 6.2.
62 See Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility and Cardinal Welfare, supra note 60; see also
Vickrey in the same connection, supra note 60, at 524 (noting in a similar fashion
how to derive utilitarianism). The insurance-associable terms include "rational
choice under uncertainty," "expected utility maximization," and cognate expres-
sions behavior. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 60, at 22, 32. In his ear-
lier article, Harsanyi derived simple aggregative utilitarianism as the social distri-
bution rule. See Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility, supra note 60, at 434. In the later
article, he derived average utility-maximation as the distribution rule. Harsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, supra note 60, at 304. The theorems turn out to be invalid as de-
rived social decision rules. They can only be interpreted as interesting representa-
tion results. Failure to have assimilated this now well established (but apparently
inadequately disseminated) mathematical point appears still to lead some econo-
mists astray. See infra note 67.
63 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 130-53 (defining the maximin rule as rank-
ing alternatives by their most possible outcomes). There is some vagueness in the
notion of "the least well-off class." For example, whether it be the bottom income
quintile, quartile, or decile remains to be specified. This opens the door to some of
the criticisms discussed infra. Note also that maximin of itself does not preclude
welfarism as defined supra note 25. One could prescribe that we maximize the
welfare of the least well off person or class. As explained in infra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text, Rawls takes leave of welfarism by focusing upon a particular
distribuendum, an index of "primary goods." See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at
90.
64 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, id. at 139-53, 160-68 (considering a variety of competing
choice-principles, including aggregate utility maximization and average utility
maximization).
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ready the beginnings of a recognition that justice and efficiency -
the latter in its simple wealth-maximizing rendition-as well as
just and efficient insurance, might at points be complementary.)
In a sense, then, Rawls restored Paretian efficiency, which the
Kaldor-Hicksians had displaced, to social choice. The only formal
difference was the choice of what we might call the "baseline" -or
rather, it was that in one case there just was no choice of baseline,
whereas in the other case there was. Pareto, in effect, said "No one
should be rendered worse off in the move from state 4) to state T,
what ever states those two might be." Rawls said, in effect, "I'll
supply state (D: it's the state of fair initial equality, the 'original po-
sition' behind the veil of ignorance." Rawls thus gave the "worst
off" a Paretian veto over all departures from equality.
Insofar as a society conformed in its distribution of benefits to
the maximin ideal, which, again, amounted to the outcome of a
sort of hypothetical "constitutional convention" for the choice of a
"basic [social] structure" from behind the veil of ignorance, that so-
ciety could be said to operate pursuant to a sort of "social contract"
(or what we might call a "social insurance contract"). Rawls is quite
explicit about this, locating his approach to justice firmly within
the social-contractarian tradition and contrasting it, in part for that
very reason, to the dominant utilitarian tradition.65 (Recall that, as
remarked in Section 2.1, it seemed unlikely that anyone (save the
"monsters" themselves) would actually consent to or choose a soci-
ety that awarded grotesquely disproportionate quantities of its re-
sources to "utility [or "wealth-"] monsters.") 66
Rawls departed from classical utilitarianism (as expounded by
writers other than Vickrey and Harsanyi) in more than just his con-
tractualist methodology and prescribed distribution formula. Like
the Kaldor-Hicksians in their departure from strict welfare-
utilitarianism, Rawls too lit upon a different distribuendum -
65 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 11 ("My aim is to present a conception
of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar
theory of the social contract...."); id. at 22 ("My aim is to work out a theory of
justice that represents an alternative to utilitarian thought generally and to all of
[the] different versions of it. I believe that the contrast between the contract view
and utilitarianism remains essentially the same in all these cases."); id. at 17
("[W]e have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the
contractual situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of ra-
tional choice.").
66 See supra note 59 (explaining how utilitarianism directs resources to those
who more efficiently transform resources into happiness).
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namely, an "index of primary goods." 67 One reason for this choice
was that, like the compensationists, Rawls wished to avoid the in-
formational conundrum of utility-immeasurability and interper-
sonal utility incomparability. 68 But in Rawls' case this latter con-
cern apparently stemmed less from objections to utility-
measurement and utility-comparison per se than from objections to
"life plan"-comparison. Respect for persons, Rawls argued, re-
quired respect for persons' "plans of life" as well as the "concep-
tions of the good" implicit in those plans.69 These latter were so
multifarious and sacrosanct as to defy commensuration or com-
parative evaluation. But because certain "primary goods"-
material resources and "the social bases of self-respect" - are so
central to virtually anybody's pursuit of her conception of the good
that no reasonable person would wish to be without them, Rawls
argued, it was they whose distribution is the proper concern of jus-
tice; and they, like money or wealth, are largely measurable and
interpersonally comparable, at least once the indexing problem is
solved.
70
Like Kaldor-Hicksian "compensationist" consequentialists,
then, Rawls in effect took a sort of "objective" social wealth rather
than "subjective" utility as that which was to be distributed, even if
that wealth was somewhat more complex than money-valued GDP
alone, 71 and even if that wealth was not, in his case, to be aggre-
67 RAwLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 99. See also id. at 54-55, 78-81, 348, 358-65
(discussing social justice as the basic structure of society). We shall have occasion
to consider the technical difficulties raised by indexing infra Section 6.
68 See id. at 90-91 ("For questions of social justice we should try to find some
objective grounds for [interpersonal] comparisons, ones that men can recognize
and agree to.").
69 Id. at 407-16.
70 Id. For more on commensuration and commensurability, see infra note 81.
For more on the importance of and the challenges raised by indexing, see infra
Section 6.3.1. Rawls, arguably, like the Kaldor-Hicksians faces an index problem.
See Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 Nous 429 (1990) (arguing that
Rawls faces an intractable indexing problem); ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra
note 22, at 171 (largely agreeing with Arneson, but noting that under certain con-
ditions, which it is difficult to imagine satisfying, the problem might be solved);
but see Robert Hockett and Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited: The "Political
Problem" and Its Rawlsian Solution (under review by Economics and Philosophy;
manuscript on file with the author) (arguing that Rawls's index problem is largely
soluble under a relatively relaxed set of conditions). See also generally Robert
Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory of Justice (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Hockett, Deep Grammar].
71 Which is not to say that gross domestic product ("GDP") or its valuation is
especially simple. See supra note 41. On the "objectivity" of the index of primary
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gately maximized. Unlike Kaldor-Hicksians, on the other hand,
Rawls, through maximin, in effect required that the "compensa-
tion" actually be paid. Returning to the first hand, we should also
note that, once more like the Kaldor-Hicksians, Rawls largely ig-
nored what we might call "negative primary goods," or "primary
ills" -i.e., handicaps and talent-deficits of sundry sorts. Much of
the subsequent work of Amartya Sen, who has argued for equaliz-
ing "capabilities" or (human) "functionings," can be read as a sup-
plement to Rawls in this respect.72
The assorted difficulties and potential objections besetting
Rawls' theory of justice would make for a book in themselves.73
Perhaps most obvious among them is the controversial nature of
Rawls's claim that maximin is a dictate of rationality itself. 74 Risk-
aversion and taste for risk are, on most accounts offered by modern
philosophical psychology and taken for granted by economists and
other choice-theorists, tastes like any other-they are primitives,
"givens," or, in the language of economists, exogenous-not sub-
ject to rational critique.75 Rationality being a matter of the adapta-
goods (and the matter of "consistent" Kaldor-Hicksians), see supra note 63 and ac-
companying text. Note also that there is no necessary tie between distribuendum
and distribution formula; one might have maximized "utility" or "welfare," pro-
vided, of course, that one had managed to define and determine means of meas-
uring them.
72 See, e.g., works by Sen cited supra notes 18, 22, and 25. Much of Sen's work
on measure theory is motivated at least in part by the concern of the capability
approach in terms of realized functionings.
73 And have made, for plenty. See, e.g., ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING
RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" 3 (1977) (" [Yiet
there are numerous serious inconsistencies and unclarities that make it appear
that Rawls could not make up his mind on some quite fundamental questions.");
READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS'S "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" (Norman
Daniels ed., 1975); BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES OF "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" BY JOHN
RAWLS (1973).
74 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's The-
ory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 251 (1973) [hereinafter Arrow, Ordinalist-Utilitarian],
reprinted in 1 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 30, at 96 (noting that "it has,
however, long been remarked that the maximin theory has some implications that
seem hardly acceptable."); John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a
Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 594, 594
(1975) [hereinafter Harsanyi, Critique] (noting that the maximin principle can
"lead to serious paradoxes because [it] often suggest[s] wholly unacceptable prac-
tical decisions").
75 For more on the psychological status of risk and probability, see infra note
173 and accompanying text. Additional concern with risk-aversion emerges infra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Note that risk-aversion and the declining
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tion of means to ends, tastes, as preferences for ends, are not them-
selves either rational or irrational.76 And since tastes for risk
would seem to lend themselves to different distributional formulae
marginal utility of income- the latter exploited, as observed supra note 30 by such
egalitarian-minded utilitarians and welfare economists who believed that society
simultaneously could maximize and equalize-are mutual entailments. They are
effectively the same thing. Risk-aversion, therefore, is effectively assumed by
both egalitarian conceptions of justice thus far discussed.
These conceptions are welfare-maximizing egalitarianism and Rawlsianism.
The form of egalitarianism that will be discussed in the next subsection pursuant
to my own understanding of justice, and the space that equality occupies in that
conception, crucially involve no such commitment.
76 This is of course the view, common since Weber canonized it, that Western
(or "liberal") rationality since the time of Thomas Hobbes (and particularly in
societies operating under capitalist modes of production) has been co-terminous
with instrumental rationality. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 26
passim. (Claus Wittich & Guntehr Roth eds., 1979). For a popular exposition of the
same general point of view, see ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
See also George J. Stigler & Gary Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 76-77 (1977) (discussing the phenomenon of endogenous prefer-
ences calling into question the view that tastes are beyond rational critique). For
more materials in connection with Stigler & Becker, see JON ELsTER, ADDICTION:
ENTRIES AND EXIms (1999); JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND
THE EMOTIONS (1999); JON ELSTER & OLE-JURGEN SKOG, GETrING HOOKED:
RATIONALITY AND ADDICTION (1999); JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN
THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY (1997); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE
SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1987); JON ELsTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION,
ADDICITON, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1999); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-103 (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); Ge-
rald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64 (1972).
It should be noted that Rawls himself purports to operate under this "liberal"
or "instrumental" conception of rationality. See RAwLs, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at
14 ("[Tihe concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the nar-
row sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to
given ends."). It will not go unnoticed that rationality, on this conception, equates
to efficiency.
It is worth noting that if the discussion were to adhere to a teleological view of
human life and purpose, such as was evidently commonly done by (at least)
European thinkers prior to the "voluntarist" revolution initiated by Scotus and
Ockham early in the second millennium C.E. (severing the will of the deity from
any form of rational plan intelligible to human reason), then even means-oriented
rationality would be applicable to "ends," in that even the latter would constitute
means of a course that set the stage for the Calvinist and Lutheran Reformations
and the gradual decline of teleological Natural Law theories as accounts of law,
justice, and human flourishing. On these matters, see, e.g., WILLIAM KNEALE &
MARTHA KNEALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC (1962); JOHN MAURICE KELLY, A
SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992); JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE
HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 6-7 (Barbara Herman ed., 2000).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
likely to be chosen from behind the veil,77 Rawlsian justice accord-
ingly looks to be little more than the universalization of Rawls'
own temperamentally cautious (dare one say "professorial"?) risk-
preference set.78 The idiosyncrasy of that set is brought into par-
ticularly bold relief when one considers that maximin "implies that
any benefit, no matter how small, to the worst-off member of soci-
ety will outweigh any loss to a better-off individual, provided it
does not reduce the second below the level of the first."79 It seems
rather much to claim that every rational agent would contract for
that particular social insurance policy from behind the veil. We
might thus say that utilitarian justice - along with simple aggrega-
tive consequentialist justice more generally- appears to attribute
surprisingly little risk-aversion to hypothetical social contractors. It
is difficult to believe that anyone would consent to a simple aggre-
gate-maximizing distribution of initial resource-endowments (in-
cluding talent- and familial-endowments) as if she were indifferent
to the distributional variance and thus to what her birth-lottery
77 For example, why might an assembly of risk-lovers behind the veil not opt
for maximax, whereby the endowment(s) of the best-off member(s) of the resulting
society would be maximized? Some might argue that American society has begun
to approximate such an assembly. See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK & PHILLIP COOK, THE
WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995). Witness also the proliferation of casinos and
the associated spread of what we might call "casino culture" throughout Ameri-
can society in recent years as evidenced by lotteries, television programs, etc.
Perhaps the latter reflects less a love of risk than widespread irrational beliefs that
we will all win.
78 Indeed, the universalization of "infinite" risk-aversion. See Arrow, Ordinal-
ist-Utilitarian, supra note 74, at 249 (discussing the derivation of Rawls's specific
rules); Harsanyi, Critique, supra note 74, at 595 (discussing how Rawl's theory
leads to irrational risk-aversion); L. Hurwicz, Optimality Criteria for Decision Mak-
ing Under Ignorance, 370 STAT. 1 (1951) (stating that maximin scores a perfect "1"
on a "pessimism index"); GEOFFREY A. JEHLE & PHILIP J. REMY, ADVANCED
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 260 (2d ed. 2001). Harsanyi drives the point home with a
colorful hypothetical involving a person's choosing not to cross a street in view of
the fact that even the very slight risk of being injured by a passing vehicle suffices
to offset whatever they might stand to gain by proceeding. See Harsanyi, Critique,
supra note 74, at 595. Note, again, that egalitarian minded maximizing utilitarians
likewise are connitted to risk-aversion. Id. Section 6.2 notes vitiating, though
rather less extreme, assumptions about risk-aversion in Dworkin's proffered al-
ternative to Rawls.
79 See Arrow, Ordinalist-Utilitarian, supra note 74, at 251 (citing hypothetical to
effect that "there can easily exist medical procedures which serve to keep people
barely alive but with little satisfaction and which are yet so expensive as to reduce
the rest of the population to poverty."). It is intriguing, if not amusing, in light of
this quote and that of NozICK, supra note 18, that Rawls might be said to favor the
interest of what might be called "disutility monsters" or "risk holdouts."
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winnings and consequent place in the resulting society would
likely be. Rawlsian justice, symmetrically, appears to attribute sur-
prisingly much risk-aversion to the same hypothetical contractors.
80
At least as compelling as the risk-aversion objection to Rawl-
sian justice for present purposes is that flaw which it actually
shares, in significant though not in full degree, with the utilitarian
justice that it was meant to displace -that is, the attenuated nature
of the link that it provides between the size of the divided and dis-
tributed "pie" on the one hand, and the voluntary actions of those
for whom the pie is being divided on the other. In the case of utili-
tarian (and for that matter Kaldor-Hicksian) justice, there seems to
be little or no link at all, certainly no necessary, non-contingent
one; distributions ultimately are to maximize total or average util-
ity (or wealth, in the case of non-welfarists) irrespective of what the
loci of utility - persons - do by way of enlarging or diminishing the
same.81 In the case of Rawlsian justice, the only critical link is in
80 See supra note 78 for discussion on the "infinite risk-aversion" entailed by
maximin.
81 A caveat might be in order. The routine rewarding of actions that tend to
increase aggregate utility or wealth (provided that the costs incurred by that re-
warding not then overly diminish the aggregate), and punishment of actions that
tend to decrease the same (provided that the punishment not give rise to more
disutility than it prevents) might be thought generally to tie the responsibilities of
those rewarded and punished to the size of the "utility (or "wealth") pie." (It
might even be thought to represent a reasonable concession by consequentialists
to the problems of bounded rationality and uncertainty- the same conditions that
account for the existence of institutions additional to rules in the theoretical work
of practitioners of the "new institutional economics." See infra Section 2.3. Conse-
quentialism, after all, enjoins a decision-procedure, and what workable decision-
procedure can afford to ignore the boundedness of human rationality in the mak-
ing of choices?) But this would then be a matter of tendencies rather than strict act-
by-act linkages between reward or punishment and responsibility. There would
be no necessary, analytic, conceptual link between justice and responsibility, justice
and desert. Nor would there be any sorting out between the degrees to which the
outputs of the actions were attributable to bona fide efforts versus innate traits.
A community adopting policies such as those just countenanced would, in the
prescribing of reward and punishment policies, effectively be promulgating pub-
licly enforced rules of private behavior that would render its form of consequen-
tialism "indirect" or "rule" consequentialism as distinguished from "direct" or
"act" consequentialism. On the latter distinction, see, e.g., Smart, supra note 29, at
9 ("Act-utiliarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to
be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. Rule-
utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be
judged by the goodness or badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone
should perform the action in like circumstances."). Rule consequentialism's ven-
erable pedigree can be traced through, for example, Mill, in UTILITARIANISM AND
OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 27, at 294-97; Roy F. Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, 45
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MIND 137 (1936); and John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), re-
printed in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 20 (1999).
It is to be doubted whether a rule consequentialism that does not ultimately
collapse into pure act consequentialism actually can be coherently maintained,
which lends additional force to the observation just made that the ties between
reward or punishment and responsibility under consequentialism will be contin-
gent and conceptually attenuated at best. For consider, if in a given case I simply
happen to know that my stealing from an innocent will bring favorable conse-
quences (say that I plan to give the money to a medical research lab and the inno-
cent was simply going to purchase a meal) and that it will not, in this case, un-
dermine general observance (even my own) of the fundamental rule of justice
prohibiting theft from the innocent (assume that the innocent party is morally
conscientious but also morbidly shy, so that her victimization will result neither in
her own corruption nor in her reporting the theft and that I am a scrupulous con-
sequentialist who only violates the ordinary, categorical -i.e., non-
consequentialist -rules governing mortals when I can be quite certain both that I
will do more good than harm in so doing and that I will not undermine general
observance of those rules), what is there, in the rule-consequentialist calculus, to
prevent my stealing from this innocent person? (After all, by hypothesis it will
bring favorable consequences.) And would my doing so not nonetheless be un-
just? Would Raskolnikov's murder of the pawnbroker be unjust? See FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Jessie Coulson trans., 1981) (1869). On the
ultimate tenability of rule consequentialism, see RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL
THEORY (1959); HARE, supra note 29, at 131-36; Richard B. Brandt, Toward a Credible
Form of Utilitarianism, in MORALITY AND THE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCT 119-23 (H.N.
Castafieda & G. Nakhnikian eds., 1963); DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF
UTILITARIANISM (1965); Smart, supra note 29, at 5; Williams, Utilitarianism, supra
note 25, at 118-35.
The usual difficulties of measurement and comparison, in addition to the af-
front to pre-theoretic intuitions of personal responsibility and inalienable rights,
would beset either rule consequentialism or act consequentialism -e.g., how to
determine when the disutility of the criminally punished is less than the gained
utility of those benefited by enforcement of the criminal code, etc. Again, see
Smart, supra note 29, at 12-41. It should also be pointed out that rule utilitarians
would have to face the questions as to whether and when, in view of inculcation
costs, it is ultimately more utility-maximizing to reward utility-enhancing behav-
ior or to penalize utility-diminishing behavior (or both). Answers to such ques-
tions would depend, among other things, upon whether the capacities of indi-
viduals to experience the utilities and disutilities of reward and punishment
amounted to a scarce social resource and inculcation processes accordingly were
subject to diminishing returns. On these questions, see BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL
CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY OF MORALITY (2000); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Human Nature and the Best Consequentialist Moral
System (2002) (unpublished working draft, on file with the author). It grows a bit
mind-boggling to contemplate how all of these measurements -extending into an
indefinite future -might be carried out.
For more on the special problems raised for consequentialism by an un-
bounded, uncertain future, in particular the "dare I eat a peach?"/"dare I not eat a
peach?" sort of anxiety (excessive responsibility and "negative responsibility")
that it tends to induce and the ravages of the same upon personal integrity (and
indeed the very concept of a person), see Smart, supra note 29, at 44-51 and Wil-
liams, Utilitarianism, supra note 25, at 82-118. See also John Broome, Incommensur-
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the choice of the distribution-formula itself82 - pretty thin gruel
when one considers, first, that this choice is one which Rawls (al-
beit implausibly) claims must virtually by definition be made by
any "rational" chooser from behind the veil, and, second, that there
able Values, in WELL-BEING AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES GRIFFIN
(Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker eds., 1999), reprinted in JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF
ECONOMICS 145 (1999) [hereinafter BROOME, ETHICS]; PARFIT, supra note 22. James
Griffin seizes upon such problems in ultimately condemning consequentialism as
necessarily mandating an unsuitable decision-procedure. See JAMES GRIFFIN,
VALUE JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 161-66 (1996); James Griffin,
The Human Good and the Ambitions of Consequentalism, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 118, 118-
32 (1992). As "ought" implies "can," and as consequentialism amounts to a can-
not, consequentialism also proves to be an ought not. See id.
82 See Rawls's reduction of personal desert to institutionally determined
entitlement, RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 88-89, 273-77; see also JOHN RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 72-74, 77-79 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (explaining
desert in context of legitimate expectations, entitlement, native endowments, and
distributive justice). As institutions are determined ultimately by the choice
behind the veil, desert and responsibility likewise collapse into that one primal,
all-determinative choice. I shall object to this treatment of moral desert, infra
Section 2.3.
On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that Rawls' choice of an in-
dex of "primary goods" rather than welfare as that which is to be distributed ac-
cording to maximin, see RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 54-55, 78-81, certainly at
least lends itself to the allowance of more rein to personal responsibility than does
welfarism. (In the language in supra notes 25 and 28, Rawlsianism is information-
ally somewhat richer than is utilitarianism.) For note that by distributing primary
goods -i.e., the raw materials which people use in pursuing their "life plans"-
rather than utilities, which the difference principle alone certainly does not dictate
(one could be a maximin welfarist), Rawls implicitly is leaving persons to their
own choices in building lives from raw materials. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note
22, at 80 ("Justice as fairness does not look behind the use which persons make of
the rights and opportunities available to them in order to measure, much less to
maximize, the satisfactions they achieve."). The problem, however, is that the
quantity of "primary good stuff" that Rawlsian citizens receive is not forthrightly
tied to or adjusted in response to what they are born with or what they do apart
from making their primal choice from behind the veil. Indeed, we might augment
the Arrovian objection noted supra note 74 and accompanying text, by observing
that some citizens might work very hard to earn 10x, and others might not work at
all to end up with x, and maximin nonetheless would seem to warrant leveling all
to 2x if such be possible. Ultimately, however, none of these criticisms is on en-
tirely solid ground, for Rawls himself seems to have left the matter of primary
goods-distribution theoretically underdetermined, inconsistently specified, or
both. See GERALD A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, How COME YOU'RE SO
RICH? 117-47 (2000); ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 166-85 (dis-
cussing primary goods, fundamental preferences and functioning); Gerald A.
Cohen, Incentives, Inequality and Community [hereinafter Cohen, Incentives], in
EQUAL FREEDOM, supra 22, at 331 (discussing arguments for and against inequal-
ity); Gerald A. Cohen, The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 12 SOc. PHIL. & POL'Y 160
(1995).
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is in the world we know a practical infinity of choices that every-
body makes over the course of a lifetime which actually bear upon
the ultimate size of the social aggregate to whose division justice
speaks.83 Justice to the principle of individual responsibility, then,
would seem to demand rather more than either the classical utili-
tarians, the Kaldor-Hicksians, or Rawls appear prepared to give.
84
If justice be the outcome of a sort of "social contract" (implicit or
otherwise), and if that contract as best specified in fact requires that
the day-to-day decisions and resultant actions for which the decid-
ers and the actors are properly accountable be charged to their
"justice-accounts" and appropriately recompensed, then all three
of the utilitarian, Kaldor-Hicksian, and Rawlsian social "contracts,"
minimal, risk-attitude-presumptive and otherwise informationally
impoverished as they are, look to be both radically and needlessly
overbroad and incomplete. Whatever our attitudes toward risk,
we've "contracted" for a good bit more.
2.3. An "Informationally Enriched," Risk-Attitude-Neutral & More
"Lawyerly" Account: Social Contribution & -Detraction Informa-
tion, More Complete (& Relational) Social Contracting, "Justice-
Accounting," Justice-Pertinent-Information-Impounding Markets
& Contingent Claiming
It is with the weaknesses of utilitarian, Kaldor-Hicksian and
Rawlsian justice in mind that this Article proposes its own sketch
of what an informationally adequate, risk-attitude-neutral, and
more finely meshed responsibility- and value-sensitive theory of
distributive justice should look like.85 By providing insufficient at-
83 See Arrow, Ordinalist-Utilitarian, supra note 74, at 259 ("Rawls is inexplicit
about... incentive effects"); DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 113
(observing that Rawls's "difference principle is not sufficiently fine-tuned in a va-
riety of ways."); id. at 114 (suggesting that distributive equality is better viewed as
"a matter of individual right rather than one of group position"); ROEMER,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 166 ("Rawls is unfortunately vague on the
relationship between labor choice and primary goods."); id. at 237 (noting that
personal responsibility is only "germinal" in the work of Rawls and Sen).
84 See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22. Much of the cited work is
devoted to elaborating a theory of equality that is "ambition-sensitive" without
being "endowment-sensitive." See id. at 108. I have tried to comprehensively
elaborate the complex conceptual linkages among ambition, choice, responsibility,
virtue, and fair distributive shares in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17.
85 The theory is more fully elaborated in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra
note 17. On informational sufficiency, see note 23 and 26, supra, and accompany-
ing text. On contribution and detraction-information, complete (and relational)
social contracting, justice accounting and contingent claiming, read on through
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tention to the plethora of individual choices, actions, and ulti-
mately habits which actually contribute to or detract from the
common weal or social aggregate-what we might call, broadly,
"social value" 86 - consequentialist and Rawlsian justice alike give
unnecessarily short shrift both to our disaggregated, day-to-day
moral responsibilities and, therefore, to the behavioral prerequi-
sites of value-productive efficiency. An optimally informed, suffi-
ciently textured theory of justice will integrate the concept of jus-
tice, as did the Greeks, with the virtues, or at any rate with such
behaviors as, particularly once they become dispositional, typically
are accounted virtuous.8 7 This, in turn, will link justice both to a
variety of social values - or, to be more precise, social "valueds" -
and to a variety of value-expressive and -conducive social prac-
tices. It will thus link justice to what, in the modem era, we might
call value-adding and value-expressing institutions, including mar-
kets, which in crucial part are normative (or norm-expressing or -
enforcing) hence rewarding (or penalizing) structures. (Note, in an-
ticipation of what follows infra, that risk-assumption is a service
this subsection.
86 Hopefully this will be appreciated by the scrupulous value-nominalist
(e.g., someone who is sympathetic to Little, supra note 27). The "social aggregate"
can be taken here merely as a facon de parler, a convenient means of connoting -
and usefully pool-analogizing-the familiar and intuitive idea that some actions
which people take are "constructive," "productive," "beneficial," or world-
improving (i.e., valuable and indeed valued, hence (and only in that sense) "add-
ing" to the "total" of "good" or "value" in the world), while other actions wreak a
contrary effect. No more objectionable metaphysic or ontic commitment need be
found here than that entailed by such familiar concepts as "value-added" (to "add
value" is simply to render more valuable), and by such familiar assertions as that
"there is at least one prime number between the numbers five and nine," "there is
at least one quality which that number possesses-the quality of being prime,"
etc. "To be is to be the value of a variable." See W. V. Quine, A Logistical Approach
to the Ontological Problem, 9 J. UNIFIED SCI. 1 (1940), reprinted in W. V. QUINE, THE
WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 64 (1966) (approaching questions in terms of
linguistic questions regarding the line between names and syncategormatic ex-
pressions).
87 For more on "the Greeks" and their linking of justice to the virtues, refer to:
SUSAN BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE (1991); NANCY SHERMAN, MAKING A
NECESSITY OF VIRTUE: ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON VIRTUE (1997); ALISDAIR MACINTYRE,
A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS (1967) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, ETHICS]; MACINTYRE,
VIRTUE, supra note 22; A.W. ADKINS, MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK
VALUES (1960). It is not the case that we do or ought to see precisely the same traits
as virtuous as did the Greeks; we do see some, as did they. Nor is it the case that
we do or ought to conflate virtue or merit with hereditary social status as did the
Greeks at times. The point here is only that justice and virtue are deeply bound
up with each other.
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that we value and reward by the payment of insurance premiums.)
An adequate account of justice therefore also will link justice to a
form of implicit, ongoing, and relational "contracting" -i.e., to sets
of desired and generally compensated actions and sets of legiti-
mate expectations to which such actions give rise -which is much
more "complete" than Rawls' social contract. What I shall call
"productive virtue," then, provides a conceptually and empirically,
social-interpretively rich, operationally suggestive, and heretofore
missing critical link between modern justice and efficiency, and in
so doing serves to mediate between social-contractual rights-based
and deserts-based justice on the one hand, wealth-(broadly conceived
wealth-) maximizing consequentialism on the other.88 Here, more
precisely, is how.
On the theory here offered, justice is best understood, if crudely
described, as (baseline-) "equality plus or minus merit"89-i.e.,
88 "Wealth" here means something broader, fuller, and richer than the cur-
rently popular notion of wealth valued by money. See the remainder of this sub-
section; see also supra note 82; infra, and accompanying text. Because income-risk
is the focus of this Article, it is largely concerned with what happens to be a
money-valuable form of wealth.
As for "productive virtue," note that although this is not the standard ex-
pected use of it, there has been what nonetheless is an instructive revival in con-
temporary moral theory of so-called "virtue ethics," generally presented as an al-
ternative to rights or justice-based "deontic," or "deontological" theories, such as
that of Rawls, and consequentialist (including utilitarian) theories. See, e.g.,
Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, supra note 25 (often credited with having re-
vitalized the movement); PETER GEACH, THE VIRTUES (1977); PHILIPPA FOOT,
VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); MACINTYRE, VIRTUE, supra note 22; L. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP,
ALTRUISM AND MORALITY (1980); MICHAEL SLOTE, FROM MORALITY TO VIRTUE (1992);
NOMOS XXXIV: VIRTUE (John W. Chapman & William A. Galton eds. 1992); JULIA
ANNAS, THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1993); VIRTUE ETHICS (Roger Crisp & Michael
Slote eds. 1997); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); PETER
BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1999); THOMAS
HURKA, VIRTUE, VICE, AND VALUE (2001). These works support my interest in the
virtues, even if not always my return of the justice-focus to an embrace of the con-
cept of virtue. An advantage of the theory is that it does not treat rights, conse-
quences and virtues as strict alternatives or simple all-important Archimedean
points, but as jointly (i.e., equally) essential and deeply interdependent features of a
complete moral theory. I reject reductively deontological, consequentialist, and vir-
tue-based approaches to ethics in favor of a comprehensive justice theory that
analytically inter-relates all three.
89 Or desert. Desert and merit sometimes are distinguished. See, e.g., MILLER,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 125 (giving a contemporary definition of the term
merit as a person's admirable qualities and of desert as something more specific
for when someone is responsible for a certain result); J. R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 166
(1980) (distinguishing merit and desert, using merit to refer to a man's personal
qualities and desert to the deeds he has done); J. R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 124-26
(1993) (defining merit as a feature that forms the basis for a rational decision and
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equal (or equalized-e.g., compensated) initial endowments of
benefit and burden, including opportunity and risk, all departures
from which must subsequently be justified by reference to produc-
tive virtue or productive vice. 90 The latter are such generally incul-
desert as something tied to an action) [hereinafter LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY]; MICHAEL
YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 94 (Penguin Books ed. 1961) (1958) ("Merit
= IQ + Effort."). Merit, on these accounts, pertains more to inherent (either innate
or family/social class-related) physiological traits or status, and desert to deeds
for which agents actually are responsible. I by and large combine the two to-
gether, on the theory that we all share inherent status as fundamental rights-
bearers. We are all "aristocrats" now, all of us "noble" by dint of our humanity.
The only real distinction is that deserts generally pertain to persons as merits gen-
erally do to deeds (and other impersonal entities, for that matter). Persons de-
serve, things merit or warrant. (e.g., "You deserve a fair hearing," while "your
idea merits/warrants consideration.") A person deserves yp if (but not only if) her
deed merits yp. A person need not deserve only by dint of a deed's merit, how-
ever, a person deserves initial ("starting gate" or "baseline") equality simply by
dint of being a person (herein the force of our all being "aristocrats," "noble," pos-
sessed of "human dignity"). That desert is a fundamental right, a "status right,"
one might say. On desert as a "status concept," see infra note 112; Hockett, Mar-
ket-Able Justice, supra note 17; and GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITrINGNESS 35-48
(1996). Deserts can be grounded in meritorious deeds or rightful status, and in-
deed the basic deservingness of persons whose deeds are meritorious is itself a
matter of right. For a discussion of moral deserts further contrasting Rawls's the-
ory and then rejecting it see Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17; infra,
notes 106 and 117.
It might be worth noting the relation between deserts and merits on the one
hand, virtues and vices on the other. Deserts and merits stand to virtues and vices
much as acts stand to rules. There is thus a link between individual deserts and
virtues analogous to that between "direct" or "act-utilitarianism" and "indirect"
or "rule-utilitarianism" as described supra, note 81-a link explored further infra,
note 126. I tend to emphasize virtue more in the present work when I am looking
more to the "macro" level of our institutions than the "micro" level of our indi-
viduated deeds. We tend to count as virtuous such persons as generally act in a
manner (or in manners) deserving of praise and reward, whose deeds merit the
same. Those who generally act in a manner(s) deserving of opprobrium and pun-
ishment we tend to count as vicious, whose deeds merit the same.
90 Equality of "initial endowments" alternatively may be described as "start-
ing gate" equality, a presumption in favor of equality that is rebuttable by show-
ings of deservingness or virtue or fault on the parts of those whose allotments are
being compared, "equality of opportunity" or "equality of resources." See COHEN,
SELF-OWNERSHIP, supra note 22; DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22 at 65-
119 (discussing the competing claims of equality of resources); ROEMER,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22 at 263-315; ROEMER, OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22
(organizing disparate views about equal opportunity); ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL
JUSTICE 17-195 (1991) ("presumption"); HUGO A. BEDAU, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 155
(1971). There is no need to explore subtle differences among such conceptions,
but all of them, if they are to be theoretically adequate and not mere "second
bests," must be read as insisting upon a form of dynamic or diachronic equality.
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 86-90. That is, there is not simply
one starting gate, opportunity, presumption, or primal act of resource-division.
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cated, habituated, often indeed self-constitutive, and ultimately
chosen or novated behaviors as contribute to or detract from social
well-being or wealth.91
Initial equality, prior to the actions for which agents can rea-
sonably be held responsible or to account, is dictated by that im-
partiality or fairness that virtually all theories of justice take in one
way or another as central to the concept. 92 Such "starting gate"
Rather, such metaphors must be taken simply to convey the idea that no inequali-
ties or increments of inequality (no differentials) through time not traceable to
voluntary choices are justly to be tolerated. See generally, Hockett, Market-Able
Justice, supra note 17. The equalizing task entailed by these conceptions when
adequately construed implicates the conceptually aligned problems of value-
pluralism, indexing, and commensuration. See notes 44, 77-82, 99, 331-39 and ac-
companying text on these matters. Though it does not seem to be remarked in the
literature, the technical difficulties attendant upon those allied problems and what
implicitly strikes different authors as the best means of dealing with them might
account in considerable measure for the subtle differences among the cited con-
ceptions of suitable baseline equality. See generally, Hockett, Deep Grammar, su-
pra note 70.
91 "Ultimately chosen" means ultimately holding people responsible for con-
forming to or departing from the norms that we consider virtuous. In light of dif-
fering beliefs in the realms of philosophical or empirical psychology, societies
may draw different boundary lines separating the (endogenously) willed and the
(exogenously) compelled, but the point is that of the two, that which is considered
virtuous will fall on the side encompassing choice, responsibility, and account-
ability.
On "social well-being or wealth," social value in most, if not all modern socie-
ties, is plural in nature. My proposed theory of justice must reconcile justice with
the foundations underlying philosophical pluralism and incommensurabilism, as
well as "Arrow's Theorem" and its variations. See ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra
note 45. I must also deal with "objectionable preferences" of the sort that vitiate
welfarist forms of consequentialism such as utilitarianism. See supra note 22. I
have already analyzed literature on pluralism, incommensurabilism and social
choice, arguing that value pluralists, incommensurabilists and self-purported Ar-
rovians generally press their intuitions much further than considered judgment
actually warrants. I have further elaborated how market-completion and de facto
indexing through trade can greatly facilitate the "monetization" and pricing, thus
mensuration, of contributive and detractive action without objectionably "alienat-
ing" or "marketizing" personal values. Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note
17; Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 70. Because the present essay is con-
cerned principally with the simpler subject of justly distributing systemic risk to
incomes, it should be assumed as already monetized and objectionable prefer-
ence-laundered that social aggregate or well-being with which we are here con-
cerned, can be understood in terms of valuable labor income.
92 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 257 (H. Rackham ed. 1934)
(1926) ("'The just' therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or
fair."); IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITrEN (1790), trans-
lated by PATON, supra note 58; ACKERMAN, supra note 22 (nobody "better than"
anyone else); BARRY, IMPARTIALITY, supra note 22, at 28-79 (justice as "impartiality,"
and "mutual advantage"); COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, supra note 22 (justice as
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equality is what ought to be, and generally is, construed a "funda-
mental right." ("All men are created equal, and endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights, . . ."93) Before we distin-
guish ourselves from one another by our justice-accountable deeds,
we are indistinguishable in the eyes of justice, and thus deserving
of the same treatment, resources, opportunities, and risks-or at
any rate of roughly equally weighted "baskets" of such benefits
and burdens. In a word, we are initially deserving of equal regard.
94
We begin with equality.95
"equality of access to advantage"); DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at
263-7 (justice as requirement that persons be "treated as equals"); HARE, supra
note 29, at 35-36 (all moral language essentially involving "universalizability," for
example, no use of "singular terms," i.e., proper names); RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra
note 22, at 3-53 (justice as "fairness," playing no favorites); SEN, ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY, supra note 18, at 203-209 (justice as "equality of capabilities"); Bernard
Williams, The Idea of Equality, PHILOSOPHY POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Peter Laslett &
W. G. Runciman eds., 1962) (2d Series 1969), reprinted in BERNARD WILLIAMS,
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 230 (1973); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991);
Thomas Nagel, Equality, 1978 CRITERION 1, reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 106 (1979); Harry G. Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 1
(1987) reprinted in HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE
ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 134 (1988).
93 The U.S. Declaration of Independence pmbl. (1776). The "and," is subject
to the ejusdum generis canon; it associates equality and rights together, rather than
simply joining them ad seriatum as disparate matters on a "laundry list."
94 DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22.
95 It is presumably for this reason that so few scholars take seriously the work
of Nozick as an account of justice (as distinguished from a provocative meditation
on the very idea of "distributive justice"). NOZICK, supra note 18. Nozick rejects
what he calls "patterned," i.e. distributive, conceptions of justice (which include
Rawlsian justice, utilitarianism, and welfare economics by his lights). He argues
that the category of justice ought rather to be construed as historical in nature,
pertaining to the method by which one has acquired title to that which she pos-
sesses. Id. at 149-60. Within this framework, he pays a limited form of obeisance
to "baseline" equality by requiring, that one is only justified in appropriating re-
sources from the natural environment ("to" in note 96, infra) for her exclusive use
if in so doing she will leave no one worse off than had she left the resources un-
appropriated. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett
ed., 1967) (1741). Locke also would have imposed a non-waste requirement upon
the appropriator. Id. Note that both the Lockean and the Nozickian proviso in-
volve patterning. This means we cannot limit ourselves to historical conceptions
of justice before history has got underway (i.e., at to); history must at least begin at
and proceed from some baseline distribution, i.e., pattern. But no sooner does
Nozick offer this rough Paretian-faimess, baseline equality, proviso, but proceeds
to argue that all succeeding patterns of distribution proceeding from these acqui-
sitions via uncoerced transfers are just; implying by dint of the allocation of his
argument-time that such would essentially be the world we actually inhabit were it
not for the redistributive taxation that so exercises him -as if, that is, his proviso
in fact had been met! But of course the proviso, even assuming that it were an ap-
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But it is also a fundamental right subsequently (i.e., on the other
"side" of the "baseline,") to be rewarded and penalized, differentially,
in accordance with such differential voluntary, valued or dis-
valued, virtuous or vicious deeds for which we reasonably can be
held responsible or to account-hence, in accordance with our
"just deserts" and thus, ultimately, with our productive virtues
and vices.96 That too is mandated by equal regard for persons as re-
propriate account of that baseline equality or impartiality that justice requires, is
not met in the world that we actually inhabit. As a matter of actual history, the
first acquisitions from which our current distributions descend cannot be said to
have rendered nobody worse off than they would have been had the acquisitions
not been made (or seized). More crucially, of course, there is no reason to accept
the proviso itself in any event as a satisfactory account of baseline equality, for it
impermissibly assumes that the baseline from which to measure the "worse off" /"not worse off" comparison is non-ownership rather than joint ownership, joint
ownership being any departure from which people would have to bargain for
separate allotments with the co-owners. See generally COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP,
supra note 22, at 19-143 (arguing that self-ownership and equality of condition are
compatible and explores an alternative to Nozick's theory about the external
world that it is jointly owned by everyone, with each having a veto over its pro-
spective use); ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 205-35 (challenging
Nozick's theory of justice by arguing that prisitine natural resources are jointly
owned in common); Allan Gibbard, Natural Property Rights, in LEFr-
LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS, THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 23 (Peter Vallantyne
& Hillel Steiner eds. 2000) (advocating a private property arrangement where
agents have an initial equal right to use external resources but no right to appro-
priate without the consent of others); JAMES. 0. GRUNEBAUM, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
80-85 (1987) (rejecting Nozick's state of nature justification of private ownership);
HILELL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994) (arguing that for a set of rights to be
just they must at least be mutually consistent); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY 253-83 (1988) (exploring some difficulties with Nozick's theory
of historical entitlement). On Nozick's flaws more generally, see Hockett, Life is a
Race, Which Nozick Ran Well (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author)
[hereinafter Hockett, Life is a Race].
96 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 92 (describing the relations among deserts, merits
and virtues or vices). On this account of justice I am at least at the present level of
abstraction, refuting the traditional distinction between so-called "distributive"
and "retributive" (not to mention "corrective") justice. On "corrective" justice, see
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361-406 (1992) (stating that corrective justice
responds to losses by wrongdoing, by imposing a duty on individuals to repair).
Likewise, "substantive" and "procedural" justice. Finally, of that between what
Nozick calls "patterned" and "historical," "entitlement" conceptions of justice.
NozicK, supra note 18, at 153. Justice is all about impartiality at to, when the activ-
ity subject to justice-evaluation begins, followed by subsequently earned depar-
tures from that baseline, in the form of benefits and burdens at t1, t2,... tn. One
may earn benefits -favorable distributions or burdens -unfavorable distribu-
tions. Since "earning" is determined by valuation of one's deeds, and since val-
ues-as valued by those who reward or penalize actions-are all that are meant
by the term "substance" in discourse on "substantive justice," so-called "proce-
dural" justice has always to do with justice at the "starting gate," at "to." They are
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sponsible agents. Distributions therefore are rightful and just, on
the theory I am advocating, insofar and only insofar as they reward
virtue, penalize vice, and thus conduce-because virtues con-
duce- to aggregate social well-being, or wealth. The "insofar" en-
tails deserts-grounded recompense. The "only insofar" entails
baseline-or "starting gate" -equality. Any inequalities not thus
chargeable to the "virtue-" and "vice-accounts" of individuals are
perforce unjust and, through their erosion of productive incentives,
actually tend to diminish aggregate well-being.
97
It bears emphasis that justice and efficiency, rather than consti-
tuting simple substitutes or "trade-offs," 98 are in considerable
therefore synonymous with simple "fairness" or "equal treatment." That is, pro-
cedures do not implicate substantive values other than those of fairness or equal
treatment itself, hence do not implicate the idea of "earning" or justified depar-
tures from baseline, and are required in justice to afford nothing other than fair-
ness or equality of treatment.
Note that I am hereby committing myself to the possibility of a "right to pun-
ishment," a notion often attributed to Kant and thought idiosyncratic. I hope that
the present argument will make clear why that is not really so odd a locution. The
perceived oddity is the joint product of: a) its being "natural," as it were by defi-
nition, for one not to desire what we call "punishment," and b) our adversarial liti-
gation- and homo economicus-influenced contemporary culture's assumption that it
is also natural for parties to be more concerned that their preferences be satisfied
(with "winning") than that rights be respected or that justice be done, hence to
run rights and desires together. Since we tend to think of rights as things (or
claims to things) that we want, and since we tend to self-interestedly think of jus-
tice, when it dictates outcomes contrary to our own self-interest self-interestedly,
as something "natural" (and therefore in some sense even legitimate, and there-
fore "justified") not to want, it rings peculiar to suggest that one might have a
right to that which justice requires but which we do not prefer for unjust, unjusti-
fied and self-aggrandizing reasons -prefer.
There is substantial psychological literature on the therapeutic nature of pun-
ishment among those who believe that their unjust behavior makes them deserv-
ing of punishment, as well as faced by those who have evaded punishment de-
spite their guilt. The subject also has made for some very great art. See, e.g.,
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 81; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET,
PRINCE OF DENMARK (Folger ed. 1979 [15xx/16xx]); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, KING OF SCOTLAND (Folger ed. 1978 [15xx/16xx]). Some of
these lessons seem to have found their way into the "corrective or community jus-
tice" movement. Perhaps we find here further evidence, then, of a sort of "hard-
wired" or at any rate "cognitivist" understanding of, and even need for, justice.
For more on that possible "wiring" and "cognitivism," see sources cited supra note
18; infra notes 99, 126.
97 See infra notes 101-102 and Section 4.3, for a partial caveat to and further
discussion on this point. On "aggregate well-being," see supra notes 88 and 91.
On incentives and their erosion, see sources cited supra note 18; infra Section 4.3.
98 See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF
(1975); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 93-124 (3d ed. 2000);
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
measure essential complements mediated by virtue. Insofar as
benefits and burdens accrue to truly voluntary actions, as distinct
from accidental personal characteristics such as innate capacities
(e.g., handicaps or talents) and parental wealth or status, all of
which must in justice be roughly equalized through endowment-
compensation or -adjustment, a distribution cannot be efficient
unless it be just (and vice versa), while neither efficiency nor justice
may be obtained absent what ends up being the general rewarding
(or "incenting") of virtue and penalizing (or "disincenting") of vice
through the social-economy's responsibility-sensitive incentive
structure.99
DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO
POLICY 67-71 (3d ed. 1990); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989). If efficiency refers only to monetary wealth maximiza-
tion, irrespective of means, then the interests of justice and efficiency might con-
flict. Dworkin contends that in such cases "efficiency" is not really a value as dis-
tinct from a fetish. See generally Dworkin, Efficiency, supra note 41. One of the
burdens assigned to the publication is to show that efficiency understood in ac-
cord with the term's lay meaning, is in fact in considerable measure complemen-
tary to justice. See also Roland B~nabou, Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital In-
vestment: The Local Connection, 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 237-64 (1996); Roland B~nabou,
Meritocracy, Redistribution, and the Size of the Pie, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 317-39 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Arrow et al.,
MERITOCRACY].
Only insofar as talents or handicaps enter into productivity, can justice and
efficiency diverge. An important analogue, which lies at the heart of the present
essay's concerns, arises in the case of just and efficient insurance as expounded
infra Section 4.3. Efficiency as maximization might dictate risk classification that
renders insurance unjust when the risk at issue is not controllable by virtuous be-
havior. A canonical case would be a genetic predisposition to disease. Apart
from this prospect of talent/effort, innate-risk/fault divergence, justice and effi-
ciency are extensionally equivalent. Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17.
A (or rather, "the") fundamental "justice-accounting" question, becomes the de-
gree to which we can sort out the behavior or choice based sources of benefit and
burden (including risk) production and avoidance, and "innate" sources of the
same. The markets proposed at infra Sections 5 and 6 are meant in part to facili-
tate the discovery of this justice-crucial information-at least in the realm of in-
come-risk via the workings of new price-discovery mechanisms.
99 Several other writers, with varying degrees of explicitness, have drawn
some links between justice, merit, and social value, usually by undrawn implica-
tion, efficiency as well. Professor Sen does so tentatively in the introductory chap-
ter to a recent collection of essays edited by Professors Arrow, Bowles, and Dur-
lauf. See Arrow et al., MERITOCRACY, supra note 98, at 5-16. David Miller provides
an unsystematic, overinclusive, and ultimately unsatisfactory melange account of
justice in MILLER, PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, and MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note
22, at 17-153 (Miller includes "need" as a source alternative to equality and desert
of valid justice claims; but it is clear that need implicates justice as distinguished
from charity only insofar as it is rooted in differential initial endowments). Joseph
H. Carens's work is quite intriguing, but his prescriptions rest ultimately upon an
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It is also worth noting that, as with Rawls' (and Harsanyi's
unnecessary and likely futile hope to restructure incentives wholesale in the direc-
tion of full altruism. See JOSEPH H. CARENS, EQUALITY, MORAL INCENTIVES, AND THE
MARKET: AN ESSAY IN UTOPIAN POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORY (1981) (proposing an
egalitarian politico-economic system where utilization of the market is combined
with equal distribution of income by making use of moral incentives). Alisdair
MacIntyre, in the two monographs cited supra note 22, engages in a good deal of
provocative and pessimistic but ultimately misguided discussion of the impossi-
bility of coherent accounts of justice in societies, like ours, in which the Greek con-
cept of a practice has, as he alleges, been lost; this discussion certainly implicates
links between justice, merit, and social value. Dworkin is at least attentive (quite
so) to some important links between justice, responsibility (in the forms of "ambi-
tion" and accountability for what we might term the "social opportunity-costs"
that one's consumption choices impose upon others) and market value (via Walra-
sian auctions). DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22. It is part of my task to
draw out further and generalize these and a number of what seem to me to be
important related links, in particular that with efficiency.
As the previous footnote highlighted, insofar (and only insofar) as innate tal-
ents and handicaps enter into productivity, justice and efficiency can diverge.
Where we speak of efforts, hence incentives, however, the two goals are on my
theory fully reconcilable. I treat incentives and their significance in considerable
detail in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17. Serviceable surveys and syn-
theses of recent work done in this area in the economics literature include JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-
AGENT MODEL (2002) (note that, as will become clearer in the remainder of this
subpart, on my theory members of society are reciprocally "principals" and
"agents" to each other); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
(2000); DONALD E. CAMPBELL, INCENTIVES: MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION (1995); James Mirrlees, Information and Incentives: The Economics of
Carrots and Sticks, 107 ECON. J. 444 (1971); see also JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN
TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION (1993); Samuel
Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Does Schooling Raise Earnings by Making People Smarter?,
in Arrow et al., MERITOCRACY, supra note 98, at 118 (contending that schooling con-
tributes more to "incentive-enhancing preferences" than to actual cognitive abil-
ity).
Incentives, regrettably, do not appear to have figured prominently in the phi-
losophic literature. I attempt to remedy that in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, su-
pra note 17. Other work includes CARENS, supra; Cohen, Incentives, supra note 82,
reprinted in EQUAL FREEDOM, supra note 22, at 331 (largely, alas, toeing the Carens
line); Sen, Interpersonal Comparisons, supra note 36, at 291 (arguing that entitlement
and instrumental arguments for distributions, the latter of which would embrace
incentive arguments, must be distinguished). Sen's assertion is surely correct, but
it also should be bome in mind that entitlements are determined in considerable -
indeed, decisive -measure by institutions (e.g., promising, contracting, being paid,
etc.). These institutions, in turn, generally take the forms that they do-or to in-
clude the rewards and penalties that they do with a view to the additive and de-
tractive effects on the social welfare that they will bring about. For an additional
discussion on the "positive" and "evolutionary" nature of institutions and their
more normative and conceptual (indeed probably tautological) relations to so-
cially additive and detractive behavior, see infra, this subsection.
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"veiled" utilitarian) account of justice,100 one can discern an im-
plicit contractual structure embedded in the theory here offered.
Indeed, the contractual nature of this theory is rather more trans-
parent and empirically grounded than is Rawls's (and Harsanyi's).
Recall that justice on my account, like that of the ancients, is under-
stood to be the giving of every person her "due"'101-her deserts.
That due begins - at each person's birth - with the right to baseline
equality before the deeds-based "deserts-earning game" gets un-
derway. The due- the "justice-" or "deserts-account" - then em-
braces subsequently earned deserts, themselves rights, to subse-
quent departures from the baseline earned through voluntary,
reponsible, productively virtuous or vicious (i.e., consequentially
value-adding or -detracting) behavior. Now note that this post-
starting gate "deserts-earning game" bears an essentially contrac-
tual, reciprocal, exchanging, quid pro quo or tit-for-tat structure. 02
100 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 12 ("The principles of Justice are cho-
sen behind a veil of ignorance").
101 See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 28 (H. Rackham trans. 1931) ("Justice, then,
is giving every man that which is his due."); ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, at 257
("Now the term 'unjust' is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and
the man who takes more than his due, the unfair man."). See generally ADKINS, su-
pra note 87, at 38-43; MACINTYRE, ETHICS, supra note 87, at 136; TERRENCE IRWIN,
PLATO'S ETHICS 155-64 (1995).
102 There is a vast literature, originating in a number of generally segregated
disciplines that supports the fundamentality of symmetry and reciprocity. Some
of this literature centers upon reciprocity as the basis of social cooperation, while
other strands focus on exchange relations as the root of perceived fairness and jus-
tice. These two concepts appear themselves to be closely aligned. Rawls, for ex-
ample, is concerned with what he calls "Schemes of Cooperation," "Social Union,"
and "Morality of Association." RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 211-16, 520-29,
467-72 respectively. There is also a distinct strand of reciprocity thinking in com-
munitarian literature, and to some extent the "law and social norms" literature.
However, the latter, insofar as it construes social norms of conformities, tends to
play the "take" of reciprocity a bit more than the "give." See generally ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS] and sources cited in the bibliography thereto. It thus looks to be rather
more a ruthless completion of the "law & economics" program than a competing
mode of understanding.
First, for the sociological literature on "exchange theory." See, e.g., Wil Arts &
Romke van der Veen, Sociological Approaches to Distributive and Procedural Justice
[hereinafter Sociological Approaches], in Scherer, supra note 18, at 143-176; MARCEL
BARRIERE, ESSAI SUR LE DONJUANISME CONTEMPORAIN (1922), available in English as
MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans. 1990) (an anthropological precursor); PETER M. BLAU,
EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE (1964); Peter M. Blau, Justice in Social Ex-
change, 34 Soc. INQUIRY 193 (1982) [hereinafter Justice in Exchange]; K.S. Cook &
K.A. Hegtvedt, Justice and Power: An Exchange Analysis, in JUSTICE IN SOCIAL
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RELATIONS 19-41 (H.W. Bierhoff et al. eds. 1986); K.S. Cook & K.A. Hegtvedt, Dis-
tributive Justice, Equity and Equality, 9 ANN. REV. Soc. 217-41 (1983); George C.
Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. Soc. 597-606 (1958); George. C.
Homans, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (rev'd. ed. 1974); see also
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971).
For the social psychological literature on "equity theory" see generally the de-
rived from the work of Blau and Homans, supra. ARISTOTLE, supra note 92. See,
e.g., J. Stacey Adams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 422 (1963); J. Stacey Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (Leonard Berkowitz ed. 1965) [hereinafter
Inequity in Exchange]; M.A. HOGG & D. ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES (1988); ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: EQUITY THEORY: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL INTERACI'ION (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds. 1976); Elaine Wal-
ster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 151,
152 (1973) ("Outcomes" are "the positive and negative consequences that a scruti-
neer perceives a participant has incurred as a consequence of his relationship with
another." "Inputs" are "the participant's contributions to the exchange, which are
seen by a scrutineer as entitling him to rewards or costs." "Positive" inputs are
"assets," "negative" inputs "liabilities"); Elaine Walster & G. William Walster, Eq-
uity and Social Justice, 31 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 21 (1975); ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY:
THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978); P. W. Blumstein & Eugene A. Weinstein, The Redress
of Distributive Inequity, 74 AM. J. SOc. 408 (1969) (analyzing productivity-harming
responses to perceived unjust treatment).
Third, for the literature (some of it classified as "economic," some "political,"
some "biological," etc.) on evolutionary game theory, see, e.g., ROBERT M.
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND
COLLABORATION (1997); BINMORE, supra note 22; FRONTIERS OF GAME THEORY (Ken
Binmore et al. eds. 1996); HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-
CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR (2000); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); HERBERT SCHARPF, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY: AGENT-
CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH (1998); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); TIHOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR (1978); JORGEN W. WEIBULL, EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (1995);
H. PEYTON YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1998). Intriguingly, this literature to some
extent calls into question exogenous preferences as discussed supra, note 76.
Fourth, for the "experimental economics" (originally psychological or socio-
logical) literature on the roles of real and perceived fairness, free-riding, dictating
and ultimatum-issuing in reciprocation, bargaining and other game-theoretic set-
tings, see, e.g., John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111-194 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 1995) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS]; Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Ex-
periments, in EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, id. at 253-348; see also Binmore, supra note
22.
Fifth, for the "law & social norms" literature, catalogued as of 2000, see
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra. Finally, for some of the canonical "com-
munitarian" and "social capital" literature, see, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.,
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985);
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Justice, once we're past "square one," has to do with kinds of trading.
Schematically, the structure of the "deserts game" unfolds thus:
"If I/you do 5, then you/I are/am to expect, have reason to expect,
have a right to expect-"it is right" so to expect-have earned, de-
serve, s." Any movement from a neutral baseline that precedes an
interaction-i.e., the commencement of any transaction-
implicates, or engages this fundamental social structure. (Such
transactional baselines, of course, emerge, are passed, subside, then
re-emerge. If you say "hello" to me, I am expected to reply. But
you need not reply to my reply unless my reply calls for it. If it
doesn't, we've returned to baseline.) It should be kept in mind that
the 6/ relation need not always be person-to-person, even if it
generally is so. Where risk is potentially involved with one's de-
serts, for example, one might "bargain with" (or "tempt") "fate"; if
I know or have reason to know that by doing 6 1 affect the likelihood
of s, for example, then to the degree (and only to the degree) that I
know or have reason to know that, my doing 6 can be said to war-
rant, and I can be said to deserve, F. That fate will be among my
"just deserts." I might also, of course, be able to trade the bearing of
the risk of e to another person. If I pay that person a "premium,"
for example, that person herself "deserves" -has contracted for
and undertaken to bear -the risk of s, should it come to pass. In
such cases I shall refer to F as the act of bearing the risk, and use a
new variable, y, to designate the risk-the eventuality borne-
itself.
The ongoing, reciprocal nature of the deserts-earning game
renders it formally equivalent to a manner of relational contract
comprising an indefinitely extended sequence of what in legal par-
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMICS (1988);
AMITAI ETZIONI, SOCIO-ECoNOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNETHESIS (1991); FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREASTION OF PROSPERITY (1995);
MACINTYRE, VIRTUE, supra note 22; ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNTIY (2001); ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); SANDEL, supra note
22; MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY (1996); UNGER, supra note 76; WALZER, supra note 22.
In this connection, Pareto gradually converted from being an "economist"
simpliciter to being a "sociologist" because the former approach was entirely too
simple. See, e.g., PARETO, MIND & SOCIETY, supra note 43. A similar dissatisfaction
(in this case with "law and economics") seems to underlie the movement toward
interest in "law and social norms." See POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra. In
the idiom of the present essay, we might say that such stories are cases of a per-
ceived need for more "informationally enriched" accounts of the phenomena un-
der consideration.
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lance often are termed "expectancies" and "considerations" (one
"expects" E "in consideration of" 6). The contractual nature of this
picture of ongoing reciprocal exchange behavior is both more
plainly "contractual" -at least in the workaday lawyer's sense, and
surely the economist's as well'
03 - and more empirically plausible
than that put forth by Rawls (and Harsanyi).104 Rawls's "con-
tract" is, first, a "one-off" affair, amounting to a single, forthrightly
fictitious, primal decision said ultimately to guide society's distri-
bution of benefits and burdens once and for all; it doesn't matter
what people subsequently do.'0 5 But a society's (at least a largely
privately ordered society's) distribution of benefits and burdens
continually shifts -just like the credits and debits to accounts main-
tained by, and/or held with, financial intermediaries and other
firms-through the ongoing exchange relations engaged in by its
members over time. There are generally as many shifts as there
are transactions or interactions, and it is arbitrary, mistaken, or
both to assume that these interactions themselves do not implicate
the question of justice. The real justice question-what we might
call the necessary "micro-justice" question-is the degree to which
each of these shifts, each of these completed transactions, is distribu-
tively just. It is a question of ongoing justice-accounting, thus of an
ongoing relational justice-contract applied to the terms of these on-
going exchanges. Rawls's single, once-for-all, "macro"-contract is
unnecessarily and vitiatingly insensitive to this dynamic, ever-
changing micro-texture. It simply does not include such mani-
festly justice-pertinent information among its terms.
06
103 See Bernard Salani6, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer (1997) (5th ed.
2002) (1994).
104 We might even draw an analogy between the relation in which this theory
stands to that of Rawls, on the one hand, and that in which "behavioral law &
economics" and "law & social norms" stand to "law & economics" on the other.
But I would not wish to push the analogy very far.
105 See RAWLS, JusTICE, supra note 22; see also discussion supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
106 The starkest symptom- and the likely cause - of Rawls's failing here is his
altogether unsatisfactory treatment of moral desert. See supra note 82; infra, note
117. Rawls appears to have been so enamored with the idea of justice as the out-
come of a single rational choice, or one-time veiled bargain, that he scarcely at-
tended to moral desert at all. One cannot help but think he simply brushed it off
because it didn't fit into the "veil" picture that had been his focal point. Perhaps
he saw the social contractarian tradition as the only immediately apparent alterna-
tive to the then-dominant utilitarian. I offer this diagnosis only because Rawls's
book is otherwise so immensely impressive, so thoroughly considered as regards
to other matters, that one cannot attribute the short-shrifting of desert to mere in-
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Rawls's contract is, secondly, only degenerately contractual
(at least insofar as contracts are essentially reciprocal in nature), in
that the decision under the veil is construed to be that which any
rational individual would make under uncertainty. It is less the lit-
eral product of actual reciprocation and exchange than it is the out-
come of a (highly risk-aversive) rational choice algorithm, said to
characterize the decision of a single, ideal agent.1 07 (This is of
course a central reason for the presumptive-risk-aversion objection
to Rawls's social contract. It is not only that he presumes "infinite"
risk aversion, but also that he assumes that everyone would pur-
chase what I am calling the very same "insurance policy.") Again,
the account of justice that I offer here would look to be more per-
spicuously contractual -because reciprocal-in nature than
Rawls's. The account is both more realistically dynamic and "rela-
tional," and more forthrightly symmetrical than Rawls's.
The contract also is, in this connection, more "complete" than is
Rawls's.1°8 Because of its continuous unfolding and its overarching
structural governance of ongoing trans-temporal exchange rela-
tions or transactions among persons-that is, because it is norma-
tively binding upon each element in the ongoing sequence of ex-
changes or transactions over time-the theory's conception of
justice "remains active," as it, were, ever watchful over all ex-
changes, formal and de facto, over time as persons engage in
countless behaviors and take countless decisions that affect others
and, thus, the social aggregate or commonweal.1 09
Though the contract is more complete than Rawls's, I empha-
size that it nonetheless is inherently and necessarily "incomplete"
capacity. Once we recognize the centrality of moral desert to an adequate account
of justice, we can move beyond the "starting gate" and take account of the dy-
namic, ongoing import of justice, at all (including subsequent) positions. If we fail
to take them equally seriously as agents who are responsible for their own differ-
entially deserving deeds, then we fail to account for relevant, i.e., justice-pertinent
equality.
107 See supra text accompanying note 86 (mentioning "social aggregate").
108 In this connection it is worth noting: "Justice as fairness is not a complete
contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the
choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including prin-
ciples for all the virtues and not only for justice." RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at
17. My own system does not envisage a contract as to what shall count as virtu-
ous - it too is incomplete in that sense - but it does include provisions to the effect
that virtuous actions are to be recompensed.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 96, 99, and 102 (describing a theory of
justice in which the base-line equality of individuals is continually offset by activi-
ties producing virtue and vice).
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in the sense articulated by practitioners of the new institutional
economics ("NIE").110 (That is part of what "relational contracting"
as modeled by the NIE is, after all- a means of dealing with neces-
sarily incomplete contracts rendered necessarily incomplete by in-
complete information, or uncertainty, about the future."') The so-
cial contract proffered here is incomplete in the sense that what
count as benefits and burdens, values and disvalues (or "valueds"
and "disvalueds") -hence what count as productive virtues and
vices-are determined as such by societies and sub-societal institu-
tions, such as prize-carrying games, sanction-bearing norms, pay-
ment-awarding markets, and so on. In the terms of the 6/E relation
noted earlier, the 5's and a's are variant among societies and sub-
societal institutions across space and over time; the basic 6/E "con-
tract schema" is therefore, and in this sense, "unsaturated" or "in-
complete." This degree of incompleteness seems desirable if we
are to allow for some degree of exogeneity of individual and social
valuation across space and over time.
112
110 The NIE is concerned with the organizational implications and conse-
quences of transaction costs, agency costs, information failures (both in regard to
future contingencies -risk and uncertainty-in general and in regard to hidden
knowledge, motives and intentions in particular) and like frictions which tend to
muddy the waters of classical price theory. The literature is extensive. See,
HANSMANN, infra note 236; WILLIAMSON, infra notes 151 & 155; OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968); HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND
THE FIRM (1988); HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN
CRMCAL COMMENTARIES (1995); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM:
GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM (2000); MICHAEL C.
JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY (1998); OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); G. B. RICHARDSON, INFORMATION AND
INVESTMENT: A STUDY IN THE WORKING OF THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (1990);
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); ARMEN A. ALCHIAN,
ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK (1977); RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW (1988); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1976); HERBERT A.
SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958). Two decent anthologies are THE ECONOMIC
NATURE OF THE FIRM: A READER (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds. 1996)
and THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds. 1993). A useful textbook synthesizing this
broad terrain is PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT (1992). A useful formal synthesis is SALANIt, supra note 103. On
incomplete contracts, see, e.g., id., at 175-89.
111 See HART, supra note 110, at 21-28 (describing the transactional costs asso-
ciated with contractual incompleteness).
112 Note however, that the basic schema itself, as further discussed in the next
paragraph in the text, entails certain limitations upon what may justly be valued.
For example, the schema itself would invalidate holding someone to "deserve"
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On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the schema or
basic contractual structure-the reciprocal 5/E relation, and hence
the entailment of F's by 6's-is invariant through time and across
societies and institutions. That structure is what justice, in its es-
sence, is. (This is "the basic structure."11 3) Moreover, it is a logi-
some "penalty" for what she cannot reasonably be thought to have done voluntar-
ily. So would certain grossly disproportionate "payoffs," as discussed infra, note
126 and accompanying text. Finally, particularly in the event that the "doer" (or
"do-ee") lacks any opportunity to seek alternative society with others who value
deeds differently (in which case the social "contract" would be one of adhesion),
certain basic rights place constraints upon what general social values may right-
fully "weigh" against one's own. We might imagine, for example, a society in
which a majority "valued" harm inflicted upon members of some minority and
those who loved members of that minority. If that minority were racially identi-
fied, then justice's equal initial endowment component would prohibit the general
social valuation, at least as regards the members of the minority. But lovers of
members of the minority, or members of that minority themselves if the minority
were not identified by dint of ineluctable personal features, would not be thus
protected; they would have to be protected either by supplemental fundamental
rights apart from justice, or by appeal to some deeper value underlying justice it-
self, e.g., respect for human agents, rational natures, sentient beings, etc. In the
first case we would be introducing "rights as trumps" in the Dworkinian sense.
See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 45-47 (illucidating objective
theories of welfare). The rights would in effect bracket-off certain matters as le-
gitimate subjects of social valuation (or disvaluation), a kind of mandated incom-
mensurability. In the second case, we would be seeking one "master value" in
which to ground all others, e.g. "human dignity" or the like. In this latter connec-
tion the notion of desert as a "status concept," mentioned supra note 89 and dis-
cussed at greater length in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17. Justice's
equality component itself, as well as its "tit-for-tat" deserts component, would
then be grounded in a sort of "basic desert," e.g., the deservingness of all respon-
sible agents for respect as responsible agents, agents whose responsibility de-
mands respect for certain fundamental agent-constitutive valuations, initial
("baseline") equality, and deserts responsive to deeds. Hockett, Market-Able Jus-
tice, supra note 17.
113 See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 84 ("The basic structure is a public
system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men to act together so as
to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain recognized claims
to a share in the proceeds."). Note that symmetry, as embedded in the basic struc-
ture here discussed, has figured prominently throughout the ages in conceptions
both of justice and of beauty -hence, the frequency with which, historically, the
two ideas have been tied. See, e.g., PLATO, REPUBLIC 546a-547a (justice, cubes, per-
fect numbers); ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, at 269 ("Justice is therefore a sort of pro-
portion; for proportion is not a property of numerical quantity only, but of quan-
tity in general, proportion being equality of ratios, and involving four terms at
least."); St. Augustine, De Musica (W.F. Jackson Knight trans.), selections reprinted
in PHILOSOPHIES OF ART AND BEAUTY: SELECTED READINGS IN AESTHETICS FROM PLATO
TO HEIDEGGER 186 (Albert Hofstadter & Richard Kuhns eds., 1976) ("The higher
things are those in which equality results."); KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 33
(James Creed Meredith trans., 1980) (1928) ("The result is that the aesthetic judg-ment refers not merely, as a judgment of taste, to the beautiful, but also, as spring-
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cal - indeed, tautological - entailment of this relation that a) before
the "game" of doing sundry "payoff"-awarding or -deducting
deeds gets underway (i.e., at the baseline), all deserve the same, or
baseline, equality -for before the game is underway, no one de-
serves anything more or less than anyone else; and b) what counts
as a prize, sanction, or payment-an "E"-will be more or less
equi-valued in terms of other valueds (or of an index of such val-
ueds-e.g., a price-level where there is frequent exchange, hence
market liquidity, and a numiraire good (money)"
4) in relation to
the deed that merits the prize, sanction or payment. That is, by
definition a society in aggregate will tend to maintain a propor-
tionality between deeds and deserts, to value the deed as much or
as little as it values the generally offered recompense.
115
ing from a higher intellectual feeling, to the sublime."); IRIS MURDOCH, THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD OVER OTHER CONCEPTS 2 (1967) (Beauty "prepares us for jus-
tice."); ELAINE SCARRY, ON BEAUTY AND BEING JUST 55-124 (1999).
114 Frequent exchange results in established ratios and once money is intro-
duced, determinate prices. See I MARTIN SHUBIK, THEORY OF MONEY AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999); JAMES TOBIN & STEPHEN S. GOLUB, MONEY, CREDIT,
AND CAPITAL (1998); CHARLES LINDBLOM, THE MARKET: WHAT IT Is, How IT WORKS,
AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT (2002).
115 If it did not, and the deeds and their merited recompenses were frequently
exchanged, there would be an arbitrage opportunity and a consequent inherent
instability. A tendency would result for the recompenses to move into sync with
the perceived value of the deeds as more people "paid" more to ensure that the
deeds were done for them, or, alternatively, for the deeds to become more rare
(and hence again, more dear).
This fact, along with the conceptual tie that binds proportion to equality,
seems to account for the frequency with which justice has historically been
equated with or linked to notions of measure (including musical measure) and
proportion. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, at V.6.1134a25-b17 (justice as pro-
portion and "proportion being equality of ratios"); ARISTOTLE, id. at MM 1194a18,
25; ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 113. See also SCOTT MEIKLE, ARISTOTLE'S ECONOMIC
THOUGHT (1995); M.I. Finley, Aristotle and Economic Analysis, 47 PAST & PRESENT 3
(1970); M. I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY (1973); Josef Soudek, Aristotle's Theory
of Exchange: An Inquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis, 96 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC.
45 (1952).
Note also in this connection the findings reported in the sociological literature
noted supra note 102, to the effect that subjects believe that there should be pro-
portionality between "inputs" and "outputs," and that the same such ratios
should obtain among all who make those inputs and receive the consequent out-
puts. See, e.g., Sociological Approaches, supra note 102, at 154 ("There is a general
feeling that returns should be proportional to costs and investments."); Justice in
Exchange, supra note 102, at 194-95 (" IMien compare themselves with each other in
terms of their investments as well as in terms of the rewards they receive from
their services and expect differences in the latter to correspond to differences in
the former. This satisfaction depends not only on the absolute amount of reward
they receive for their services but also on the fact that the expectations raised by
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In this sense, the account of justice offered here views society,
justice, and the just society as a two-tiered structure of contingent
claims (claims of the earlier elaborated form "If I/you do 6, then
you/I should receive, and have a right to expect, i.e. deserve,
F.").116 The first, "lower," tier is a set of contracts constituting, for-
malizing, or expressing the implicit normative force of exchange
relations among pairs or groups of constituent members of a soci-
ety, sub-society, market, or other organization. This tier and its
continuous structural tie to the second tier are largely ignored by
Rawls; they are the domains of "missing information" that an ade-
quate theory of justice must factor into its account. The second,
"higher" tier roughly corresponds to Rawls's "basic structure," but
is much more tightly interwoven with the lower tier embodying it
than Rawls seems either to allow or to appreciate.1 7 It is a sort of
the comparisons are not disappointed."); Inequity in Exchange, supra note 102, at
281 ("Op/Ip = Oa/Ia," i.e., p's ratio of deeds to rewards should equate to a's ratio
of deeds to rewards -the so-called "linear equity criterion," which subsequent au-
thors attempt to refine with nonlinear models in some contexts).
116 Note that there is but one contingency here. When we reach formal "con-
tingent claims contracts" at infra Sections 5 and 6, there will be two contingencies:
the contractual "consideration" and the "insurable event." Hence, there will be
three relational variables: "If I do 6 (pay a premium) and y (the insurable event)
occurs, then f (indemnification)." (Schematically, the simple contingent claim
might be rendered "6 D c," the state-contingent claim "6.y D E.") Where it is nec-
essary, I will distinguish between these two-termed and three-termed contingent
claiming relations by referring to the first simply as "contingent claims," to the
second as "state-contingent claims."
117 The starkest symptom is Rawls's inadequate handling of moral desert.
Rawls effectively makes the same equation that I do in connecting moral desert to
just entitlement (in his case, reducing the former to the latter), while at the same
time claiming to reject the equation in arguing that desert should not be conflated
with legitimate expectation. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22. It is my claim that
just entitlement and legitimate expectation are in fact the same, and thus that de-
sert and legitimate expectation are the same. Rawls also complains: a) that desert
and the criteria of deservingness do not admit of precise definition, b) that in
markets people do not receive deserts, in part because demand is determined by
scarcity, and c) that effort does not qualify as a desert basis because effort is
rooted in natural capacities. These are exceedingly odd objections. As to the first,
it is commonplace that moral concepts are irreducible to non-moral ones, but that
does not render them unusually imprecise or unusable. Think of how many non-
moral concepts are entirely usable though their contours admit of occasional
"hard cases" in application "baldness," for example, since at least the time of the
Sorites paradox. Moreover, once we adopt a schematic like I have proposed in
this subsection, the notion of desert seems no more imprecise than those of Rawl-
sian "fairness" or "indices of primary goods." As for the market, why should the
satisfaction of demands for that which is scarce rather than abundant be unde-
serving? Am I not more deserving in satisfying wants than in "providing" more
of what is had to those who already have? Finally, as for the putative rootedness
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contract blueprint, contract-schema, master contract, or meta-
contract - in a word, the social contract - to which all of the lower
tier contracts conform, which in fact they instantiate, or replicate.
It is more complete than Rawls's social contract, and likely as com-
plete as can be expected in view of a) uncertainty as to future indi-
vidual and societal evolution in the face of unknown future con-
tingencies, and b) the consequent prudence of societies' and their
members' retaining a free hand in dealing with the uncertain fu-
ture as it continuously unfolds. We presumably will wish to allow
consequent exogenous cross-societal differences and trans-
temporal societal evolution. Finally, both because this contract is
necessarily incomplete and because it is more empirically rich than
is Rawls's, the social contract I envisage is more clearly relational
than Rawls's.
u8
I note, finally, that notwithstanding that this contract offers a
more realistically dynamic, ever-unfolding, or diachronic nature
than Rawls's single, primal choice model, it would nonetheless
seem more likely to be chosen in some primal social choice situa-
tion behind the veil than would Rawls's (and Harsanyi's)."
9 And
this is so irrespective of the parties' attitudes toward risk.
20 Con-
sider, insofar as the parties behind the veil are impartial (in which
case the veil is unnecessary, but let's assume its use anyway
21),
they will demand nothing more, perhaps even less, than what they
of effort in one's physiology, I do not see what point it is that this is meant to
make. If physiological association of itself is problematic, then it seems that we
must rule out all bases of distribution, since presumably all attributes of persons
that enter into the distribution function choices behind the veil, need, what ever
are likewise. See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS
(1980). Perhaps Rawls intends a "denial of free will" here. If so, I simply cannot
help but disagree. For more on matters of desert and Rawls thereon, see, e.g.,
Robert Hockett, Save Room for Desert: How Rawls Leaves Justice Undernour-
ished (2002) (working draft on file with the author).
118 There is thus an irony here. Relational contracting is a consequence of in-
complete contracting. Rawls's contract, however, is both less complete and less
dynamically relational than the contract offered here.
119 See GOLLIER, supra note 61 and accompanying text (employing a veil in
modeling portfolio-selection under uncertainty)
120 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text on Rawls' risk-aversion as-
sumptions. Note also that risk-aversion assumptions (albeit not altogether unrea-
sonable ones) infect two defenses of traditional social insurance offered by
Dworkin and Varian, as discussed infra, Section 6.2.
121 See BARRY, IMPARTIALITY, supra note 22 (distinguishing between "justice as
impartiality" and "justice as mutual advantage."). Barry discusses why the veil
would be unnecessary for impartially motivated choosers.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
produce added to their equal shares of what is not produced122
That is, they will demand nothing more than the baseline-equal
initial endowments -augmented by their deserts. All will accord
each other freedom to transform as they will and make what they
wish of the initial shares of unproduced, exogenously endowed re-
sources that they are equally allotted, and to dispose of what they
subsequently produce out of those allotments as they see fit, so far
as the dispositions do not adversely affect others by giving rise to
externalities.
By much the same token, insofar as the parties are not so much
impartial as they are self-interested bargainers behind the veil,123
they can rationally expect nothing more than the same distribu-
tion-formula as that selected by the impartial choosers. For, first,
with respect to that which they do not produce -their initial, ex-
ogenous endowment-the bargaining game is zero sum; a's receiv-
ing something entails P's not receiving it. We thus have a cake-
cutting problem whose equilibrium solution will be an equal divi-
sion-neither 3 nor a, qua bargainers, will allow to the other more
than s/he him/herself receives.124 And second, with respect to that
quantum which the bargainers do produce, though we move past a
simple exogneously-given-cake problem, our results remain the
same. Where one fully controls the production of that which is to
be distributed, which is the case after we correct for innate talent
and handicap differentials in initial endowments and begin bar-
gaining over the products of effort alone, as a self-aggrandizing
bargainer s/he either refuses to surrender the product or refuses to
122 Bear in mind here that different talents, handicaps, risks, opportunities,
and other features of the initial endowment are not counted as entering differen-
tially into the production function. These things are first equalized, themselves
exogenously given resources after all, by impartial resource-dividers. Talents are
not counted here as entering into the individual's production function. Talents,
handicaps, and their products, being morally arbitrary in their distribution be-
cause they are not earned -are part of the residuum shared by all. The "slavery
of the talented" problem, however, is present in "talent pooling." The catch is the
inherent difficulty of separating talent from effort. In this light, in the presence of
such means of sorting out such distinctions, choosers behind the veil might well
choose what I advocate here, provided that they know that such institutions or
methods existed and are practicable.
123 In other words, insofar as they are doing that which will issue in "justice
as mutual advantage." See RAwLs, JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 536 ("[R]egardless of
the excellences that persons or associations display their claims to social resources
are always adjudicated by principles of neutral justice (§ 50).")
124 Id. at 534-41 (discussing equality, envy, and distributions of both among
and between individuals in a society).
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 163
produce it.125
We appear, then, to conclude with a contract pursuant to which
bargainers agree to divide equally the unproduced initial endow-
ment, and to retain the produced deserts on a producer-by-
producer basis for private consumption, future exchanges, or gifts
out from behind the veil. Thus, we have derived, from Rawls's
own "original position," the social contract offered here rather than
Rawls's-unlike Rawls, and unlike aggregative consequentialists,
on the basis of no particular, let alone peculiar, attitudes toward
risk, and irrespective of whether our parties are benevolently neu-
tral (impartial) or self-interestedly bargaining (arriving at mutual
advantage).126 And we therefore appear to have arrived at a rather
125 Rawls, presumably, would object that this would not be the case, in that
choosers behind the veil would depart from this arrangement were the departure
to result in a tide raising the lowest boats. But for reasons adduced in the previ-
ous subsection, that imputed choice is extensionally equivalent to an implausible
imputation of extreme risk-aversion.
The decision to produce and give to others in order to benefit oneself, inciden-
tally, would be a different matter. Presumably, with respect to this type of deci-
sion, one would be performing a highly fact-specific assessment, and would ar-
range to produce and distribute both privately and openly only after one knew
whether such an exchange would actually be beneficial.
126 See RAvWis, JUSTIcE, supra note 22, at 118-23. I should more fully explicate a
similarity here between my theory and that of "indirect-" or "rule-utilitarianism,"
(or "rule-consequentialism") as described supra note 81. A "rule" under the latter
corresponds in some degree to my own notion of a social practice, "reward struc-
ture," "incentive structure," or "institution." See Hockett, Market-Able Justice,
supra note 17. Hence the connecting lines drawn between both indirect conse-
quentialism on the one hand (again, see supra note 81) and my own account of jus-
tice on the other (see supra note 117 and accompanying text) vis-i-vis the NIE.
The difference, however, is that under rule-utilitarianism there is only an acciden-
tal link between proper (utility maximizing) action on the one hand and reward
on the other, in that "proper" actions only tend to maximize utility and are re-
warded only because this is thought to tend to result in more such actions. (When
the link is absent, the consequentialist lets "bygones be bygones," looking only to
the future, never to the past.) The links between action, recompense, and social
utility-maximization are all then contingent in the final analysis (which is why, as
observed at note 81 and by the some of the authors cited therein, rule-
consequentialism tends to "collapse" into simple act-consequentialism).
On my account, by contrast, all that are accidental are what society regards as
good, as "wealth" and worthy of production and reward, on the one hand, and
what it regards as being proportional to that (i.e., what actions and rewards it
equally values) on the other. (And note again that the schema itself, and possibly
some master value in which that schema is ultimately rooted (e.g., respect for re-
sponsible agency) places limitations even upon this. Justice does not permit dis-
valuation of persons by dint of their ineluctable traits-for example, their racial
characteristics -and disproportion between valued deed and subsequent desert
cannot long endure.) Once these matters are determined, however, we have a
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firm "contract" between doer and rewarder, whether the deed actually increases
social wealth or not, and whether the rewarding itself in the given case actually
will encourage the doing of such deeds or not. We simply do not regard as just,
nor do we tolerate, the notion that since my action did not happen to bring the
usual good result this time, I should not be regarded as having acted virtuously;
or that a single breach of the "contract" is alright since one breach will not gener-
ally undermine the entire social practice in question. (Note that there is thus a
link here with the retributive conception of punishment, and again, with Kant's
idea of a "right" to punishment. See Hockett, Life is a Race, supra note 95.) At the
same time, however, it will tend to be tautologically true that that which we hap-
pen to regard as virtuous action worthy of reward will "add" to social value. For
what we value, in the last analysis, is what we reward. My theory is, then, norma-
tively or prescriptively deontic, while in a certain trivial sense positively or de-
scriptively consequentialist.
Now it might be complained, in light of the foregoing, that I somehow "con-
flate" "is" and "ought." Don't I elide altogether too glibly between prescriptive
and "meta"-ethics, between normative philosophy and (putatively) positive social
anthropology, etc.? In a manner, yes. But the real point here is that this objection
misses the point. In a sense, I deny the very distinction upon which it rests, or bet-
ter, the significance that it attaches to that distinction. If we reject the voluntarism
which descends to us from Scotus and Ockham, then we do not distinguish so
sharply between a rationality of means (which passes for normatively neutral in
the modem world-view), hence "consequentialist" ethics, and a rationality of ends
(which is a normatively non-neutral, a forthright "ought," and yet purports to be
in keeping with a sort of basic teleology or goal-directedness of human life itself,
an "is") hence, "deontological" ethics. "Is" and "ought" come together in this
view.
Normativity is far more subtle an affair than crude positivists (both legal and
scientific varieties) appear to appreciate. And positivism and crude consequen-
tialism alike appear to be one-sidedly rooted in what Thomas Nagel has called the
"view from nowhere." THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3-12 (1986); see
also A.W. MOORE, POINTh OF VIEW 48-9 (1997) (discussing Nagel's theory and its
validity). The "view from nowhere" arises because one is able to disembody one-
self, as it were, and point to things "on the ground," to regard all that one sees as
just so many elements in a chain of causation, often with oneself -the viewer -
being the only being above cause; and from that vantage one sees all but himself
as a matter of description and cause, while regarding himself as a causer, an
agent, and one who prescribes. From that point of view, where one is as it were
"outside" of the world, one's perceived "ought," if one is benevolent, is to maxi-
mize happiness among all of the caused things below, as if there were no inter-
vening causes (no other agents) between one's causing and others' happiness. And
from that point of view, there is indeed an unbridgeable chasm between "is" and
"ought" that mirrors the chasm between oneself and the world.
But we also, in fact, are in the world, and we share that world with other
agents, who cause things as fully as we do. And when we recognize this fact, and
respect those whom we recognize as agents by dint of that fact, it is impossible not
to light upon a more deontological than consequentialist ethic -at least as regards
our own actions and the actions of others when we view them as agents. For re-
specting others as agents is respecting them as causers, not causees, as responsible
agents, not passive objects, as ends in themselves rather than mere means.
Both views - the perspectiveless and the perspectived - and their compossibil-
ity within our thinking have been familiarly remarked since Kant at the latest.
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See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
1929) (2d ed. 1787). But it seems to me that once we have recognized the co-
presence of these ways of seeing, and all of its logical consequences, we become in
a manner both prescriptive deonticists and descriptive consequentialists, in that
we feel and act upon the normative force of reciprocity while recognizing, as a
positive (and again, even a tautological) matter, that that which tends to be recip-
rocated favorably by people in a society will be that which people in that society
tend to value, while that which is reciprocated disfavorably is that which is gener-
ally disvalued. Recognition of the latter, of course, is simply recognition that so-
cial norm systems as wholes -as systems, rather than as the persons whose norm-
expressive actions constitute those systems, are, trivially, consequentialist -in that
they, again trivially, involve general encouragement of what is valued, thus bring,
in the large, valued consequences. But that is not by a long shot the same thing as
saying that their participants are consequentialists. Far from it. (That would be to
commit Harsanyi's error in reverse -to attribute the logic of the system to the par-
ticipants, in the manner that Harsanyi attributed the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms governing individual choice to social choice.) See Hockett, Deep Gram-
mar, supra note 70. The systems yield favorable consequences because their partici-
pants think and act deontologically. See LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 92, at 47
("Mutual Assured Destruction would not have worked if either side had been
thought to be aufond consequentialist.").
This approach finds support in recent linguistics work. See ROBERT B.
BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE
COMMITMENT (1994) [hereinafter BRANDOM, EXPLICIT]; ROBERT B. BRANDOM,
ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM (2000). Brandom's
approach views grammar and logical inference as rendering explicit certain
"norms implicit in practices." See BRANDOM, EXPLICIT, supra, at 623. Practices are
not simple behavioral regularities, they are "implicitly normative in a way that
mere behavioral regularities are not." Id. at 626. They can only be "specified in
explicitly normative terms." Id. at 625. There are thus important points of contact
between Brandom's work and the normative-practice-interpretive approaches to
law taken by Ronald Dworkin in RONALD R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) and
Jules Coleman in JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001). (Note that
Coleman refers to his approach to law as "pragmatist," while Brandom works in
that subfield of linguistics known as "pragmatics." There are important antece-
dents in Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peter Winch. Perhaps, also, in the work of
Jorgen Habermas, the title of whose recent monograph on law is particularly sug-
gestive in the present context. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS
(William Rehg trans. 1996).
Particularly intriguing in connection with the present essay is Brandom's ob-
servation that practices give rise to what he calls "deontic scorekeeping" and "so-
cial scorekeeping practices." BRANDOM, EXPLICIT, supra, at 141 and 626 respec-
tively. Those who make assertions make "doxastic commitments," which commit
one to acting in keeping with actual belief in what she has asserted and "entitle"
her to make inferences from the same, to make of the asserted proposition a reason
for further action. "Competent linguistic practitioners keep track of their own and
each other's commitments and entitlements. They are (we are) deontic scorekeep-
ers." Id. at 142. If Brandom is right, then we can see an important reason for the
traditional linkage between truth and justice (particularly as I have characterized
the latter). One "commits" to another in asserting by, in effect, promising that one
believes the truth of what one asserts. The other party then takes the asserter se-
riously as a person, as one who believes and acts upon the basis of beliefs (making
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reasons of them), by accepting the asserter's sincerity. That is a kind of exchange.
If then the asserter goes on to speak or act in some manner normatively (inferen-
tially or action-wise) inconsistent with belief in the truth of what has been asserted,
then the asserter in a sense breaks a commitment, breaks a promise, to those to
whom she has spoken. In speaking untruthfully to them, she has done them an
injustice.
It is also worth noting in this context the earlier cited work in the sociological,
social psychological, and evolutionary game-theoretic literature, which purports
to be describing norms experienced by actors as deontologically experienced,
even while, from a more consequentialist point of view (the "view from no-
where"), species-favorable. From the same "evolutionary" point of view, we
might mention some of the work in the "sociobiology" literature suggesting that
justice norms-or reciprocity norms of some type might in some sense be "hard-
wired" into human beings and other creatures, such that they would tend to be
experienced normatively and deontically while being viewable positively and
consequentialistically as species-survival-enhancing. See, e.g., M. Milinski, Tit for
Tat in Sticklebacks and the Evolution of Cooperation, 325 NATURE 433 (1987) (indicat-
ing reciprocity among two species of fish in "predator-inspection"); Robert Ax-
elrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 No. 4489 SCIENCE
1390 (1981) (more fish, this time grooming); Eric A. Fischer, The Relationship Be-
tween Mating System and Simultaneous Hermaphroditism in the Coral Reef Fish, 28
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 620 (1980) (title says it all); Gerald S. Wilkinson, Reciprocal Food
Sharing in the Vampire Bat, 308 NATURE 181 (1984) (reciprocal altruism among bats,
in what amounts to a form of social "hunger insurance"); C. Packer, Reciprocal Al-
truism in Papio Anubis, 265 NATURE 441 (1977) (male baboons take turns with wife
of cuckolded rival from one occasion of cuckolding to the next); D.L. Cheney & D.
Seyfarth, Recognition of Individuals Within and Between Groups of Free-Ranging Vervet
Monkeys, 22 AM. ZOOLOGIST 519 (1982) (monkeys respond more quickly to distress
calls of others who have recently groomed them). Note also in this connection
that if Chomsky is correct that all humans are "wired" with a sort of "universal
grammar" then grammar would simultaneously be positive (part of the "wiring")
and normative (governing meaningful speech). See NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC
STRUCTURES (1957); NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1973); see
also FRED SOMMERS, THE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE (1982); JEAN PIAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorice Gabine trans., 1960) (1932); see gener-
ally JOAN E. GRUSEC & HUGH LYTTON, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RESEARCH 81-160, 326-62 (1988).
Finally, it is worth noting here the important philosophical work on the objec-
tivity of morals and "cognitivism" in moral theory. See, e.g., SUSAN L. HURLEY,
NATURAL REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY (1989); JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL
REA.SONS (1993); DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS
(1989); DAVID WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH (1998) (1987); A.J. AYER, ET. AL.,
ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); JOHN MACDOWELL,
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOL. II. (1999); RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF
EMOTION (1987); JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1973); FOOT, supra note 87. There is
double irony in the history of that philosophical view, which, in opposition to the
writers just cited, severs "is" from "ought." First, consequentialism, which arises
from a moral tradition inaugurated by David Hume (the first explicitly to draw
the distinction) itself both "normatizes" what is positive, makes an is an ought, in
treating as a moral requirement that which happens to tend to increase welfare,
while "positivizing" (or at any rate "contingentizing") what is normative (what is
morally necessary) by countenancing the non-reward of what tends to increase
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more plausible, as well as a more just, social contract than the utili-
tarians, the Kaldor-Hicksians, or John Rawls could say that we
have signed.
We need not endorse the contractarian approach to social jus-
tice to accept the view of justice I have offered here. Insofar as we
are genuinely impartial, we shall view the proceeds of the birth lot-
tery, and all proceed-portions subsequently traceable back to that
lottery, as morally arbitrary. We shall wish therefore to neutralize
them - to compensate for them - and also to compensate all earned
deserts as earned deserts. We shall not require a contract following
on sharp negotiations to do that. Justice, in this case, will not be
readily assimilated motive-wise to market-provided "insurance" at
all. My point in speaking of a social contract has been that if we do
accept a view of persons as self-serving bargainers -which, alas, it
seems most people take to be the view with which we must start -
and if we do see justice as the outcome of such persons' bargaining
under fair conditions -behind a veil of ignorance-then we are
viewing justice not just as a contract, but as an insurance contract.
And my larger point has been that that contract's dictates will be
just what we, as impartial divvyers of all goods and ills, opportuni-
ties and risks, would have decided.
There is a critical "rub" at the center of any account of justice,
whether we view justice as a matter of impartiality or of social bar-
gain. It is a critical information problem. How do we, impartial or
bargaining, know what the "initial endowments" are? How do we
distinguish between and parse out ethically exogenous endow-
ment and endogenous effort, residuum and desert, in particular
cases? How do we determine which portion of one's "value-
added" to a given bit of raw material is attributable to her morally
arbitrary, given natural talent -itself part of the "raw material" -
and which to her (often talent-developing) productive virtue?
These are the central problems for justice, and again, they
welfare if the rewarding, even though morally mandated by the social contract
and legitimate expectations, is not on a particular occasion necessary to incent the
welfare-improving action. Second, Hume, with his friend and colleague Adam
Smith, actually began the tradition of tying "is" and "ought" even prior to the
emergence of utilitarianism as a distinct moral theory, by arguing that what we
call good and what we encourage is generally what appeals to our natural sympa-
thies and tends to improve the social lot of others. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE
ON HUMAN NATURE (Temple Press ed. 1951) (1739-40); DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Charles W. Hendel ed. 1955) (1748); ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 212-18 (D.D. Raphael et al. eds.,
photo. reprint 1982) (1779).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
jointly constitute an information problem. I treat the problem
more generally in other work, but for purposes of the present essay
I shall consider it only insofar as it affects income insurance, hence
shall treat it simply as an insurance problem that I shall propose
means of circumventing in subsequent sections. 127 The insurance-
affecting face of the problem is sufficiently well known in the busi-
ness and the literature of insurance that it has acquired, in its best-
known forms, the overtly ethics-connotative names of "adverse se-
lection" and "moral hazard," themselves coupled under the
overtly egalitarian-suggestive heading of "asymmetric informa-
tion." Before moving on to the specific institution of the insurance
market, however, I would like to close this section of the Article by
quickly examining the value-expressive role of market institutions
more generally, in order to drive home the point that the account
of justice here offered is largely-though imperfectly- embodied
in our most salient, omnipresent and publicly discussed forms of
norm- and value-expressive organization and regulation.' 28
It has perhaps gone unnoticed thus far that the tit-for-tat of so-
cial value to which I have resorted in linking justice to virtue and
value can be found at work in an institution seldom associated
with justice. Yet that is precisely what a market is - when properly
configured -a standardized example of the broader tit-for-tat rela-
tion. And thus the market is, potentially, an ideal engine of justice.
For it follows quite directly on the view of justice set forth above
that insofar-though only insofar-as markets operate efficiently
(with no externalities, so that all occasioned costs are covered by
their occasioners) and those who participate in markets do so on
equal terms (with symmetrical information as regards the transac-
tions in which they engage; symmetrical bargaining power, so that
all participants are non-coercive price-takers and non-participants
may freely enter; and endowments descended from a symmetrical
127 1 discuss the problem in Section 4. 1 assess means of dealing with the
problem in Sections 4, 5, and 6. I propose how we might "end-run" around it in
Section 6. As for my more comprehensive treatment of this general and justice-
crucial information problem, see Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17; see
also ROEMER, OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22; ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note
22, at 255-79; John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian
Planner, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146 (1993), reprinted in JOHN ROEMER, EGALITARIAN
PERSPECTIvES: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ECONOMICS 179 (1994).
128 See Joseph H. Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, 1 ECON. &
PHIL. 39, 39-40 (1985) (charging philosophers with failure clearly to see the prob-
lems they propose to solve because of the level of abstraction on which they view
the problems).
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initial division), markets will accurately track and manifest their
parties' proper justice-relations. 129 Markets will accurately monitor
participants' "justice-accounts." 130 Markets will, like a kind of de-
centralized, parallel-processing supercomputer, take in and syn-
thesize more information (at least as to money-valuable goods, in-
cluding paid labor) than any single mind is able to do, accepting,
processing, and producing appropriate justice "outputs" on the ba-
sis of all critical justice-pertinent -namely, comparative value-
information.'31 What is more, markets will display that information
in a conveniently summarized form-a schedule of prices. For the
efficiency price of a good, including insurance or labor income,
129 On the importance of the efficient market functioning and the symmetrical
initial endowments, bargaining power and information to a fair ultimate alloca-
tion, see supra note 56 (bear in mind that the initial endowment must take account
of inalienable resources such as talents and handicaps, not just alienable ones).
All of these "insofars" are of course tall orders, but we endeavor in significant
measure to ensure these conditions in our present markets. These include public
(or government-subsidized) education (designed to help equalize the initial en-
dowments, notwithstanding San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973)); antitrust law (to assure free-er market-entry and non-coercive,
value-additive competition), laws against fraud (to even out informational access),
etc. I hope that in underscoring the distributive justice-significance of these public
policies I might be assisting in renewal of our public commitment to them.
130 Instructive in this connection is a quote attributable to Andrew Carnegie:
"One of the chief sources of success in manufacturing is the introduction and strict
maintenance of a perfect system of accounting, so that responsibility... can be
brought home to every man." PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
552 (Harper-Collins Publishers 1997).
131 The "market as computer" and "information-processor" though not spe-
cifically as "justice-computer," figured prominently in the so-called "great social-
ist calculation debate" of the 1930s. The upshot of that debate was the socialists'
concession that the informational burdens on any socialist state planner would be
too great to effect an efficient allocation of resources optimally satisfying con-
sumer wants, hence optimally expressing consumer-valuations. "Market social-
ism" was the socialist theoreticians' response. Intriguingly, however, at least one
prominent conceder, Oskar Lange, became obsessed with computers and cyber-
netics as these began to grow sophisticated near the end of his life; he apparently
thought that they might offer a means of replicating the market's information-
processing functions on behalf of socialist planners. See Enrico Barone, The Minis-
try of Production in the Collectivist State, in IL GIORNALE DELGI ECONOMISTI (1908),
reprinted in SOCIALIST ECONOMICS 52 (Alec Nove & D.M. Nutti eds., 1972); Friedrich
A. Hayek, The Nature and History of the Problem, in COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC
PLANNING 1, 2-3 (F.A. Hayek ed. 1938); Friedrich A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation:
The Competitive 'Solution,' 7 ECONOMICA 125 (1940); Oscar Lange, On the Economic
Theory of Socialism, in ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin Lippin-
cott ed., 1938); SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 18; LUDWIG VON MISES, PLANNED
CHAOS (1947). For more on the history of the debate, see SCHUMPETER, supra note
39; ALEC NOVE, THE ECONOMICS OF FEASIBLE SOCIALISM REVISITED 129-39 (2d ed.
1991); JOHN E. ROEMER, A FUTURE FOR SOCIALISM 28-36 (1994).
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sold in an efficient market reflects the opportunity cost that its pos-
session or use by one party represents, not only for that party her-
self, but for other parties-the good's social opportunity cost, we
might say.132 In an efficiently functioning market, those prices re-
flect the relative values of valueds, i.e., of goods and labor (at least,
of those that are tradable or money-valued). Indeed, they reflect
that very proportionality that justice requires, and that the process
of reciprocal trade effects, between deed and desert, between ""
and "E."1 33 They do so with a precision not found in less regular-
ized and standardized relations of reciprocal exchange. A com-
plete and properly functioning market, then (and again, this is an
admittedly very pregnant condition), would constitute a sort of
comprehensive and precisely calibrated justice machine.
A corollary to these observations is that where markets are
missing or incomplete, or where they do not conform to the neu-
132 To borrow and adapt from a well-known phrase from a well-known arti-
cle concerned with another, but in fact closely related, topic. In this connection,
see, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 114, at 136 ("Take special note that, with efficiency
prices, the cost of anything for a person is what that person must give up to get it,
assuming that the only way he can get it is through a voluntary transaction....
Prices [produced by Walrasian equilibria] are called 'efficiency prices' because
they represent the terms - the prices - at which interchange from a starting posi-
tion bring to all participants all the gains to all that are possible other than gains
possible by compelling or imposing losses on some participants."); see also
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 70 (" [T]he true measure of the social
resources devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how important, in
fact, that resource is for others.") Again, however, it must be emphasized that for
the market to do what I claim it can do, it must be "neutral" -it must treat all par-
ticipants as equals; all must be able to enter it freely, must be price-takers not dic-
tators, and participants must not impose costs that they do not cover ("external-
ities"). A corollary, less often (indeed, scarcely ever) remarked in the literature, is
that participants must enter the market from positions ultimately descended from
initial endowment-equality. See id. ("Of course it is sovereign.., that people en-
ter the market on equal terms."). For more formal treatment, see sources cited su-
pra, note 56. The well-known article noted above, featuring the notion of social
cost, need hardly be cited - but is, of course, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
133 See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 114, at 125 ("When all possible favorable
trades are completed, observers will see that for each specific exchange ... the
final trades are almost all at the same ratio .... So long as there were exchanges
at two different ratios, trading would not stop."); see also id. at 135-36 ("At the end
of the trading, the prevailing ratio for each traded good or service is of course
linked to all other prevailing ratios .... This set of ratios for all goods and ser-
vices can be expressed as a set of prices."). For more formal treatment, see
Shubik, supra note 114. Note that, in the idiom of "social cost" and "social oppor-
tunity cost" introduced earlier, what prices show in their proportional relations are
the relative social costs of each of the goods'/services' consumption.
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trality-conditions stated above, justice -or at least "macro-justice"
among large numbers of people -will be rather more difficult to
track. Ascriptions of justice therefore will be more prone to
vagueness or, worse, simple indeterminacy than where markets are
present, neutral, and efficient.1 34 Justice as a more complete and
finely tuned social contract requires more complete and properly
functioning markets in the valueds whose provision justice de-
mands be compensated. 35 One means, then, of rendering justice
more determinate - thus effectable, hence more extensive - in a
given context involving many parties or potential parties is not
only to ensure the fair and efficient functioning of markets that al-
ready are in operation, but to "marketize," or standardize already
common and de facto or desired trading that has not yet taken full-
fledged market form in that context. This, in turn, means that we
must "commodify" more valueds that are traded or that would be
traded in that context.136 That is simply to say that we must foster,
encourage, and regulate more regular practices of trading in that
context.
Now "commodification" is, of course, a dirty word. 37 Its des-
ignatum frequently is said to threaten to alienate us from the
things or people, deeds or transactions that would be commodi-
fied.138 The desire to commodify or marketize also is said to consti-
tute a fool's errand, for, it is said, the valueds that one would pre-
sume to commodify, and the interactions that one would presume
to marketize- i.e., to transform from interactions to transactions in
the latter word's more familiar market-oriented usage-are "inc-
ommensurable." 39
134 Here, then, is another possible answer to Rawls' complaint about moral
desert. See supra note 117.
135 Much more on market-completion in its more technical sense infra, Section
6.
136 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996) [hereinafter RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES]; see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY (1993) [hereinafter RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY]; ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
137 See generally RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 136.
138 Id.
139 See ANDERSON, supra note 136, at 44-90, 117-67; BROOME, ETHICS, supra note
81, at 145; id. at 123-44, 162; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-68 (1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779
(1994), reprinted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997);
WALZER, supra note 22; PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY (David Miller & Michael
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In fact these sorts of quibble are much overblown. Where we
"trade-off," we can trade (in a manner we do trade), and when we
trade (indeed, even when we trade-off) we establish, or demon-
strate, co-measurability - proportionality - hence commen-
surability. And in fact, de facto trading and commensuration are
more common, I suspect, than seems to be supposed. 140 But we
need not demonstrate this claim conclusively or iron out its diffi-
culties here, as the present Article is concerned with the prospect of
trading in, and thereby both better distributing and justice-
measuring, already money-valued income-risk. As labor is already
traded, there is no reason that we ought not trade in risks to labor-
income. Indeed, until we complete markets in those risks, we shall
not really have just markets for that labor itself. Just labor markets
require that we complete markets in labor-income risk, so that
people can more freely pay such others as more willingly would
bear that risk, to bear it.141
To sum up the relations between justice, markets, justice-
information, prices, market-regulation, and market-completion,
particularly in regard to income-risk, we might try this simple syl-
logism: Justice is "equality plus or minus merits -or deserts." De-
serts arise from reciprocal exchange behavior and thus reflect rela-
tive valuations. Full justice requires full deserts-information and
thus full valuation-information. Where exchanges are efficient,
fair, and frequent enough for statistically reliable proportional
Walzer eds. 1995); GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1881). A particularly thorough anthology is
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed.
1997).
140 For example, if we "spend" - the word is suggestive - more time with our
unpaid hobbies than our families, there is a sense in which we establish a de facto
scale of comparison and commeasurement, even covaluation ("in terms of" time),
between those hobbies and (time spent with) those persons. We "value" one or
time spent with one as much as or more than time spent with the other. Of
course, generally we desire both, and they might even be "complements" in some
degree in certain cases (the game of Monopoly, for example, probably is best en-
joyed with family). There might be-there likely are-concave marginal rates of
substitution, such that we would prefer not to have to do only with one to the ex-
clusion of the other in most cases. But the point is that we are trading, whether we
like to admit it or not. Purity of heart might be to will one thing -if it is, we're
most of us "impure." The allusion is, of course, to SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PURITY OF
HEART IS TO WILL ONE THING (Douglas V. Steere trans., 1967).
141 Note that there is thus a close analogy here to the ways in which deriva-
tives markets improve the efficiency of spot markets by speeding the rates at which
the latter reach their equilibrium prices.
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valuations to emerge, valuation-information, hence deserts-
information, itself becomes reliable and expressible as price-
information. Where the particular valued - or in this case dis-
valued - is risk to income, justice-information as to that disvalued's
distribution will be more reliable if the risk can be priced, and this
will be possible, in general, only if we can establish markets in that
risk.
2.4. A Critical Case in Point: Just Risk-Sharing and Risk-Trading
This Article, recall, is concerned with the proper-i.e., the
just -distribution of systemic income-risk faced by individuals and
wrought by or attendant upon the "new" global economy. Indi-
vidual income-risk represents, of course, a detriment or burden
which individuals and the societies that they constitute generally
will wish to avoid, all other things being equal. It is socially and
individually disvalued.142 But particular risks to income generally
will of course be disvalued at different rates by different people. It
is, on the conception of justice just offered, a dictate of justice as
well as, tautologously, of efficiency and simple common sense that
both opportunities and incentives be structured so as to facilitate
the minimization and/or selling off of risks that can be (partly or
wholly) avoided or sold, and to distribute equally those which
cannot. That is, it is just to hold people to account for risks that
they bring about, fail to mitigate, or neglect to trade away, pro-
vided that such be possible-these patent risks are their deserts-
and to equalize, over the whole of society, the bearing of such risks
or degrees of risk-latent risks-as people cannot avoid, mitigate,
or shed through trade. These latter risks, which we might call the
"residuum," are to be considered part of what we called at Subsec-
tion 2.3 the baseline endowment.143 In the 5/ schema of that sec-
142 What counts as a risk will ride upon what those who constitute a society
generally consider to be burdensome and to be avoided. Risk is thus a schematic
category -an "F" in the sense elaborated in Section 3, supra. Moreover, risk often
will be differentially disvalued by different people. The social disvaluation rate -
the "social cost"-of risk thus corresponds to the equilibrium rate at which the
bearing of that risk-insurance -would sell if available in the society in question
(again, assuming properly functioning markets as described in Section 2.3, supra).
143 Interesting in this connection is Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as
Social Insurance, 14 J. POL. ECON. 49, 50 (1980) [hereinafter Varian, Redistributive
Taxation] ("These data suggest that the movements of individual incomes over
time contain a large random component, i.e. a component that is not explained by
differences in tastes and [physical] endowments."). I discuss Varian's proposed
means of handling that "random element" at Section 6.2.2.
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tion, individually avoidable or shedable risks are a's appropriately
following on 6's. Individually unavoidable and untradable risks
do not belong in the 5/E deserts-earning game at all -they are de-
finitionally undeserved, part of the ethically exogenous endow-
ment at the baseline or the starting gate that must be equalized.
Now the precise location of the demarcation line between these
forms of risk-the patent and the latent-is a justice-crucial infor-
mation problem that fuller risk markets can help to solve. First, by
completing risk-markets, we would effectively eliminate the trade-
able/untradeable risk line altogether; and no risk or increment of
risk that is untraded would need be regarded as undeserved be-
cause untradeable. The line between deserved and undeserved
risk, then, would be determined solely by other forms of differen-
tially exploited opportunities to head off, mitigate, or eliminate
risk. Second, new and more complete markets will assist in solv-
ing the information problem that is the location of that line as well.
By focusing upon new forms of information relating to the dili-
gence/fault divide - forms that correlate to that justice-decisive in-
formation, and are more available to all than the more familiar
"hidden knowledge" problems that plague justice in other contexts
(e.g., talent versus effort), hence much more symmetrically distrib-
uted- we lessen the harm wrought by that other divide. Markets
can process that information, and thus enable us to do fuller jus-
tice. Moreover, markets, as the information attractors, processors
and impounders (in prices) described at 2.3, can be exploited actu-
ally to enrich, not merely to organize, the informational environ-
ment. New information technologies (as discussed further below
in Section 6) as well as new theory, are rendering new forms of in-
formation, as well as new markets, tantalizingly closer to full avail-
ability. Again, we will further examine, explore and exploit these
possibilities in this Article. But we shall not be getting too far
ahead of ourselves in noting even now that a crucial part of the an-
swer lies in that very phenomenon which has engaged the justice-
motive ultimately prompting this Article in the first place: latent,
systemic, individually uncontrollable, and individually unconceal-
able income-risk.
3. SO MUCH (MACRO-) MOMENT, So LITTrLE (MICRO-) CONTROL:
SYSTEMIC, UNSHARED, UNTRADED INCOME-RISK IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY
In the previous Section we distinguished between "unavoid-
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able," "residual," "systemic," or "latent" income-risk on the one
hand, and "avoidable," "individually preventable" or "patent" risk
on the other. The former is precisely the kind of risk that justice
dictates should be socially-pooled and distributed, for it is by defi-
nition practically unanticipatable risk against which even produc-
tively virtuous individuals cannot provide. While productive vir-
tue dictates that individuals act privately to head off risks that they
can anticipate and act upon, justice's baseline endowment-equality
component dictates that the residuum of risk that cannot reasona-
bly be expected to be individually foreseen and avoided be allo-
cated among everyone in identical increments, as if all of us were
back at the same starting gate.
A full accounting of systemic income risk in the new, global
economy might well make for a book.'" It will perhaps be best for
present purposes, however, to sacrifice universality and maximal
empirical texture for a more impressionistic strategy, organized by
particularly salient subcategory. There are at least three broad
types of risk attending the new economy which are in large if not
full measure systemic. These are: unforeseeable sectoral redun-
dancies; human capital lock-in; and unavoidable adjustment-lags.
3.1. "Just Like That?": Unforeseeable Redundancies
A well-functioning economy is virtually by definition a dy-
namic economy. New products and processes appear with unpre-
dictable and sometimes bewildering regularity.145 Not only are
longstanding wants and needs constantly coming to be addressed
in new, more effective, and/or more efficient ways, but new wants
and needs themselves also are being conceived, sown, advertised
over, and ultimately (one hopes) satisfied all the time. One of the
principal identified advantages of "globalization" itself, indeed, is
precisely that it accelerates this process of dynamic change.146
New products and productive processes cannot generally be
144 Or at any rate a full chapter of a book -one which the Author is writing.
It happens that the more such risks we can catalogue, the more opportunities
there will be for risk-sharing, as discussed at Section 6, infra.
145 This near-truism receives celebrated, and somewhat melodramatic, articu-
lation in SCHUMPETER, supra note 39; see, in particular, id. at 81-86 (discussing "The
Process of Creative Destruction"); see also WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET
INNOVATION MACHINE 1 (2002); PHILIPPE AGHION, ENDOGENOUS GRowTH THEORY
(1997) (explaining the incredible growth of free-market economies).
146 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1522; see also RAZiN & SADKA, supra note 7, at 3-
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foreseen-not, at any rate, by many, and certainly not as regards
the precise timing of their becoming both widely demanded and
feasibly supplied. If they could, they would presumably all be in-
stantiated already.1 47 It is in fact owing to what is at first the non-
generality of particular new possibilities, according to standard
microeconomic theory, that entrepreneurs are able to envisage and
capture-thus be motivated by-the temporary monopoly rents
generable by envisaging, conceiving, and inventing new goods and
services in the first instance.148 The well known price-theoretic
danger of "rent-dissipation" presumes that it will disincentivize
inventive activity. It would seem to follow that to require a popu-
lation generally to anticipate all new products and services would
be to require a world of comprehensive rent-dissipation and virtu-
ally no inventive activity at all.149
What sense, then, would it make to refuse to afford social in-
surance against sectoral redundancy -i.e., to hold all non-
entrepreneurs with respect to a given new good or service entirely
responsible for not having anticipated its possibility and made
their career choices accordingly? The answer is that it would make
147 One thinks in this connection to the proverbial University of Chicago pro-
fessor, who remarks confidently that the ten dollar bill his student spots on the
walk cannot be authentic, else it would already have been retrieved. The profes-
sor's error, of course, lies in assuming that every possible source of value is ex-
ploited instantaneously. That might be true of arbitrage opportunities in efficient,
information technology-rich capital markets, but it doesn't seem to be true many
places else.
148 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 39. See generally ISRAEL M. KIRZNER,
COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973).
149 Such is, of course, one reason classically offered for property rights, in-
cluding intellectual property rights. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967) (discussing the role of property
rights as a means to guide incentives and maximize internalization of external-
ities); see also SCHUMPETER, supra note 40, at 81-86, 111-20; Jack Hirshleifer, The Pri-
vate and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON.
REv. 561, 572-73 (1971) (discussing the impact of private knowledge and knowl-
edge on information); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
(1988); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 U. CHI. J. LEGAL
STUD. 489, 489 (2002) ("expand[ing] Harold Demsetz's seminal work on property
rights by arguing that property rights entrepreneurs discover previously
unowned or unpriced attributes of a resource and capture rents by defining and
enforcing rights to those attributes"); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-24 (5th ed. 2002). A partial caveat would of course in-
volve such inventive activity as would benefit the inventor alone (and perhaps
subsequently be copied). Copyright and patent laws are designed precisely with
that end in view.
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no sense at all -unless we wished to encourage the development
of a universally anxious culture of superfluous "inventors" and
preemptive "responders" eagerly acting to create or accommodate
themselves to not-yet-existent markets lest they be left to starve.
150
Surely our actual social policy, which rewards bona fide want-
satisfying inventors rather than purposely punishing non-
inventors, is the more sensible approach.
It seems fair, then, to regard the risk of unemployment, or at
any rate the need for job retraining, borne, for example, by a coal-
miner in the face of newly-discovered uses for petroleum as ap-
propriately carried (at least in part) by society as a whole. Like-
wise, the risk faced by the newspaper printer that an internet or
some other electronic news medium might come along and sub-
stantially displace traditional printed media, or relatedly, broad
changes in the social safety net, such as curtailments of govern-
ment-offered unemployment insurance, breakdowns in the ex-
tended family, and so on -backdrops against which people have
planned careers and made decisions concerning education and
training. Although change of this sort can to some extent be fore-
seen or anticipated and provided against, it can only be done to
some degree. And while the primary risk-bearer in a situation like
this - the individual employee - can and should act to mitigate the
damage wrought by such contingencies' coming to pass, here too
the individual's capacity to mitigate is only to some degree. One
advantage offered by the new markets to be proposed is precisely
that they will facilitate the calculation of such degrees.
3.2. The Best Years of Our Lives: Human Capital Lock-in
There is a substantial economic literature devoted to the subject
of "specific human capital." 151 The idea is that human capital, like
any form of capital, is built upon and accumulated over time. Of-
150 Or of Luddites ready to vandalize what comes along.
151 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,
29 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1962), reprinted in 5 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 157 (1985) [hereinafter 5
ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS]; GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 40-51 passim (1964);
PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER
ANALYSIS 14-27 (1971); ROBERT M. SOLOW, LEARNING FROM "LEARNING BY DOING":
LESSONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (1997); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 57-81 (1975); Gary S. Becker,
Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON., Supp. 9 (1962).
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ten economies of scale and attendant specialization efficiencies
demand that the accumulation be carried out in a manner respon-
sive to the particular needs of specific sectors, industries, or even
individual firms. The problem, of course, is that specialization to
one skill-set often will tend, as a matter both of temporal opportu-
nity costs and of the frequent mutual exclusivity of skill-sets,152 to
diminish one's usefulness with respect to another skill-set. The re-
sult is that if the original skill-set is obliterated by some technologi-
cal or other development, rendering a firm or sector redundant, the
individual who has developed her human capital to those tasks
will, suddenly and unforeseeably, be rendered redundant.
Through little or no fault of her own, she will no longer be as
"marketable."
Most of us respond to the possible future uselessness or value-
lessness of an asset by accumulating assets of more than one type.
"Don't place all of your eggs into one basket." "Diversify your
portfolio." Diversification is, of course, a form of insurance-a
means of preventing precisely the sort of covariance that is dis-
cussed in this Article's next Section in connection with the insur-
ability of risk. 53 Yet, human capital generally is not diversifiable in
the way or to the degree that other forms of capital are.
To begin with, the requirement of some participants in the
labor force that they develop specific human capital is, quite simply,
the very contrary of diversification. Moreover, human capacities
and the length of a human life (particularly a working life) gener-
ally limit one to developing only so many skill-sets during her time
on this planet. It takes time to develop marketable skills. One is
therefore, to some extent, locked into those skills that she initially
invests in developing early on in, or midway through, her career.
While mid-life career-changes have become more common than
they once were,154 it seems doubtful that "third-of-the-way-
152 A body-builder, for example, by rendering herself "muscle-bound," will
render herself a poorer ballerina.
153 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941-73 (1963) [hereinafter Arrow, Uncertainty], reprinted in
6 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: APPLIED
ECONOMICS 15, 36-7 (1985) [hereinafter 6 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS].
154 See, e.g., Labor Secretary Chao Says U.S. Workplace is Changing, AGGIEDAILY
(November 15, 2002) (describing Labor Secretary's speech at Texas A&M Univer-
sity, during which she stated that the "average person will change jobs nine times
over the course of his or her career."), reprinted at http://
rev.tamu.edu/stories/02/111502-12.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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through," "two-thirds-through," or more frequent career changes
involving the use of radically different skills, will be commonplace
in the foreseeable future.
What is more, present institutions do not permit the ready divi-
sion and diversification of one's human capital holdings by, for ex-
ample, purchasing pieces of other persons or their income-streams
("talent pooling"). 155 For example, in a world of complete asset
markets, a doctor might diversify her human capital portfolio by
purchasing portions of the butcher's, the baker's, and the candle-
stick-maker's future income streams, while selling a portion of her
own generated stream. Members of the other occupations might
do the same. As it happens, however, customs, difficulties atten-
dant upon enforcing service contracts, and laws prohibiting per-
sonal servitude significantly constrain the prospects for such trad-
ing.156 And even insofar as the latter might be effected through,
say, hedging contracts, currently there are no clearinghouses in
which such contracts might be purchased, sold, and backed by
margin account. One point of this Article, of course, is to envisage
155 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 258-59 (1987) (observing that labor is
non-diversifiable); see also Donald F. Gordon, A Neoclassical Theory of Keynesian
Unemployment, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 431, 443 (1974) (noting that one cannot "sell a
piece of oneself if one is a lawyer in Cincinatti and buy a portion of a carpenter in
San Diego"); BRANKO HORVAT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIALISM 447 (1982)
(recognizing that individual workers have only one labor power or job while
owners can acquire a diversified portfolio of shares).
156 This, of course, has not always been the case, indenture having been a
common form of securing loans and paying off debt in, for example, late medieval
times, and recommended in the early nineteenth century by no less a figure than
Chief Justice Marshall. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)
(stating that debtors may be confined for failing to perform contractual duties or
as a means of inducing debtors to perform). A modem form of contractual future-
income indenture for the sake of securing educational (i.e., human capital-
development) funding has been famously proposed by Milton Friedman, The Role
of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 141 (Robert
A. Solow ed., 1955). See also William Vickrey, A Proposal for Student Loans, in
ECONOMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 268-80 (S. J. Mushkin ed., 1962); Nicholas Barr,
Income-Contingent Student Loans: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in ECONOMICS,
CULTURE AND EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC BLAUG 155 (G.K. Shaw ed.,
1991); Alan B. Krueger & William B. Bowen, Income-Contingent College Loans, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 193 (1993) (citing a similar proposal by former President Clinton).
Some pop stars also appear to have begun to reintroduce the notion of personal
indenture as a means of raising financial capital. See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin, Man
ho Sold the World Loves to Court Top Artists: David Pullman Created Bowie Bonds
and He Likes to Litigate, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at 23. Sections 5 and 6 will intro-
duce means of completing markets in a manner effectively allowing for the trad-
ing of statistically correlated proxies for human capital.
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how such clearinghouses might be brought into being -the subject
of Sections 5 and 6.
The upshot is that in general, a person rendered redundant by
some unforeseeable technological development will simply have to
endure through a lagtime -one likely to constitute a significant
fraction of her entire working life's duration-en route to accumu-
lating a new portfolio of marketable skills on a par with her first
such set.157 Hers is not the only lagtime about which to be con-
cerned.
3.3. Waiting for Things to Get Better: Macrocycles & Macrolags
Not all shocks to one's income stream are the product of per-
manent technical change and the consequent redundancy of one's
previously accumulated human capital. It frequently happens that
one is rendered temporarily redundant by shocks to the mac-
roeconomy and market-saturation, sectoral slow-downs, inventory
build-ups, wage- and price-rigidities, "liquidity traps" and related
developments associated with general macroeconomic or sectoral
downturn.158 Particularly significant instances in recent years have
157 See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND
RISK SHARING 136 (1995) ("Most individuals' primary asset is their human capital.
This is subject to significant fluctuations in value as industries grow and decline
.... Those people who have nontransferable skills have suffered a large unin-
sured capital loss.").
158 See generally REAL BUSINESS CYCLES: A READER (1998); ROBERT E. LUCAS, JR.,
MODELS OF BUSINESS CYCLES (1987); THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CYCLE: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE (Robert J. Gordon ed., 1986); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Future
and the Present in Economic Life, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 157-70 (1978), reprinted in 2
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM 275 (1988) [hereinafter 2 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS]. Macroeconomic
downturn and labor redundancy are treated in most standard macroeconomics
texts. See, e.g., DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS 195-236, 439-86 (1996);
MERTON H. MILLER & CHARLES W. UPTON, MACROECONOMICS: A NEOCLASSICAL
INTRODUCTION 321-55 (1986). More formal treatment is found throughout THOMAS
J. SARGENT, MACROECONOMIC THEORY (2d ed. 1987) and, more recently, in LARS
LJUNGQVIST & THOMAS J. SARGENT, RECURSIVE MACROECONOMIC THEORY 81-125
(2001).
There are of course various speculations as to what manner of exogenous
shock generally drives macroeconomic cycling. See, e.g., Finn E. Kydland & Ed-
ward C. Prescott, Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1345
(1982) (examining the role of technical innovation); MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM
FOR MONETARY STABILITY vii-23, esp. 22-23 ("Every [episode of fluctuation] has
been accompanied by a significant monetary disturbance... [and] [tihe monetary
disturbances have had a [sufficiently] independent origin in enough cases to es-
tablish a strong presumption that they are contributory causes rather than simply
incidental effects of the economic fluctuations."); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J.
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resulted from shocks to the global financial markets caused by high
market-volatility, rooted in turn at least partly in the proliferation
of high-speed information-processing, trading, and communica-
tions technologies throughout those markets. 59 There is nothing,
in general, that the individual member of the labor force can do to
head off such developments. (But note, in anticipation of Sections
4 and 6, that for precisely that reason it should be possible to avoid
moral hazard problems by tying insurance to such developments.)
In general, kinks in the macroeconomy of this sort work them-
selves out over time, usually through the familiar channels of in-
terest rate, wage, and price adjustment. 60 But wages and prices, as
is well known, often are sticky -they do not change with the im-
mediacy that neoclassical price theory demands in order that
"Say's Law" be practically obeyed in the short run as it might theo-
retically be in the long run.161 And this stickiness, like macroeco-
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960 (1963); Robert J.
Barro, Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States, 67 AM.
ECON. REv. 101 (1977) (exploring empirical results supporting the notion that
"only the unanticipated point of money expansion influences unemployment");
David M. Lilien, Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment, 90 J. POL. ECON. 777
(1982) (arguing that most of the unemployment fluctuation of the 1970s was
caused by "structural shifts," e.g., demand for services versus demand for goods);
James D. Hamilton, Oil and the Macroeconomy Since World War II, 91 J. POL. ECON.
228 (1983) (arguing oil price shocks play a role in recessions).
159 Again, the Asian Financial Crisis is a conspicuous example. For more on
its genesis and implications, as well as on its ultimate effects upon employee in-
comes throughout the affected region, see Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra note 6.
For more on financial market volatility and its effects on the informational effi-
ciency (or otherwise) of financial markets, see Section 5, infra.
160 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra note 6 (noting the effects of adjustment
on the macroeconomy).
161 This is by now a quite familiar story. See supra note 159. Still illuminating,
however, is JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). "Say's Law," alas, has suffered nearly as many alter-
native formulations, even by the Author himself, as has Kant's Categorical Im-
perative. In what is likely its most familiar articulation, the "law" states that
"supply creates its own demand." Say's Law actually bears at least two possible
interpretations, the first, "mechanistic" one being captured by the "demand-
creation" maxim. This is now labeled "Say's Equality." See BARR, supra note 156,
at 149-78; SCHUMPETER, supra note 39, at 611-25. The other interpretation, now la-
beled "Say's Identity," has it that because all productive inputs are factor pay-
ments, supply-side investment by definition gives rise to equivalent potential de-
mand. Keynes' innovative attentions to flow-lags, differing marginal propensities
to consume and save, money-hoarding, and "sticky" wages and prices might be
seen as the first comprehensive effort to explain why "Say's Identity" failed, at
least in the short run, to warrant the oversimplified mechanistic predictions seem-
ingly entailed by "Say's Equality."
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nomic slowdown itself, is not practically under the control of the
laborer. He might be willing to accept a lower wage or to work
fewer hours for a time, but the collective bargaining agreement to
which he is subject, and thus the labor laws which reinforce that
agreement, might not allow him to accept this lower wage or to of-
fer working hours intermediate between the simple binary choice
of fully employed and unemployed. 62 And this is not even begin-
ning to consider the general levels of prices and interest rates, over
which the individual bears essentially no control whatsoever.
It thus seems fair not to hold the individual responsible for
general economic downturns, the slow rate at which such difficul-
ties iron themselves out, or the resulting protracted losses to his in-
come. These risks, like those occasioned by technical change, con-
sequent redundancy, and specific human capital lock-in, are best
regarded in significant part as systemic risks, appropriately borne
by all in roughly equal measure. 63 They are part of the risk-
residuum, the exogenously given, deserts-unjustified endowment.
But they are also, because systemically affecting all, risks that are
visible to all-they amount to publicly available information-
hence, risks against which it ought to be possible to insure pri-
vately. This takes us to the general theories of insurance and of so-
cial insurance, the latter of which, as we shall see, might fairly be
recast as a theory of just insurance.
162 There have of course been interesting proposals along these lines. See, e.g.,
JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF WORK AND
SPEND (1994); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK (1996); MARTIN WErrZMAN, THE
SHARE ECONOMY (1984). Note also that a shorter work week has been attempted in
France as a means of sharing the burden entailed by labor market saturation. See
David Woodruff, France Moves Smoothly to Shorter Work Week, WALL ST. J., Novem-
ber 9, 1998, at A20. Finally, see Robert Hockett, Assets and Stakes in the Efficient
Liberal Republic: Conceiving, Mapping, Advocating and Implementing "Owner-
ship Solutions" to Socio-Economic Dysfunction [hereinafter Hockett, Assets &
Stakes) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author), where "capital-diffusion"
in the form of broader corporate ownership is advocated as one means of address-
ing such problems in a manner consistent with America's propertarian, pro-
growth and "homesteading" ideological traditions. My proposals need not be
seen as competitors to these ideas. They are, in fact, fully complementary.
163 As for that qualifier, "in significant part," we shall see in Sections 5 and 6
that informationally rich trading markets in hedging instruments tied to systemic
risks will facilitate price-discovery, hence monetary valuation, in connection with
the non-foreseeable increments of individuals' income risks.
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4. INSURANCE AS JUSTICE AND AS "MARKET-OUTPUT": FAIR AND
(MOSTLY) EFFICIENT RISK-SHARING THROUGH TRADING
It is somewhat surprising that nobody, so far as this author has
been able to determine, has endeavored systematically and com-
prehensively to integrate the philosophico-economic theory of dis-
tributive justice with the full economic theory of insurance. 64 For
reasons that soon will become apparent (if they are not apparent
already), the marriage would seem to be a natural. Insurance is,
after all, like justice a matter of distribution,165 in this case the dis-
tribution of risk. Risk is, in the terms used in Section 2, a valued
(or disvalued) distribuendum-a value-burden the distribution of
which implicates justice. Choices behind veils of ignorance, more-
164 I attempt to do just that, comprehensively, in Hockett, Market-Able Jus-
tice, supra note 17, and to sketch the relation in this Section of the present essay. I
should note that Ronald Dworkin innovatively uses a "hypothetical insurance
market" to brilliant, if ultimately unsuccessful, effects in exploring what a just sys-
tem of redistributive taxation designed to compensate people for handicaps and
differential talents would look like. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at
73-99; see also COLIN M. MACLEOD, LIBERALISM, JUSTICE, AND MARKETS: A CRITIQUE
OF LIBERAL EQUALITY 98-105, 132-150 (1998); RAKOWSKI, supra note 90, at 126-38;
Varian, Redistributive Taxation, supra note 143. For the (relatively few) weaknesses
of Dworkin's generally inspiring effort, see Hockett, Market-Able Insurance, supra
note 17; ROEMER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 245-61. I discuss Dwork-
inian and Varianian insurance more infra, Section 6.2, in explaining why the new
markets I am proposing, which could be exploited (if not indeed established) by a
governmental unemployment-insurance entity structured more as a financial in-
termediary than as a welfare agency, would constitute a better "second best" to
ideal just insurance than do either Dworkinian-Varianian social insurance or the
current Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program.
An attempt at least to discuss justice and insurance together, albeit in a rather
piecemeal, fragmentary and ultimately unsatisfying manner, is KENNETH
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK (1986) (compiling a number of articles originally ap-
pearing in the legal literature). Dworkin's and Abraham's works jointly exhaust
the class of writings of which I am aware that so much as hold justice and insur-
ance together in the same thought. Unless, of course, we count GOLLIER, supra
note 61, Harsanyi cites, supra note 60, and Vickrey, supra note 60, and the count-
less public finance texts that briefly cover "justice" (generally Rawls's account
alone) and social insurance (generally welfare, Medicaid and Social Security pro-
grams) in discontinuous chapters. See, e.g., HYMAN, supra note 98, HARVEY S.
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (4th ed. 1995), and STIGLITZ, supra note 98. Or, that writer
on justice who has explicitly treated the original position as a decision problem
under uncertainty (Harsanyi), and that one writer on financial theory who has ob-
served the portfolio problem as involving a "veil of ignorance" (Gollier). See supra
notes 59 and 71, respectively.
165 And, as observed supra notes 60 and 62, Harsanyi's and Rawls's employ-
ing the device of a "veil of ignorance" in deriving principles of justice converts the
justice problem into a problem of rational choice under uncertainty -hence (and
in that sense) an insurance (or "portfolio") problem.
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over, which as we have seen have figured prominently in discus-
sions of justice, are choices under uncertainty -they are insurance
problems. Intriguing as these connections are in their own right,
there are additional reasons to consider justice and insurance in
tandem. As insurance problems, for example, are readily parsed as
portfolio problems, the marriage of justice and insurance theory of-
fers a chance to exploit, on behalf of justice, terrific advances made
in financial theory over the past several decades, and a chance to
exploit new markets and technologies that have arisen partly as re-
sults of those advances. Indeed, the marriage of justice and insur-
ance (hence portfolio) theory offers the promise that we might ex-
ploit globalization itself (which has in no small part been enabled
and effectuated by the very technologies that lie at the heart of "the
new finance") in addressing the harms that globalization, along
with its benefits, has wrought. Full synthesis of the theories of jus-
tice and insurance thus not only illuminates some important and
fascinating conceptual relations between, and fuller separate ap-
preciations of, justice and insurance themselves, but also, more ur-
gently, offers the opportunity at long last of articulately and com-
prehensively addressing some of our most pressing and persistent
ethical and economic problems through some very practical and
thus far untried programmatic means. This Section accordingly
endeavors to synthesize precisely such a theoretical framework, all
the while with a menu of precise practical programs -to be dis-
cussed in subsequent Sections-in view. We begin with the eco-
nomic theory of insurance.
4.1. Definable and Verifiable Risks, Predictable Variances, and Shared
Information: Prerequisites to Efficient Insurance Markets
The theoretical prerequisites to the development and long term
viability of a private insurance market-in the terms used at Sec-
tion 2, a market in which the "valued" traded is the bearing of or
provision against loss-are by now well rehearsed, though the
risk-distributional and justice-significance of those markets and
their prerequisites are rather less so. 166 Insurance is a means of
166 See, e.g., EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
RISK AND INSURANCe 20-22 passim (8th ed. 1999); J. FRANCOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF RISK AND INSURANCE 131-65 passim (1998). More formal treatment
can be found in MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 167-208, 436-73; VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 172-94; KREPS, supra note 12, at 71-124,
577-715; and throughout KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (1990).
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shifting, through trade, risks from those who disvalue them more
to those who disvalue them less.167 An insurance market is thus a
means of pooling, through trade, broad categories of anticipated
risk which in relation to a pool's risk-bearers taken as a whole are
affordable while in relation to all or most risk-bearers as individu-
als are not.' 68 By all "chipping in" and establishing, through pay-
ments of premiums, a common pool of resources sufficient to cover
the total expected risk-costs to the pool (the distribution of which
within the pool is antecedently unknown), participants in an insur-
ance market not only minimize the expenditures that each of them
would need make in order fully to self-insure, but lower the total
social cost of risk as well. For were all fully to self-insure, re-
sources that might have been invested in greater production of
other goods would be held back. 69 The "antecedently unknown"
condition is important. In the absence of a veil of ignorance, we
don't face risks, but determinate burdens with determinate distri-
butions, and the self-serving who are not subject to those risks
simply will let the losses lie where they may. An efficient insur-
ance market, then, amounts to a "justice-opportunity," a chance to
convert antecedently unknown "brute" luck into "option" luck.
170
But that opportunity rests upon certain features of the risk(s) to be
insured against, and, as noted, the knowledge states (or what I
shall sometimes call "information endowments") of the parties to
167 I digress, for the moment, from why those who "disvalue them less" dis-
value them less. It need not be a matter of comparative personal attitudes toward
risk; it might be a matter of differing opinion as to risk's likelihood, or of the abil-
ity of one party to bear risk more efficiently than another-perhaps because the
party which disvalues the risk less has organized a pool of risk-bearers over
which risk in the aggregate can be dissipated.
168 In this connection I can hardly improve upon the words of the venerable
Smith: "The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private peo-
ple, and by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individ-
ual, makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society." SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS, supra note 40, at ch. 1.
169 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation [herein-
after Arrow, Insurance], in KENNETH J. ARROW, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-
BEARING (1965), reprinted in 4 KENNETH J. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J.
ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 87 (1984) [hereinafter 4 ARROW,
COLLECTED PAPERS] ("The possibility of shifting risks, of insurance in the broadest
sense, permits individuals to engage in risky activities which they would not oth-
erwise undertake... and society will be better off by the increased production.").
170 This useful distinction appears to originate in DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN
VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 73, though it is perhaps rooted in G.E.M. Anscombe, On
Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69 (1958), reprinted in ANSCOMBE, COLLECTED PAPERS, su-
pra note 25, at 22.
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the prospective insurance contract-and, to a salient extent, of the
societies to which those parties belong.
The first requisite risk feature generally is referred to as insur-
able event orthoganality, or "independence." 171 There is a vener-
able debate in the theoretical literature on probability as to whether
independence- and probability more generally -should be con-
sidered a metaphysical ("objective," "frequentist") or an epistemic
("subjective," "personalist," "expectationist," "Bernoullian,"
"Bayesian") category. 72 While this distinction takes on consider-
able practical significance in connection with the other prerequi-
sites to efficient insurance discussed infra (as well as in connection
with cardinally measurable utility as discussed in Section 2),173 and
171 Or "randomness" or "non-catastrophicity." See BORCH, supra note 166 at
163-74; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166 at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note
166 at 22; other sources cited supra, note 166.
172 See, e.g., OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 73-83; M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX
HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE
RISK AND POLICY ANALYIS 48-50 (1990). The two sides are classically represented in
the twentieth century by the works of Keynes and Ramsey. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921); F. P. RAMSEY, Truth and Probability, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 52-109 (D.H. Mellor ed. 1990) (1926). The Ramsey position,
largely forgotten to decision-theorists during Ramsey's day (principally the
1920s), was later picked up and popularized by L. Savage in the latter's influential
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1951). Useful histories of the perennial debates sur-
rounding probability and statistical inference, and their significance both for util-
ity theory as discussed supra, Section 2, and for insurance theory, discussed pres-
ently in Section 4, are IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY (1975); IAN
HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE (1990); JAN VON PLATO, CREATING MODERN
PROBABILITY (1994); THEODOR M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING: 1820-
1900 (1986); STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY BEFORE 1900 (1986); LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE
ENLIGHTENMENT (1986) (adapted from the author's more suggestively titled doc-
toral dissertation, THE REASONABLE CALCULUS: CLASSICAL PROBABILITY THEORY
1650-1840); see also A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD (expanded ed. 1992) (1972) (de-
fending an alternative approach to inductive inference, first proposed by R.A.
Fisher, based upon relations of support between hypotheses rather than additive-
axiomatic probability, and highlighted differences between this approach and
classical probability theory as developed throughout its history). In the economic
context more specifically, but principally in regard only to probability's place in
utility theory, see BARR, supra note 156, at 87-95; SCHUMPETER, supra note 39, at 302-
05.
173 See supra notes 28, 40 and 75; Kenneth J. Arrow, Alternative Approaches to
the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations, 19 ECONOMETRICA 404 (1951) [herein-
after Arrow, Alternative Approaches], reprinted in 3 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR UNDER CERTAINTY
AND UNCERTAINTY 5 (1984) [hereinafter 3 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS]; Kenneth J.
Arrow, Utility, Attitudes, Choices: A Review Note, 26 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1958), re-
printed in 3 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS, id. at 55; Kenneth J. Arrow, Rational Choice
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some such significance in connection with some of the means
available to ensure independence (also discussed infra), for the
moment it should merely be flagged as a matter of theoretical im-
port. As a practical matter, in order for insurance to be efficiently
providable, the probability of an insured event's befalling one pro-
spective member of the risk pool must generally be found to be
more or less independent of that of the event's befalling other
members. (Note that there must therefore be probability informa-
tion available.) In the absence of an ascertainably sufficient degree
of such independence -a state referred to as "covariance"- the in-
sured event will tend to occur in wave-like, or more or less general
catastrophic fashion. Under these circumstances there are fewer
(or no) unaffected persons available to finance- to trade with, shift
resources to, or compensate -affected ones, and the pooling of
compensatory resources and channeling of those resources from
those less needful or valuing of them to those who need or value
them more, particularly when administrative and transaction costs
are factored into the equation, is simply impossible; everybody
needs them.1 74
Independence and covariance are of course matters of degree.
In general, the more covariance and less independence there are
between the prospective insurable events befalling various insur-
eds, the less likely it is that insurance -as distinguished from gen-
eral disaster relief175-will be possible at all, let alone privately
providable. In addition, it makes it more difficult for a purported
insurer credibly to commit to indemnify.
The second prerequisite to insurability is the determinability
(or verifiability) and the measurability (or estimability) of an in-
Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMICA 121 (1959), reprinted in 3 ARROw,
COLLECTED PAPERS, id. at 100; Kenneth J. Arrow, Utility and Expectation in Economic
Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF SCIENCE 724 (S. Koch ed., 1963), reprinted in 3
ARRow, COLLECTED PAPERS, id. at 117; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk-
Aversion, in KENNETH J. ARROw, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 28 (1965),
reprinted in 3 ARRow, COLLECTED PAPERS, id. at 147; and Kenneth J. Arrow, Exposi-
tion of the Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION 19 (C.
B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1971), reprinted in 3 ARROw, COLLECTED PAPERS, id.
at 172.
174 See note 179, supra, for a formal summation of this and the following pre-
requisite to a sustainable insurance market.
175 The latter can of course be seen as a form of non-contracted insurance (at
least in its distributional aspect); but even this, then, will depend upon the exis-
tence of some who are unaffected, or at least less affected, by the disaster-
generally people in some distant, unaffected locality.
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sured event's definitional contours, probability and cost-
amalgamable as "probable cost."176 Determinability is a semantic
as well as an ex post epistemic category; parties to the insurance
contract must agree upon what, more or less precisely, shall count
as an instance of the insured event and how to determine whether
such an event has transpired. Estimability is, for its part, forth-
rightly an ex ante epistemic category; the concern is with what can
be foreseen and forecast. (Note that, through the workings of the
"law of large numbers,"'177 probable costs become more predictable
with greater frequency through time for the events falling within
the insured event class; cost variance is reduced.) Where the in-
sured event's likely prospective cost cannot in any way be as-
sessed, there is no way of knowing how much in the way of com-
pensatory resources to pool, thus how much to assess the insured
by way of premiums. Where a product - here insurance - cannot
be reliably priced, it is analytically impossible for a market to
emerge or to continue.178 The would-be consumer does not know
what to pay, the would-be producer/provider does not know what
to charge, and no one has any reason to believe the latter economi-
cally capable of living up to a contractual commitment to indem-
nify.
79
176 See OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra
note 166, at 21; other sources cited at note 166; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Informa-
tion and Economic Behavior [hereinafter Arrow, Information], in 4 ARROW,
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 169, at 136 ("If contracts are contingent on the oc-
currence of some event, then it must be verifi[able] whether or not the event oc-
curred." In anticipation of our next prerequisite, see id. at 165 ("[Tlhe range of
possible contingent contracts becomes limited to those for whom the events are
easily verifiable by both parties." (emphasis added)). Note that in general the
probability must be less than one (i.e., less than certain), otherwise the insurance
premium will equal the loss cost plus the administrative cost of the insurance,
hence will be more expensive than the loss itself.
177 The "law of large numbers" actually refers to at least two families of theo-
rems, one canonically referred to as "weak," the other as strong (generally called
"central limit theorems"), both of which tighten up and lend precision to the basic
insight that statistical frequencies stabilize as the number of trials grows larger.
For popular exposition, see IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND
INDucnvE LOGIC 189-208, esp. 190, 205 (2001). More formal treatment can be
found in any standard probability text, for example, WILLIAM FELLER, I AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 243-61 (3d ed. 1968);
WILLIAM FELLER, II AN INTRODucrION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS
219-84 (2d ed. 1971); DANIEL W. STROOCK, PROBABILITY THEORY: AN ANALYrIC VIEW
16-19 (weak), 40-43 (strong) (rev. ed. 1993).
178 See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 114 at 130.
179 Note that we can sum up the independence and estimability requirements
as follows: It is a commonplace that the insurance premium P for insured event
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One should note that if the probability of the event's occurring
to an identified individual is one (i.e., is certain), insurance for the
identified individual also will be, absent voluntary or compelled
altruism, impossible. For again, insurance markets coalesce on the
basis of shared uncertainty (ignorance or lack of information) faced
by those who chip into the pool. Hence, somewhat paradoxically
at first sight, ordinary market-provided insurance is available in
face of the estimability requirement only if the insured event is
both uncertain as regards affected individuals and cost-measurable
as regards the full risk-pool. Too much information kills the pri-
vate market (by prematurely lifting the veil of ignorance'
80 ), as
does too little.
The third prerequisite to an efficient insurance market is, not-
withstanding its label, epistemic, metaphysical and even ethical in
nature: information held by parties to the prospective insurance
contract must be more or less symmetrically distributed.
181 Asym-
metrically distributed information comes in two forms, either of
which threatens the viability of insurance markets.
Where the insured is able to conceal an insured event's prob-
ability of occurring from the insurer, the market is said to be sub-
ject to "adverse selection" or "anti-selection." 182 Prospective insur-
i - Pi - must be equal to the probability of the insured event's occurring - ni -
multiplied by the loss that will thereby be occasioned - Li -and by an adminis-
trative cost-a. In short, Pi=(l+a)niLi. Now if the probability of the event's oc-
curring is certain, such that Hi = 1 (which is what complete covariance would
amount to), then Pi = (1+a)Li, and the premium exceeds the loss. If ni is un-
known, on the other hand (which is complete inestimability amounts to), there
will be no Pi at all.
180 See supra note 60 (referring to Rawls's and Harsanyi's use of the veil of
ignorance).
181 See BORCH, supra note 166 at 315-30; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166 at 166-67;
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 166 at 5-6, 21-22; other sources cited supra, note
166; see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insur-
ance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629
(1976); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter Arrow, Limited Knowledge], reprinted in 4 ARROW,
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 169; Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk Allocation and Informa-
tion: Some Recent Theoretical Developments, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INSURANCE 1
(1978), reprinted in 4 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS, id. at 197.
182 See BORCH, supra note 166, at 319-25; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 152,
179-80; MICHAEL H. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 16-18 (1999) (describing the foundations of social in-
surance). Readily accessible formal treatments are JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G.
RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 307-13 (1992); LOUiS
PHILIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 57-88 (1988). See also Arrow,
Information, supra note 176, at 147-48. On the same problem beyond the insurance
189
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ers knowing or fearing that insureds know more than they do
about the relevant probabilities will tend to expect or plan for the
worst -assuming that only those who know themselves to be par-
ticularly likely to suffer the event's falling will seek to insure in the
first place-and therefore see the particular risk as covarying, the
market as a classic "market for lemons." 183 In response, they will
either charge an average rate (pooling equilibrium) that better risks
find too high and thus decline (demand-side withdrawal) or with-
draw themselves (supply-side withdrawal).184 A sort of
"Gresham's Law" effect ensues; "bad risks drive out the good."'185
Where the insured not only can conceal the relevant probability
but is able to manipulate or affect it, the market is said to be subject
to "moral hazard."186 Intuitively, the concern here is that the in-
sured, precisely because she is insured, will refrain from taking ac-
tions which tend to lessen the insured event's likelihood of occur-
ring, or even will take actions which affirmatively enhance that
likelihood. (There is thus, in the sense of Section 2.3, an incentive
concern.)187 If the event is of the sort that tends to occur with sig-
context, see SALANIt, supra note 103, at 11-83 (discussing the general theory of ad-
verse selection).
183 See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488-500 (1970); see also L. Glosten & Paul Milgrom,
Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed
Traders, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (describing a more general, formal model of the
same phenomenon).
184 It seems to me that this assumes a particular degree of risk-aversion on the
part of would-be insurers (rather as we noted that Rawlsian justice assumed a
particular degree of risk-aversion among rational choosers behind the veil of ig-
norance -see supra, Section 2.2), and that the would-be insurers themselves in
turn are assumed to assume non-risk-aversion on the part of prospective custom-
ers who do not know themselves to be subject to the risk in question, but I intend
here only to report the consensus theory, not to displace it.
185 Gresham's Law, of course, is that "bad money drives out good." RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 839 (2d ed. 1986).
186 See BORCH, supra note 166 at 325-30; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166 at 133-34,
179-80; GRAETz & MASHAW, supra note 182, at 16-18; HIRSHLEIFER & RILEY, supra
note 182, at 296-307; PHILIPS, supra note 182, at 57-58; SALANI8, supra note 103 at
107-42 (again, beyond the insurance context alone); M.V. Pauly, The Economics of
Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Arrow, Information, supra note 176, at
148-49; Arrow, Insurance, supra note 169, reprinted in 4 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 169, at 77, 85; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968), reprinted in 4 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 169, at 103; Arrow, Uncertainty, supra note 153, at 941-73, reprinted in 6
ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 153; CAMPBELL, supra note 99, at 156-65.
187 See discussion infra Section 2.3.
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nificantly greater frequency if not affirmatively provided against,
and many insureds refrain from so providing, or if insurance itself
tends to lead directly to the event's more frequent occurrence (e.g.,
fire-insureds set fires), the market is again beset by a kind of insur-
ance-induced covariance, and tends either to operate inefficiently
or to prove unsustainable. A salient hypothetical example in con-
nection with this Article's concerns would be the displaced or un-
employed laborer who refrained from seeking new employment or
new skills precisely because she was the beneficiary of unemploy-
ment insurance (the proverbial Reagan "welfare queen" in her
AFDC-financed Cadillac 8 8).
4.2. Broader Pooling, Better Information: Typic Means of Addressing
Classic Impediments to Efficient Insurance
Participants in insurance markets and practitioners (as well as
legislators) of insurance law have developed a variety of means by
which to address the classic impediments to fairness and efficiency
in insurance markets. It is both conceptually and ethically intrigu-
ing to observe how transparently these methods and rules appear
to manifest concerns with both of those values.
89
Comparatively little can be done, by way of rendering insur-
ance more feasible, to prevent or alleviate the actual covariance of
insured events. In general, one simply addresses its likelihood
within or financeability by the pool of insureds, by broadening that
pool itself as widely as is practicable. The wider or deeper the
pool, the smaller is the fraction thereof that truly random events
will likely befall.190 One might attempt to ameliorate the effects of
covariance through epistemic (informational) means as well; the
discovery of statistical or microstatistical ("causal") relations be-
tween subfeatures y and 8 of events r and A, for example, will ren-
188 See Welfare Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign: Hitting a Nerve, N.Y.
TIMES, February 15, 1976 (describing Reagan's use, and embellishment, of the
"welfare queen" story in his stump speeches).
189 The following paragraphs lay out the specifics. For more general back-
ground, see, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 164; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW
AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2000); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I.
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES,
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES (1988); ROGER C. HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY II,
INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. JERRY II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (3d ed. 2002).
190 See OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 132; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note
166, at 21. Broader pooling also improves estimability, through the workings of
the "law of large numbers." Id.
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der the degree of covariance between F and A more predictable;
one might, upon such discovery, find that /y (or more convention-
ally F\y) and /6 (or more conventionally A\ 5) can be separately in-
sured because it is only y and 5 that covary291 But this is of course,
again, a means of accommodating rather than preventing covari-
ance; pool-broadening redefines the class of persons, empirical cor-
relation-discovery the risks (hence sometimes also the persons) in-
sured.192
The estimability of probable costs likewise is addressed by both
epistemic (informational) and pool-broadening means.193 Like the
number of events that can be insured against, the degree of preci-
sion with which such insurance can be priced (through operation
of the law of large numbers) is a positive function both of the
number and consequent standardizability of potential contracts,
and of that quantum of knowledge available to society at large (or,
more specifically, to the scientific community) to which insureds
and insurers are able to gain access. Like covariance, then, ines-
timability is a constraint upon insurance markets that recedes gen-
erally with the advancement of society's scientific knowledge-
what we might call "the social information endowment" -and the
widening of public awareness of and interest in insuring against
particular risks. There is, relatively speaking, comparatively little
that individual prospective insurers and insureds can do to facilitate
insurance markets by attacking covariance and inestimability.
They are problems faced by the collectivity of would-be insurance
market participants.
The challenges posed to insurance markets by asymmetric in-
formation are in many cases more easily addressed than are those
posed by the other obstacles to efficient insurance (it is often easier
to equalize information, and to do so more quickly, than it is to
augment the aggregate social information endowment, which
191 That is, that entire classes of such subfeatures can be separately insured.
(Read "/y" and "/6" as "non-y" and "non-b." (Or read "F\ y" and "A\ 6" as "the
non-y F's" and "the non-5 A's."))
192 One possible form or result of the refinement of empirical knowledge of
statistical correlates is "risk-classification" or "-segmentation" on the basis of per-
sonal features (e.g., genetic traits) over which persons bear no control. In such
cases justice and "efficiency" understood as simple wealth-maximization can di-
verge, as discussed infra, Section 3. See also Arrow, Uncertainty, in 6 ARROW,
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 153, at 39-40.
193 See OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra
note 166, at 21.
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grows gradually with the advancement of science). Where the
problem is not so much the quantity or quality of available infor-
mation but the distribution of that information, the solution lies in
facilitating the evening-out - i.e., the rendering more just 194 - of in-
formational availability. Thus, in the case of adverse selection, we
find explicit or legally implied warranties and rules against fraud
which, in effectively removing the risk of "lemons" from markets,
render such markets sustainable.195 Familiar examples from actual
insurance markets are the inspections of homes prior to affording
fire (or even mortgage) insurance, and the preexisting condition
clauses found in, and physical examinations required by, many
health insurance contracts.
196
In the case of moral hazard, insurance markets are facilitated
by merit-rating (or bonus-malus pricing), deductibles, and so-
called coinsurance contracts, under which the insured continues to
bear some of the cost of an insured event's occurring, thus contin-
ues to face incentives to prevent the event's occurrence; 197 also by
the fact that some events by their very natures will tend as a practi-
cal matter only to be coinsurable, as when, say in the case of a terri-
ble burn accident, no monetary compensation is likely to leave the
insured pleased that the event befell her, thus to have encouraged
194 "More even" means "more just" here because we are not at this level of
abstraction in the hypothetical assuming any differential deserts to the information
and thus are still at the baseline of initial equality. See supra Section 2.3; infra note
211.
It bears noting that increasing the number of people in possession of informa-
tion in a sense is an augmentation of the social information base; one increases the
number of knowers, and, presumably, with that the number of consequent in-
formed decisions taken by members of society.
195 A similar information-production norm, it has been remarked, appears to
be implicit in the common law of contractual mistake. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2
H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864); Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568
(1887). See also FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 686-
741 (5th ed. 1998); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1978); Eric Rasmussen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and
Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. Leg. Stud. 309 (1993). A duty to inquire
can be construed as a duty to "produce" information.
196 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 166, at 29, 170-71, 312; see also Ar-
row, Uncertainty, in 6 ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS supra note 153, at 39-40; sources
on insurance law cited supra note 215.
197 See BORCH, supra note 166, at 318; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 150-52;
VAUGHN & VAUGHN, supra note 166, at 382-83, 585-86; see also Arrow, Insurance,
supra note 169, at 85-86; Kenneth J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized De-
ductibles, 74 SCANDINAVIAN ACTUARIAL J. 1 (1974), reprinted in 3 ARROW, COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 173, at 212.
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her actually bringing it about. In the unemployment context, coin-
surance takes the form of lowered wage- or salary-replacement
rates, the idea being that if one is indemnified at a rate lower than
that at which she was paid prior to being disemployed, she will
continue to bear incentives to seek renewed employment.198
It bears noting that in some cases insurance markets are thought
to be either unsustainable, or available only through ongoing gov-
ernment provision or subsidy, only to turn out later to constitute
quite lucrative opportunities for private providers.199 Here, a clas-
sic case is the market for mortgage insurance, which, for a variety
of reasons, was thought to be incapable of private provision until
the federal government stepped in to provide it with the National
Housing Act of 1934 ("NHA") and follow-on legislation.200 The
government subsequently turned profits of sufficient magnitude as
to invite the establishment of a lively market of private provision,
which is now available not only through "Fannie Mae," "Ginnie
Mae" and "Freddie Mac," but also (thanks to the operations of
these latter) through the securitized mortgage market.201
198 See, e.g., John S. Fleming, Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance, 10 J.
PUB. ECON. 403 (1978).
199 Perhaps some vindication here for the mild skepticism registered supra
note 184, in regard to adverse selection.
200 National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). See also
Hockett, Assets & Stakes, supra note 162.
201 1 provide a detailed account of the development of federal housing and
mortgage insurance programs in Hockett, Assets and Stakes, id.. See also FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 1-184 (Paul Mitchell ed., 1986). The story runs
roughly as follows. The Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), established
during the depression in the 1930s to jump-start the housing industry and facili-
tate home-ownership by a larger swathe of the population, for the first time of-
fered insurance on, and via the requirements imposed upon sellers in order to
qualify for insurance effectively standardized, long-term mortgages. See National
Housing Act, supra note 201. (Standardization of course happened to be an eco-
nomic prerequisite to the later development of a liquid secondary mortgage mar-
ket.) The Veterans' Administration ("VA") got into the same line in 1944. See Ser-
vicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill), ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (1944). In
1948, the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA" or "Fannie Mae") was
established in order to create a liquid secondary market for FHA- and VA-insured
mortgages. See Act of July 1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948). Similar
agencies -the Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA" or "Ginnie
Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC" or "Freddie
Mac") -were established with roughly the same purpose in view in 1968 and
1970. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82
Stat. 476 (1968); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 84 Stat. 451 (1970). Through these agencies the federal government
backed and effectively issued the world's first mortgage pass-through securities.
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The lesson afforded by experiences like that of the NHA and its
progeny is threefold: 1) The lack of a private market at tn does not
entail the folly of (at least temporary) government-provision or
guaranty of the product in question at tx>n. 2) The lack of a pri-
vate market at tn does not entail the unsustainability of a private
market at tn or tx>n. 3) Indeed, 1 and 2 jointly suggest a particular
role that government might sometimes usefully play, namely, to
demonstrate the possible self-sustainability of a private market
where prospective providers, owing to cultural-inertial and collec-
tive action problems, risk-aversion or other causes, currently fear
to tread. For reasons of precisely this sort, markets analogous to
the mortgage-backed securities market (effectively, securitizing in-
come-correlates), and (at least temporary) government action, are
countenanced infra, Sections 5 and 6.202
4.3. With One Possible Caveat: Efficient Insurance as Ex Ante Dis-
tributive Justice
The theory of distributive justice is readily synthesized, in sig-
nificant measure, with the economic theory of insurance. 2 3 We
can, in effect, by fully specifying the insurance problem with a
view to the informationally enriched contractual justice model
sketched earlier in Section 2.3, convert the ideal insurance market
into a more responsibility-textured rendition of what Rawls would
call "the original position" behind the veil of ignorance. 204 In doing
so we shall find that just and genuinely efficient insurance markets
are near-mutual analytic entailments. More concretely, it is easily
shown that the three conditions of event independence (noncovari-
ance), symmetric information, and probable-cost estimability that
During the 1980s, private issuers, apparently impressed by the success of the fed-
eral agencies, began to offer similar securities without government backing. There
is now a very deep, active trading market in these financial assets. On securitized
mortgages, see, in addition to the sources just cited, FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL.,
FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 422-93 (3d ed. 2002); ALLEN
& GALE, supra note 157, at 112-14; A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION (Leon T. Kendall &
Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); C.J. Goldberg & K. Rogers, An Introduction to Asset-
Backed Securities, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 20 (1988).
202 I consider other possible "asset-building" and "capital-diffusion" pro-
grams analogous to the FHA mortgage-insurance program in Hockett, Assets &
Stakes, supra note 162.
203 I endeavor to carry out such a synthesis comprehensively in Hockett,
Market-Able Justice, supra note 17. Note, again, that the veil of ignorance itself
gives rise to an insurance problem. See also supra Section 2.2.
204 See generally RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22.
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are theoretically necessary to and sufficient for the existence of effi-
cient insurance markets are, properly understood, likewise (nearly)
necessary to and (nearly) sufficient for distributively just risk-
pooling. Or at any rate we shall see that most typic measures that
provide thesc, necessities enhance both the efficiency and the justice
of risk-bearing arrangements, suggesting that justice and efficiency
in insurance are in significant measure extensionally equivalent.
Event independence, as noted above, is optimized primarily
through maximal expansion of the risk-pool, while distributive jus-
tice for its own part requires that all who face systemic or latent, as
opposed to individually preventable or patent, risk be included in
the pool -i.e., again, that the pool-size be socially maximized. At
least one means by which insurance markets are rendered more ef-
ficient, then, also constitutes a means by which they are rendered
more just.
A caveat is in order in respect of the other method of address-
ing covariance discussed above. As noted, the discovery of statisti-
cal correlation between subfeatures y and 6 of events F and A
might render the degree of covariance between F and A more pre-
dictable and even allow for the separate insurability of F\y and
A\6. Now suppose that y is a particular genetic trait and 6 a spe-
cific illness. In such case it will enhance insurability, and indeed
lower the costs of insurance among those individuals within the
clusters of people bearing traits F\y who are uncertain about their
likelihoods of contracting the diseases A\6, simply to deny insur-
ance to those in subclass y or raise the price of their premiums. 205
Yet if carrying the trait y is not attributable to the responsibility-
accounts of those carrying it, then on the theory of justice that I of-
fered in Section 2.3, this exclusion will be unjust. Justice, then,
might diverge from efficiency in the latter ideal's standard conse-
quentialist or wealth-maximizing sense of aggregate cost-saving.
In a case like this we might have to choose between justice and ef-
ficiency, though on the theory of justice I have presented, there
really is no question as to which way we must go. Justice always is
our duty; wealth-maximizing efficiency is simply a common-
though as we now see not always necessary - byproduct.206 (In the
205 This is what is meant by "risk-classification," or "-segmentation." See dis-
cussion infra note 215; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 150-51; GRAETZ & MASHAW,
supra note 182, at 16-18.
206 Dworkin is thus, on my theory as well as his own, quite correct in, as he
does in those articles cited supra note 41, arguing that efficiency considered in ab-
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language of Section 2.3, the genetic trait is part of the initial base-
line endowment, which justice requires ideally be equalized over
all before the value-adding deserts-earning game gets underway.)
It should also be noted, however, that things actually are a bit
more complicated here than talk of a simple trade-off might imply.
For against the efficiency loss attributable to any prohibition on us-
ing genetic (or other ineluctable) information in deciding whether
to insure and how much to charge, we must balance the diminish-
ment of more general market participation and productive effort by the
victim of any unjustly distributed risk against which, by hypothe-
sis, no productively virtuous, preventive measure could have been
taken. (Think, again, of a genetic defect in this connection.) As for
market participation, it is well established that the unsharability of
risk tends to generate an excess of caution and a suboptimal level
of social risk-taking.2 7 We might think of this as an obverse of the
market for lemons. 208 Those who know that they will not be as-
sisted if they turn out to suffer a harm through no fault of their
own are likely to over-self-insure, and thus withdraw more re-
sources than are socially optimal from the demand market for
other products. A sort of Gresham's law with respect to risk
haunts again: bad-because unsharable-risk drives out good, in
the sense that even those who are not subject to genetic defects stay
out of demand markets more than they need do for goods other
than self-insurance. 20 9
A related incentive effect is the likely effect upon factor morale
straction from just distribution is not actually a value -as distinct from a fetish -
at all. Indeed, we might even argue that ignoring the baseline inequity of differ-
ential handicaps and talents is akin to a departure from the Pareto ideal; "mov-
ing" from the pre-birth equitable baseline to inequitable distribution of inborn en-
dowments is itself a violation of the Pareto principle. Those born (relatively)
handicapped are rendered "worse off" by the birth lottery.
Note also that there is an analog to this inherent, faultless risk-associated trait-
carrying on the one hand, and the only obstacle to the coextensionality of justice
and efficiency in production on the other -in other words, innate talent/handicap
differentials. Again, see the articles cited supra note 41. Insofar as we attend only
to efforts and thus responsibility, justice, and efficiency on my theory will coin-
cide, both in the risk/insurance context and in the production context. It is only
that increment of risk or product attributable to that for which one is not respon-
sible that might efficiently but not justly be penalized or rewarded.
207 See discussion supra note 184.
208 Id.; see also discussion supra note 183 (describing such a market).
209 See Akerlof, supra note 183; Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980)
(modeling a market in which incentives to trade are grounded in differing beliefs).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
in a world where harms against which one can do nothing by way
of virtuous prevention (as opposed to socially suboptimal private
provision) are not shared in the manner that justice would seem to
dictate. It seems doubtful that one who has seen -and thus be-
come disillusioned with -such a world in all of its profound injus-
tice is likely to remain a socially productive person to the same de-
gree that he would have been before his disillusionment. It surely
would be better, or more socially efficient, to render his prior illu-
sion a truth than complacently to accept the truth that it is illu-
sion.210 In sum, then, we find that in the case of event independ-
ence or noncovariance, the same means of rendering insurance
markets more efficient in general render them more just, with one
partial caveat concerning one possible - and ambiguous -
efficiency effect where we make justice rather than efficiency "job
one.
The means of addressing inefficiencies wrought by asymmetric
information also generally effectuate risk-justice, although in this
case again there is a possible - and once again ambiguously cut-
ting -caveat. Symmetric information is justly distributed informa-
tion,211 while the principal products of asymmetrically distributed
information -adverse selection and, especially, moral hazard (like
their solutions - merit rating and bonus malus pricing) - by their
very terms hint at this inequality's ethical significance. 212 Justly
distributed information, in turn, sometimes is effected by transpar-
ency rules (such as the above-mentioned express or implied war-
ranties, preexisting condition clauses, and home inspections),
which equalize information upward; and sometimes by mandatory
real or simulated shared opacity213 (such as the "abstain" compo-
210 See discussion in supra note 18; FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 18;
TYLER ET AL., supra note 18; Greenberg, supra note 18; Montada, supra note 18; Mul-
ler & Jakam, supra note 18.
211 Symmetric information is justly distributed information, at least insofar as
asymmetries are not deserved in light of differential virtue or fault on the parts of
the parties. See discussion supra Section 2.3; Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra
note 17; Robert Hockett, Fairness in Finance: Baseline Equality, Merited Advan-
tage and the Just Allocation of Asset-Value-Pertinent Information as Regulatory
Norms (2000) [hereinafter, Hockett, Fairness in Finance] (forthcoming) (manu-
script on file with author).
212 See discussion supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
213 A "veil of ignorance" is of course a means of effecting shared opacity. See
supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Note that such a veil mechanism will in
general result in allocations that are both just and efficient. See, in particular,
GOLLIER, supra note 61, at 312-327, who derives an envy-free (hence fair), Pareto-
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nent of securities-regulatory "disclose or abstain" rules
214), which
equalize information downward. Such "leveling up" and "leveling
down" norms in effect prevent either unjust insider advantage or
unjust risk-classification (market-segmentation) on the basis of
knowledge that all parties possess but that, because the informa-
tion concerns individually unpreventable risks, not all should be re-
garded as entitled to act upon.215 (Prohibitions on the use of ge-
netic information in formulating health insurance contracts would
again provide an illustrative example in this connection.
216)
We should not be surprised to find rules imposing what I have
called "simulated shared opacity" upon insurance markets when
advantages are not associated with diligence or virtue, or when
that which is to be insured against is not attributable to vice or
fault. Earlier in this Article, we encountered precisely such a simu-
efficient risk-sharing optimum from assumption of equal initial wealth endow-
ments on the part of bargaining-game-participating market actors operating un-
der a veil of ignorance. Note that the result is formally similar to an Equal En-
dowment Walrasian Equilibrium ("EEWE"), as discussed in the text
accompanying supra note 220. Finally, note that "each of [Gollier's] problems is
equivalent to an Arrow-Debreu portfolio problem." GOLLIER, supra note 61, at 291
(a fact which will prove to be particularly interesting infra, Section 5).
214 See Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5 (1948) (implementing 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)); see also In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc); but see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that Rule 10b-5 duty to disclose did not arise
from mere possession of nonpublic information by the employee of a financial
printer).
215 Segmentation and its justice-significance are discussed in Kenneth Abra-
ham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985), re-
printed in ABRAHAM, supra note 164, at 64-100.
216 Such prohibitions, and more generally the debate over the use of genetic
information, are the subject of, for example, the Genetic Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance and Employment Act, H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001); A Bill to
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Genetic Information with Respect to
Health Insurance, S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); A Bill to Protect the Civil Rights of
All Americans, and for Other Purposes, S. 19, 107th Cong. (2001); see also JUSTICE
AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Timothy Murphy & Marc Lappe eds., 1994);
JOHN HARRIS, WONDER WOMAN AND SUPERMAN: THE ETHICS OF HUMAN
BIOTECHNOLOGY (1992); RUNAAN GILLON & ANN LLOYD, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH
CARE ETHICS (1994); JOHATHAN GLOVER, WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE BE?
(1984); THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE:
GENETICS AND JUSTICE (Allen Buchanan et al. eds., 2000); Dennis Karjala, A Legal
Research Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS 121 (1992); Ken-
neth J. Arrow, Medical Information and Medical Insurance: An Ethical Dilemma?
(1994) (unpublished mimeo, Stanford University Department of Economics).
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lated opacity, and we shall encounter it again in Section 6.2 infra:
it is the veil of ignorance.217 The whole point of the veil is to im-
pose fairness upon the parties to a transaction, on the theory that
for each party's interests to be weighted equally, each party's deci-
sions must be laundered of the effects of such morally arbitrary
advantages and disadvantages as are brought to the transacting
situation. As discussed in Section 2, where one's advantages-be
they genetic, familial, subcultural, or otherwise-are not attribut-
able to one's productively virtuous behavior (when one is not re-
sponsible for, or does not in effect deserve, them), they do not figure
into one's "justice account," and should not be available to be capi-
talized upon unless and until the initial endowments of morally
arbitrary advantage and disadvantage have been more or less
equalized among all.
It is worth dwelling for a moment, in this connection, upon two
sets of relations between justice as symmetric information and effi-
ciency. There are, as we noted, two means of "symmetricalizing"
information- one a form of leveling up, and the other a sort of lev-
eling down. Where we equalize informational access by rendering
previously asymmetrically distributed information symmetrically
distributed and permitting all to act upon it-leveling up-we
achieve greater justice and greater efficiency simultaneously. More
information generally makes for greater production and wealth, as
more people are enabled to take more rationally informed, effica-
cious, and ultimately productive measures than before. The inter-
ests of justice and efficiency in such case are entirely complemen-
tary. On the other hand, where symmetry is achieved by means of
simulated shared opacity - leveling down - the informational envi-
ronment is in effect impoverished, and justice might then seem to
be achieved at some cost to efficiency (again, at least when con-
ceived as wealth-maximization). On the other hand, as seen in
connection with the assuring of event independence (noncovari-
ance), the effect on efficiency here is likely to be ambiguous, in that
injustice itself tends to spur unnecessarily high rates of self-
insurance and consequent socially suboptimal market-
participation, as well as socially suboptimal effort on the part of the
disillusioned, disincented victims of the injustice.
In sum, then, we find that addressing informational asymmetry
by increasing the quantum of information upon which people are
217 See RAwLS, JusTIcE, supra note 22, and accompanying text.
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able to act, via an increase in the number of information-possessors
and non-restriction of action on the basis of the information, ren-
ders insurance markets more just and efficient simultaneously.
And addressing asymmetry by decreasing the number of people
permitted to act upon information renders markets more just and
perhaps more (or less) strictly efficient in light of mutually counter-
vailing cost and incentive effects.
218
Turning finally to efficient insurance's epistemic requirement
of insured event definability and probable-cost estimability, we
find that the constraint limits not only the possibility of an effi-
ciently functioning insurance market, but also of what I have called
the accurate justice-accounting that figures so importantly in the
choice-evaluable theory of justice proposed in Section 2.3. (The
scales of justice cannot operate if they cannot weigh.) One simply
cannot efficiently insure against or justly allocate risk of any kind
without some sense of risk-contour and risk-magnitude; and the
latter, as noted above, are forms of information developed in con-
siderable measure through the development of empirical science
and the broadening of risk-pools so as to facilitate both contract-
standardization and accurate social- cost/ efficiency- priceestima-
tion through the working of the law of large numbers. The latter
operations and their significance- standardization and cost/price-
estimation - entail, as argued at Section 2.3, an important justice- as
well as efficiency-role for markets, an informational role that I ex-
ploit and recommend that we exploit more infra, Section 6 .219 Thus
we see that the third and final obstacle to efficient insurance mar-
kets, against which means of amelioration must be adopted, also
stands as an obstacle to effecting justice in the distribution of risk.
And there is no reason to believe that the same means of rendering
risk-magnitudes estimable cannot be employed for both purposes.
Again, more information makes for greater efficiency and
greater - more textured, more finely grained, more complete -
218 Note that if one were sure that the efficiency effects were negative in sum,
and were to decide that this loss somehow "outweighed" the justice concern, he
might just as well optimize the social savings even further, simply by euthanizing
the infirm. Surely simply stating this prospect is sufficient to make plain the lexi-
cal priority (if not the sole priority -see the sources cited supra note 41, and Hock-
ett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17) of justice.
219 Note that empirical science can also assist with the central justice problem
noted at supra Section 2 as well -the need to sort between talent and effort. Our
present concern is more limited; it is to do with sorting between more tractable
systemic risk and effort.
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justice.
Inasmuch as Section 2 of this Article was surtitled "Justice as
Insurance," while the present Section is surtitled "Insurance as Jus-
tice," it might be well to sum up the relations between the two sub-
jects before moving on. They are, using the terminologies em-
ployed in both Sections 2 and 4, as follows: justice as "mutual
advantage," i.e., justice as the outcome of a bargaining process en-
gaged in by self-serving agents dickering behind a veil of igno-
rance, will coincide with insurance as "purchased" from the same
position. It will constitute, in effect, a Walrasian risk-bearing equi-
librium (risk here, by dint of the veil, construed to embrace the
birth lottery as well as the apportionment of benefits and burdens
after birth). This outcome also happens to coincide with what jus-
tice as impartiality -i.e., a distribution apportioning the proceeds
of the birth lottery equally and all subsequently earned deserts as
they're earned, simply because this is the non-morally-arbitrary
division - would dictate. Insurance, in turn, will coincide with jus-
tice insofar (and only insofar) as insurance itself is, or replicates,
such an equilibrium; just insurance is insurance such as would be
sold and purchased from behind the veil, where the purchasers
and sellers buy and sell behind the veil.220 Now the social contract,
I submit and have argued, 221 ought to be construed this way, at
least to the degree that it is favored as the outcome of a primal
choice. (One need not, as noted at Section 2.3, bother with a primal
choice or contract at all, if acting impartially and not as a mere self-
serving bargainer.) The contract can be seen as a Walrasian risk-
bearing equilibrium reached behind the veil, hence, as an equal
endowment Walrasian equilibrium. Insofar as we enable private
risk-markets to simulate such an equilibrium, we shall have effi-
cient justice; we shall have fulfilled our social contract obligations
to each other.
The remainder of this Article is, accordingly, devoted to explor-
ing the degree to which society might live up that ideal with re-
spect to one particularly salient form of risk - systemic income risk.
(Another work extends the field to other kinds of risk."") That is to
say, in light of the challenges and opportunities presented by the
220 Bear in mind, this only means the parties don't know who falls prey to
sundry risks, it doesn't mean that they don't know the magnitude or incidence of
risk, or what might be done to avoid or mitigate some risks.
221 See supra Section 2.3.
222 That extended work is Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17.
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new economy as laid out in the Introduction and described
through Section 3, that the close conceptual isomorphism that we
have just laid out in Section 4 between the requirements of justice
and efficiency in the distribution of risk, and the centrality of mar-
kets to the generation of justice-pertinent information (via the price
mechanism) discussed at Section 2.3, a question naturally arises:
what are the capacities of private markets to afford just and effi-
cient insurance against such previously elaborated systemic in-
come risks223 as are occasioned by the new global economy?
5. A PAUCITY OF WELL-APPORTIONED INFORMATION: PRIVATELY
INSURING AGAINST INCOME RISK IN CURRENT MARKETS
Income for most people comes principally in the form of sala-
ries or wages earned through their paid occupations.224 Insurance
against income risk, therefore, for most people will in large meas-
ure be wage- or salary-insurance. 225 Insurance of the form one
might expect for wages or salaries, in turn, typically would take the
form of a contract between insurer and insured. 226 In exchange for
223 See supra Section 3 (discussing three broad types of risks to include un-
foreseeable sectoral redundancies, human capital lock-in, and unavoidable ad-
justment lags).
224 There is a variety of ways in which to operationalize this claim and render
its meaning more specific; the claim remains true on all of them. See LAWRENCE
MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000/2001 85-93 (2001) (providing
data on U.S. labor and employment trends); see also ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157,
at 136 ("Most individuals' primary asset is their human capital.").
225 I therefore ignore, for present purposes, portfolio- and related forms of
income-insurance. I consider these and their promise for pension incomes in
Robert Hockett, What is Pension Insurance? (forthcoming) (manuscript on file
with author) [hereinafter Hockett, Pension Insurance]. I also ignore for present
purposes the protection of human capital and its proceeds in the form of health
and occupational hazard insurance, which, because not subject to the same ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems as employment insurance, are more or
less readily available privately on current markets.
226 BORCH, supra note 166, at 1; OUTREVILLE, supra note 166, at 131, 139-41;
VAUGHN & VAUGHN, supra note 166, at 157. To some degree there is a "social con-
tract" embedded in "social insurance" actually covering income risk. See, e.g.,
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 182, at 26-46 (discussing the foundations of social
insurance in America). And advocates of social insurance programs often use the
very term "social contract" in describing "the social insurance compact." Id. The
theory of justice offered supra, Section 2.3, in a manner simply "deepens" the un-
derstanding implicit in such observations, by noting that well beyond (and "be-
hind") the realms of standard social insurance programs lies a basic understand-
ing that all harms or benefits not attributable to merit are our common lot (our
"equal initial endowments"), while meritorious and unmeritorious deeds, by con-
trast, merit established recompenses (our "subsequently earned deserts").
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a premium paid by the insured, the insurer would promise to
make a payment or payments to the insured upon the occurrence
of some contingency 227- in this case, the loss of wage or salary in-
come. The first question that ought to be addressed in connection
with the current insurability of income, then, is the degree to which
the pertinent risks faced by earners of wages and salaries pose par-
ticular problems for fulfillment of the classic prerequisites to effi-
ciently functioning insurance-contract markets.
5.1. Classical Insurability and Standard Income-Con tracts
Imagine that Prospective Insured ("Prospective"), a salaried
executive, approaches an insurer ("Insurer") for an income-
insurance contract. Insurer, if she be rational, is likely to pose a
number of salient questions.
To begin with, some-indeed, perhaps the most likely and
magnitudinally significant -risks to Prospective's salary will take
the forms of sectoral redundancy, sectoral slowdown, and macro-
economic downturn.228 Insofar as these risks indeed are sectoral or
region-wide in nature, they will of course to some degree covary
with similar risks faced by others. 229 Insurer therefore will be loath
to insure Prospective's salary unless she can set off Prospective's
risks against other, noncovarying risks faced by someone else, call
him "Prospective Prime," and similarly situated persons. Unless
and until there is at least one Prospective Prime for every Prospec-
tive, Insurer is likely either to refuse to insure or to charge a very
high premium indeed.230
Next, note that problems of asymmetric information acutely
plague this prospective transaction. Insurer will perhaps ask, first,
"does Prospective know something that I don't know about her
227 As pointed out supra note 116, there are two contingencies here- the
payment of premiums and the occurrence of the insured event. That is, 6 .y D F.
This structure constitutes, in the usage set forth at supra note 116, a state-
contingent claim contract.
22 See supra Section 3. As noted previously, insofar as human capital has had
to be accumulated or developed with great specificity for the exclusive purposes
of a particular firm, thenfirm redundancy (or bankruptcy) would also count here.
229 See supra Section 4.1 (describing the prerequisites for efficient insurance
markets).
230 This is, of course, a simplification. In actual fact what will happen is that
the premium will vary with the degree to-the proportion at-which the aggre-
gate income risks faced by the class of "Prospectives" can be offset by those faced
by the class of "Prospective Primes." It is hoped that the reduction of those
classes to two representative members serves a useful heuristic purpose.
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own or her current employer's prospects? Why is she approaching
me in the first instance?" Insurer is, of course, fretting over ad-
verse selection231- perhaps it is all and only those who have good
reason to fear for their incomes' futures who are seeking to in-
sure.232 And such people are, of course, better able to know such
things than is Insurer.
Insurer will ask, second and perhaps more compellingly, "what
is to prevent Prospective from simply leaving her employment, or
from diminishing her work effort, or from refraining to mitigate by
seeking new employment if disemployed after I have signed the
contract? And how am I to monitor her to ensure that she acts in
keeping with the contract if I provide against such contingencies in
the contract's conditioning of payment?" Insurer is of course fret-
ting over moral hazard.233 Similar frets, notoriously, beset those
who seek to design efficient social insurance programs-the "end
of welfare as we [knew] it" prior to 1996 was, in essence, the end of
moral hazard of more than five years in duration.234
Finally, Insurer will inquire into what probable cost to her is
represented by this contract. One component of this magnitude is
more or less easily estimable -Prospective's salary and salary-
replacement-rate are readily determined and written into the con-
tract. However, the other component -the likelihood of Prospec-
tive's actual loss of employment -might be somewhat more diffi-
cult to determine, particularly in the absence of an active corps of
analysts regularly and persistently ferreting out information bear-
231 See the discussion supra Section 4.1, on the three prerequisites to an
efficient insurance market, specifically symmetrical distribution.
232 But see supra note 184 (expressing some misgiving over the dominant, Ak-
erlofian theory of adverse selection).
233 See supra Section 4.1 (describing the moral hazard problem in insurance
markets).
234 Unless, of course, we factor in the "moral hazard" (i.e., the justice hazard)
of ceased welfare payments to people unemployed for over five years through no
fault of their own during some future lengthy economic downturn such as that
which has afflicted Japanese society since the early 1990s. See Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996); see also GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 182, at 71. For a quick re-
view of the Japanese slump, see, e.g., Adam S. Posen, Some Background Q&A on
Japanese Economic Stagnation, Testimony Submitted to the Subcommittee on
Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (uly 13,
1998), available at Institute for International Economics website,
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/posen0798.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2004).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
ing upon the likelihood of loss. 235
The upshot of these challenges is that one will not expect there
to be a particularly robust market in private income-insurance con-
tracts. And lo, such is precisely the case. The actual market in
such policies is anemic at best.236 Efficient insurance markets seem
235 I discuss the role that markets in "macro-proxies" might play in increasing
the size of such a corps, and the justice-significance of such a development, in Sec-
tion 6. There is, of course, already a sizable such corps and plenty of relevant data
for related purposes, particularly the need to value firm-issued securities.
236 See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 182, at 71 ("Individual unemploy-
ment insurance is virtually unknown. And insurers who have attempted to write
individual disability policies have often had disastrous experiences."); ROSEN, su-
pra note 164 ("[T]here is no market for poverty insurance-it simply cannot be
purchased."). Interestingly, as if to provide the exception to prove the rule, his-
tory offers the example of several modestly successful programs of privately pro-
vided unemployment insurance in the form of labor union-offered plans, in which
"[t]he 'moral hazard' of malingery [was] naturally reduced to a minimum," owing
to the impossibility of keeping "a refusal of a reasonable [new job] offer... a se-
cret." See I. M. Rubinow, Subsidized Unemployment Insurance, 21 J. POL. ECON. 412,
416 (1913); see also PAUL H. DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
32-33 (1932) (discussing voluntary trade union policies). These plans covered
very few workers, however, and, as noted, were at best only moderately success-
ful. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR
LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1967) (1936) (discussing principles, developments, and
changes in labor legislation). It should be noted that the facts here tend to confirm
the predictions generally made throughout Henry Hansmann's insight-filled
work on the ownership of enterprise. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 66-119, 265-86 (1996) (explaining benefits and costs of employee own-
ership and discussing insurance companies).
Similar lessons have been drawn from more recent programs of trade union-
provided unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom. See MICHAEL
BEENSTOCK & VALERIE BRASSE, INSURANCE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT 79 (1986) ("[T]rade
union schemes have a built-in system of checks and balances that effectively re-
moves the problem of moral hazard. The local union branch office is in the best
possible position to verify a member's claim."). But see id. at 78 (asserting that,
nevertheless, "in none of the trade union accounts ... is there any explicit recogni-
tion of sound economic actuarial principles in matching claims to contributions.
Rather, union provident schemes, like national insurance benefits, operate on a
pay-as-you go basis.").
Another partial exception that corroborates the general rule should be
flagged-that is, mortgage-protection and credit-loan policies which continue
peoples' mortgage and personal loan payments in the event of disemployment.
See generally TAMIE BURCHARDT & JOHN HILLS, PRIVATE WELFARE INSURANCE AND
SOCIAL SECURITY: PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES (1997) (discussing a variety of private
employment insurance proposals). These exceptions are "partial" and "general
rule-proving" in that: a) they tend to be available only to the "best" risks-
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals -and, by the nature of the case, home-
owners; b) they tend to be available only at the time the purchaser takes out the
mortgage or loan, and cannot be redeemed until after some defined period has
lapsed; and c) they tend to limit payment considerably, thus amounting to a form
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 207
simply impossible of provision through current contractual means.
That being the case, in light of efficient and just insurance markets'
near-mutual extensional entailment as related in Section 4, just in-
surance markets likewise appear unattainable through current pri-
vate contracting practices. Might we expect, however, a more ac-
tive - and just - market in wage and salary insurance if
instruments other than standard insurance contracts were offered?
5.2. Income-Insurance Through Derivative Hedging Instruments?
The model of the modernly deep, liquid, efficient capital mar-
ket offers an intriguing prospect for the more just and efficient
pooling and pricing of systemic income risk.237 Securities are, after
all, themselves a means by which issuing firms diversify a host of
risks among a broad class of able and readily willing insurers.
238
Dividends, interest, and/or securities-price-appreciations are the
premiums that those investors charge for holding firm risk.239 Ac-
tive markets in the "contracts" which entitle investors to those
premiums are paradigmatic cases of the risk-justice-accounting
markets discussed in Section 2, and they have fabulously broad-
ened the risk pool to minimize the dangers to entrepreneurs and
shareholders alike of covariance.240 They have also spawned the
birth of sizeable industries of analysts devoted to the acquisition
of co-insurance.
237 On the general significance of market liquidity, depth, and efficiency, see
supra note 114. Works discussing these characteristics in relation to market opera-
tion include MAUREEN O'HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCrURE THEORY 153-250 (1995);
SHuBIK, supra note 114, at 399427; JAMES TOBIN (WITH STEPHEN S. GOLUB), MONEY,
CREDIT, AND CAPITAL 12-14 (1998); Maurice Pagano, Trading Volume and Asset Li-
quidity, 104 Q. J. ECON. 255 (1989); Maurice Pagano, Endogenous Market Thinness
and Stock Price Volatility, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 269 (1989). For more on efficiency
specifically, see infra, note 267.
238 The insurance function of the corporate form and, by extension, the capital
market, is forgotten to many of those who are not conversant with the origins of
these institutions. The lacunae are well filled by CHARLES KINDELBERGER, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 1973) and, in somewhat chattier
fashion, JEREMY BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
(1996). See also Arrow, Insurance, supra note 169, at 79 ("The most important [non-
literal-insurance risk-shifting institution] is the market for common stocks. By this
means, the owner of a business divest[s] himself of some of the risks, permitting
others to share in the benefits and losses.... [T]hus, the stock market permits a
reduction in the social amount of risk-bearing.").
239 Again, Arrow discusses risk in relation to insurance in Arrow, Insurance,
supra note 169, at 45.
240 Id.
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and evaluation of value-pertinent information, thereby rendering
information increasingly symmetrical in the holding and specific
risk more readily estimable (and thus priceable).241 The modern-
particularly the Anglo-American- capital market is, quite simply
(at least when properly regulated 242), one of the world's most effi-
cient processors of value- and justice-pertinent information in the
sense discussed in Section 2.3. Hence it is, potentially, one of the
most just and efficient insurance mechanisms -a market for the in-
surance of economy-wide income-generation. 243 Might a similar
market spring into existence for the insurance of individual in-
comes?
We should first rehearse some of the basic mechanics of cur-
rently available securities (hence contracts) that an individual
might issue. While a great-and growing-variety of such instru-
ments already are available, most species are variations upon or
hybrids of but three basic genii -futures, options, and swaps. 244
The futures contract commits and entitles the purchaser (or
241 Again, see infra note 267 on efficiency; see also O'HARA, supra note 237, at
252-60 (discussing market transparency as an issue in market performance); An-
anth Madhavan, Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets, 475 J. FIN. 607 (1992)
(examining "the process of price formation under different forms of market or-
ganization when information is imperfect and traders act strategically"); ANANTH
MADHAVAN, SECURITY PRICES AND MARKET TRANSPARENCY (Rodney L. White Cen-
ter for Financial Research, Wharton School Working Paper, 1991) (demonstrating
that "market transparency can actually increase price volatility and lower market
liquidity").
242 Recent scandals involving Enron, World Coin, and even Martha Stewart,
needless to say, render plain the pregnancy of this condition.
243 This is true at least if its participants were to proceed from equal initial
endowments and that market was effectively regulated against fraud, coercion,
anti-competitive practices, and the like. See supra Section 2.3. (discussing the
model for an efficient market); GOLLIER, supra note 61, at 307-23 (discussing effi-
cient risk sharing and corresponding rules that "imply [a] group's degree of abso-
lute tolerance to risk per capita is equal to the mean individual absolute risk toler-
ance in the corresponding state").
244 For a sophisticated account of the history, current variety, and the process
of invention of such instruments with a theoretical view to the forces that prompt
and constrain securities-design, see ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 11-43 passim.
Accessible works on the fundamental mechanics and pricing-mathematics of
hedging instruments and their valuation include JOHN C. HULL, FUTURES, OPTIONS
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (1998), PAUL WILMOTT, DERIVATIVES: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING (1998), and LAWRENCE C. GALITZ, FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES TO MANAGE FINANCIAL RISK (1995). Helpful
introductory treatments are ROBERT W. KOLB, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (2d ed. 1998)
and Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regula-
tion, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996). Additional academic discussions can be found in
PRACTICAL READINGS IN FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1998).
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"long") to deliver or take delivery of a specific good (which might
even be simply another security) at a specific time and place at a
pre-specified price. It symmetrically entitles and commits the
seller (or "short") to receipt or delivery of the good at that price in
exchange for payment. Shorts on established futures markets are
required to maintain margin accounts in order to guarantee their
ability to pay. The markets and their margin account maintenance
requirements facilitate credible commitment, rather in the way that
reserve requirements enhance confidence in financial intermediar-
ies like banks and insurance companies. Such mechanisms thus fa-
cilitate the efficient functioning of these financial markets. In ef-
fect, the futures contract is a means by which counterparties
mutually insure against certain contingencies -changing crop
yields and/or prices, for example. Prospective losses are shed, and
relatively certainty acquired, at the price of some prospective gain.
The position that one takes is, presumably in most if not all cases, a
function of one's assessment of the relative probabilities of such
contingencies as well as one's taste for or aversion to risk.
245
The option contract is much like the futures contract, save that
the long purchases the right to purchase ("call") or sell ("put")
without simultaneously bonding herself to making the purchase or
sale. Because that bond, in the futures context, is part of the long's
payment for the right of purchase or sale, the purchaser of an op-
tion must ordinarily pay an additional monetary premium for the
contractual retention of freedom of action. Options are thus more
expensive than futures, other things being equal.
The swap is simply the contractual trade of one entitled in-
come- or payment-stream for another over some specified period.
A bank holding loans and entitled to receipt of interest payments
thereon denominated in dollars, for example, might trade the right
to those payments for another bank's reciprocal right to similar
payments denominated in pounds sterling over the course of a
245 One might argue that in an informationally perfectly symmetrical market,
the taking of different positions should reflect nothing more than the parties' dif-
fering risk-aversions to (and, perhaps, if knowledge be restricted to "brute facts,"
their differing probability assessments of) the particular contingencies over which
they are contracting. ("That's what makes horse races," as the adage has it.) More
on this can be found in Hockett, Fairness in Finance, supra note 211. See also
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Security Design, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 229
(1989), reprinted in ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 157 (modeling a market incor-
porating the transaction costs of issuing securities and differing estimations of
their value); Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 209 (modeling a market in which in-
centives to trade are grounded in differing beliefs).
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year. Naturally, the counterparty banks often expect-or at any
rate are betting on the prospect of -opposite outcomes in the mat-
ter of exchange rate fluctuations. The bank going short in dollar-
denominated debt might be wagering that the dollar will decline in
value relative to the pound, while its counterparty wagers the con-
trary.
It is not necessarily the case that counterparties to a futures, op-
tion, or swap transaction actually believe that market conditions
definitely will unfold such that they will win the implicit bets that
they are making through their transactions.246 Rather, in many (if
not most) cases these parties simply are exploiting the possibility of
such a contingency in order to provide against some other possibil-
ity likely both to counter-vary with that contingency and to be det-
rimental to their interests. They are, that is, hedging - diversifying
the risks represented to them by varying contingencies, by diversi-
fying portfolios of offsetting contingent entitlements or claims.247
They are thus smoothing the variances in their incomes over time.
The structure of hedging and its potential applicability to the
problem of income-insurance is perhaps most perspicuously
brought out in that of one particular hybrid instrument -the "col-
lar." The collar is essentially the simultaneous sale of a call option
and purchase of a put option on some revenue-generating asset.
(Note that a job is, in the requisite sense, such an asset.) The trans-
action enables the asset's holder, at the price of surrendering some
upside of the income generated by the asset, to protect against-to
insure against-some downside loss in that same income-stream.
In effect, the counterparties to a collar are, like all parties to hedg-
ing transactions, taking opposite sides of a bet; each party is, for a
246 See discussion regarding Hicks, infra note 312; see also Romano, supra note
244 (providing an introductory look at derivatives).
247 Again, many parties also simply "speculate" in such instruments, that is,
wager through them. See introductory texts cited supra, note 271. The boundary
separating speculation and hedging is notoriously difficult to draw and there
seems little point in drawing it. Insuring is readily characterized as betting, and
betting as insuring. For purposes of interpretation of some later sources quoted in
this Article, however, it might be useful to think of speculation as transacting in
regard to future contingencies in which one lacks a direct stake (apart from the
speculating transaction) in those contingencies. Hedging with respect to such
contingencies, by contrast, takes place when one is vested (even prior to the hedg-
ing transaction) in those contingencies. In the language of the derivatives trade,
the hedger bears a pre-hedge interest in the value of the underlying, while the
speculator does not. As shall be seen, the presence of large number of speculators
in a market, as distinguished from hedgers, facilitates the efficiency of hedging.
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premium, insuring the other. The question thus naturally arises
whether individuals might insure against income risk by entering
into some form of collar transaction -i.e., through the purchase of
"salary-collars" or analogous instruments.248
The answer, at one level of abstraction, would appear to be a
ready "yes." A salary-collar would simply be an income-insurance
contract with a particular form of premium structure-the pre-
mium being the stream of surrendered upside income instead of
some regular fixed payment. At a somewhat lower, more prag-
matic, level of abstraction, however, we see quite readily that we
are faced, at least to a significant extent, with the very challenges to
efficient income insurance -possible covariance, asymmetric in-
formation, insured event probable-cost-inestimability, and thus
non-credible commitment-that were discussed above in Section
5.1. Prospective counterparties whose prospects do not covary,
hence, parties who generally live far apart or are employed in un-
related industries, would have to find one another-a significant
search-hence information-cost. Parties would have to be able to
estimate likelihoods of each other's loss of labor income-again, a
considerable information cost, particularly to individuals or lo-
cally-restriced firms. And then there would be the problem of ad-
verse selection-each party potentially in effect playing Groucho
Marx, wondering why the other, much like he, is looking for a
counterparty in the first place -and the problem of moral hazard -
each party operating with an incentive to shirk so as to gain but not
lose.249 For the same reasons that a standard insurer would pre-
sumably be unlikely to offer a standard insurance contract guaran-
teeing income, a prospective counterparty would be unlikely to
take the opposite side of a collar or other hedging transaction with
a prospective self-insurer, at least in the absence of some sort of
guarantee that the other party would continue to work diligently
248 Two professors, one of law and the other of economics, have proposed
collar instruments for the protection of returns on retirement investment accounts.
See MARTIN FELDSTEIN & ELENA RANGUELOVA, ACCUMULATED PENSION COLLARS: A
MARKET APPROACH TO REDUCING THE RISK OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7861, 2000) (propos-
ing a "pension equity collar"); Gordon, supra note 1 (proposing the same); see also
Zvi Bodie, Financial Engineering and Social Security Reform [hereinafter Bodie, Fi-
nancial Engineering], in RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM 291 John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter RISK
ASPECTS].
249 See generally, the discussion and sources regarding risk and information,
supra notes 182-188.
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to earn income-earn "upside" income-and would be able (e.g.,
by maintaining a margin-account) to meet his payment obligations.
To an important degree, these are collective action problems,
which might be solved by what is in effect the concerting of risk-
trading action carried out by financial intermediaries -mutual
funds, pension funds, and the like. But on top of the standard chal-
lenges just rehearsed, the still exotic and unfamiliar nature of most
hedging instruments thus far will tend to limit the number of par-
ties prepared - at least individually - to countenance taking part in
any hedging transaction. 250 (Insofar as the measures proposed at
Section 6.3 succeed, however, this problem will be mitigated.)
Even the comparative sophistication, relative transaction- and in-
formation-cost-savings abilities, and consequent pooling capabili-
ties of those who run financial intermediary institutions might well
not suffice to offset that reluctance, for there must be willing cus-
tomers between whom such institutions can mediate. But might a
somehow jumpstarted "stock market" in individual income-
hedging instruments, complemented by certain forms of informa-
tion not currently generated or analyzed, change matters?
6. BETTING ON CORRELATES: FINANCIALLY ENGINEERING
EFFICIENT NEAR-JUSTICE THROUGH MACRO-PROXY-TRADING
We should briefly recapitulate the principal challenges facing
just and efficient wage and salary insurance: within an economy,
many risks to wages and salaries are likely to covary. Information
with respect to the noncovarying risks is likely to be severely
asymmetric; prospective insureds generally will know and control
more with respect to their future income prospects than will pro-
spective insurers. The probabilities of such contingencies are likely
to be only partly estimable by prospective insurers in the absence
of some market in (or tax-financed supply of) information (suitably
interpreted) which relevantly bears upon those probabilities. 251
While no action conceivably to be taken by an individual prospec-
tive insurer or insured seems likely to be up to the task of address-
250 Cf. GEORGE CRAWFORD & BUDYAT SEN, DERIVATIVES FOR DECISION MAKERS
198 (1996) (noting the general ignorance of most individuals regarding the techni-
cal details of derivatives transactions). Of course, the reluctance is not necessarily
justified. Id. The potential problem figures more prominently in Section 6.
251 Only macro-variables with which incomes are partly correlated -e.g.,
GDPs-will be generally predictable to some degree. It is that predictability
which the proposals countenanced in Section 6.1 exploit.
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ing and surmounting these challenges to private income insurance,
it is not difficult to envisage means of doing so through collective
action.
The key, we shall see, is to turn our attention from the risks
themselves to correlates that can serve as (at least partial) surrogates
for those risks, correlates which themselves are not subject to the
information problems that plague those risk-classes that ultimately
concern us. Were we able to convert these correlates, in effect, into
the insured events and provide trading markets in those, many of
our problems would be solved. We would have markets in which
income-risks could be voluntarily traded between those who dis-
value them more and those who disvalue them less. We would
thus have simultaneously more just and more efficient income-
insurance. Let us see precisely how this might be.
6.1. Risk-Proxy-Trading, Risk-Proxy-Pricing: How a More Com-
plete252 Contingent Claims Market Will Facilitate More Just and
Efficient Income-Insurance
252 A "more complete" market simply means a market that supplies more
goods-including financial assets-in satisfaction of current and potential wants
than do existing markets. More technically, a complete market is one allowing
trade in assets covering all elementary "state claims," i.e. states of the world the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of which somebody might wish to insure against.
(An asset covering a state-claim is a contingent claim. It is contingent in both of
the two manners in which an insurance contract is contingent, as noted supra, note
128. There is the payout/premium contingency of any contract, as noted supra
Section 2.3. There is also the payout/stated event contingency that renders the
contract an insurance contract (y and 6 2 F).
Market incompleteness results when: a) there are fewer assets than state
claims, b) there are as many assets as state claims but those assets' values are not
linearly independent, or c) there are as many assets as state claims, but not all of
those assets are tradable-human capital being a good example. I elaborate upon
all of this in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17, and more background
can be found in, generally, JAMES MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF
INCOMPLETE MARKETS I (1996). For purposes of the present essay the technical
theoretical aspects of market-completion need not concern us; the intuitive under-
standing will do. Markets in income-risk-hedging are, for the reasons outlined in
Section 4, radically incomplete. I should also flag here the possibility of simulating
complete markets through dynamic trading strategies, a prospect innovatively
and extensively modeled in the Nobel-winning work of Robert C. Merton, col-
lected in his CONTINUOUS TIME FINANCE (1992). See also ALLEN & GALE, supra note
157, at 137-38; JOHN H. COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING (2001); DARRELL DUFFIE,
DYNAMIC ASSET PRICING THEORY (2d ed. 1996); R.W. Banz & Merton H. Miller,
Prices for State-Contingent-Claims: Some Estimates and Applications, 51 J. Bus. 653
(1978); D. Breeden & R. Litzenburger, Prices of State-Contingent-Claims Implicit in
Option Prices, 51 J. Bus. 621 (1978); Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q. J.
ECON. 75 (1976). This is fully explored, again, in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, su-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
As a sort of heuristic exercise, let us begin with a very concrete
story, a tale that both gives visceral narrative expression to much
of what has been established in this Article thus far, and sets the
stage for the more theoretic and programmatic points to be made
below.
Meet Bob and Barbara. Bob is a small-town lawyer. He has
been in practice since the late 1970s, when he graduated from his
state university law school. He is in his mid-fifties, and is pretty
good at what he does. His practice involves, primarily, drafting
wills and advising private parties in estate-planning, assisting
small business people in the formation of business partnerships or
limited liability companies and the drafting of contracts, facilitat-
ing small business transactions and negotiations, and like work.
When Bob decided to become a lawyer, the town where he
lived and grew up was humble but reasonably prosperous. Its
population had been by and large stable in size, perhaps slowly
growing, for decades. It was a pleasant, easy place to live. Bob
pra note 17.
Like so much else, much of this work springs in considerable part from the
fertile mind of Kenneth Arrow. See Kenneth Arrow, Le R61e de Valeurs Boursi~res
par la Rpartition la Meilleure des Risques, 40 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES
INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953),
translated in The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REv.
ECON. STUD. 91 (1963), reprinted in 2 ARROw, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 158 at 3
(showing that a combination of contingent single-num~raire-unit-paying contracts
payable on various contingent events (e.g., for $1 paid on the occurrence of event
- now called "Arrow Securities") and spot markets for ordinary commodities is
formally equivalent to a complete market of contingent commodities -i.e. of fu-
tures contracts covering all commodities under all contingencies -which in turn
allows for the derivation of intertemporal general equilibrium, with all of general
equilibrium's standard optimality properties, in the face of uncertainty). The
catch, of course, is in actually establishing such complete contingent claims mar-
kets; the present Article is meant both to motivate the search for means to do so,
and in part to point the way toward how we might begin to do so.
See also Maurice Allais, Gingralisation des Thdories de l'Equilibre Economique G-
ngral et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 40 COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 81 (1953) (providing similar in-
sights presented at the same conference at which Arrow presented his findings);
Maurice Allais, L'Extension des Thiories de l'Equilbre Giniral et du Rendement Social
au Cas du Risque, 41 ECONOMETRICA 269 (1953) (same). The method was evidently
pioneered by Hicks -a fascinating case of high theory's envisaging general possi-
bilities on the basis of more limited common practices noticed by the theorist (in
this case, the behavior of early twentieth century British futures markets). See the
Hicks sources cited supra note 47, and following text and discussion. It was an-
ticipated by the work of Bbhm-Bawerk and other members of the "Austrian
School" of capital theory in the later nineteenth century. See generally sources
cited supra note 22.
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was very much taken with the character of Atticus Finch in the
Harper Lee novel, and went to law school with the aim of becom-
ing his own town's Atticus. Upon graduating he returned to his
hometown, hung out a shingle, soon married his high school
sweetheart, Barbara (who had attended the business school at
Bob's university and now owned a small sole proprietorship), and
made a down payment on a stately, one hundred year old "fixer-
upper" of a home. Presently, he and Barbara began to bring chil-
dren into the world. Bob did not make a great deal of money in his
practice, but he earned enough, when added to Barbara's income,
to keep the family quite comfortable, set aside funds in anticipation
of the children's education, improve the house, and keep the mort-
gage payments up to date.
Some time in the early 1990s, things began to just noticeably
change in Bob's and Barbara's town. Fewer children seemed to be
being born, and fewer still were staying or returning to town after
graduating from university. The population was gradually aging,
and more people seemed to be departing than moving in.
About the same time, a number of large, multi-department re-
tail stores and fast food establishments began to crop up on the
outskirts of the town, capitalizing on national and even global
economies of scale (often, indeed, selling cheap imported goods
from developing countries), and paying their employees-first
teenagers and retirees, then increasingly young and middle-aged
adults -lower wages in order to offer goods and services at lower
prices. These businesses attracted customers away from the
charming town square, and many of the independent, locally-
owned shops and restaurants that had once brought in or paid liv-
ing profits, salaries, or wages and rendered that square so quaint
and enjoyable began to deteriorate or close. Barbara's business
was among those affected.
The new businesses tended to retain counsel from the larger
law firms located in the nearest metropolitan area, not Bob, when
in need of legal assistance. And, of course, there were now fewer
in-town clients requiring recourse to Bob's particular portfolio of
skills, which Bob had developed carefully and gradually with the
local clientele's needs in view. The larger law firms, unsurpris-
ingly, were also uninterested in what Bob might offer. He was no
longer all that young, and as noted before, had developed his ca-
pacities very much with a particular set of needs -classic small-
town needs-in view. What is more, laws schools poured out
scores of younger lawyers, still protean and not yet fully formed,
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every year. These folk generally preferred and were more easily
adaptable to the city lawyer's life and work than was Bob. So even
were Bob's livelihood the only thing that mattered to him or the
only piper to whose tune Bob had to dance, it is far from clear that
he could have simply changed his clientele and practice areas.
Similar observations, alas, would hold of Barbara.
On top of all this, even had Bob and his family been vocation-
ally and temperamentally prepared to relocate to another place
where Bob's and Barbara's abilities might have been more market-
able, they would in a sense have been, to a quite significant degree,
in other ways "locked in" to their present place of residence. It is
not simply that their lives and traditions have been rooted in their
town for decades. It is, for one, that their children, well educable
in the town's public schools, would likely have to attend distant
magnet or expensive private schools were the family to move to
the larger city and were Bob and Barbara to hope that the children
might continue to develop their minds and sociabilities as well as
they are currently doing. And it is, at least as urgently, that Bob's
and Barbara's parents, now quite up in years, are in need of assis-
tance and unlikely to live much longer should they themselves re-
locate. A nursing home would be quite expensive, not to mention
demoralizing; so, of course, would be a new home, given the de-
cline in property values in the town as a consequence of the town's
economic prospects and the greater expense of a new place in the
city or suburbs. Bob and Barbara would have to work further from
the home than presently, and thus be unable to look in on their
parents during the day should the entire family take up residence
in one house. It also seems unlikely that Bob and Barbara would
be able to afford a large enough home as would be required by this
latter prospect, for because the town's prospects are on the wane,
their own property's value has diminished markedly, and Bob and
Barbara remain contractually committed to mortgage payments
tied to the home's previous value.
Bob and his family are, increasingly, in a bind. They are going
to have to make some painful choices. And, no matter what
choices they make, they are going to be significantly worse off than
they used to be and, naturally, expected to be by this point in their
lives. Could Bob and Barbara have acted to prevent things coming
to this pass? Was the whole scenario, in the language of the law,
reasonably foreseeable in the 1970s? Are Bob and Barbara in any
recognizable sense at fault for having relied, to their detriment,
upon things' having gone largely as they'd gone for many dec-
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ades? Is there anything, realistically speaking, that they could
have done to mitigate this, and is there now? Is it just for them and
theirs to suffer if the answers to these questions are, in some sense,
"no"? Is it welfare- or income-efficient, for that matter, if, say,
someone might have shared this risk with them quite willingly but
for the absence of a market in such risk? Would it not in any event
be more just and more efficient if such risk-trading opportunities
had bee available, of ir they were now? Why aren't they?
We could have made this story more poignant by picturing Bob
as, for example, a steel or other industrial worker. In such a case
his losses would be even more dramatic, and even more directly
wrought by economic "globalization." Let us keep Bob as he is,
however, in order to show that even less dramatic examples closer
to home give reason to consider markets such as this Article pro-
poses.
What we have been envisaging, of course, is a classic "social in-
surance"-implicative story. Social insurance is meant precisely to
ease some of the "no fault" hardships and dislocations that we find
occasioned by certain unforeseeable catastrophes and macroeco-
nomic changes. Significantly, however, there is no form of social
insurance currently on offer by political jurisdictions exercising au-
thority over advanced economies which would address Bob's and
Barbara's situation.
Now one way of looking at social insurance, this Article sug-
gests, is as a surrogate for missing markets. For familiar reasons
that we have noted supra, we do not currently find private insur-
ance markets for the trading or laying off of risks like those which
now are eventuating for Bob and his family - risks that could more
efficiently be borne by people other than Bob and Barbara. Social
insurance programs, administered by governments possessed of
authority over broad territorial expanses, step in to fill some of the
more dramatic of the resultant gaps, by exploiting governmental
powers to universalize risk pools and collect compulsory premi-
ums in the form of taxes, and their powers to monitor, to some ex-
tent, insureds. But there are well-known information costs and
consequent inefficiencies that attend such monitoring efforts, and
constant political pressures to exit the compulsory premium-
paying risk-pools (i.e., to be let off the taxation hook) exerted by
many who, often by fortune (e.g., inherited wealth) rather than by
diligence, find themselves less subject to risk, even while less risk-
averse, than others. The two sources of instability, of course, dove-
tail: opportunistic behavior by some who exploit the difficulties
217
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that attend monitoring affords ammunition to the better-off who
denigrate the legitimacy of the salient programs.
It is worthwhile carefully considering, then, whether, by both
returning to first principles, as we have done above in Sections 2
through 4, and by turning to new mathematical, legal and informa-
tion technologies only recently to have become available and still
coming on-line, as we shall see below in Sections 6.1.1 through 6.3,
we might actually provide the heretofore missing markets for
which standard social insurance programs are offered as a coarse-
grained and far from complete substitute. If we might, then we
might supplement existing social insurance programs with new
forms of de facto social insurance -new forms, indeed, of actually,
literally, privately provided insurance. And thus we might, by
means not subject to the classic vulnerabilities of traditional social
insurance programs, spare Bob, his family, and many like them
much of their apparently unfairly and inefficiently borne anguish.
We might, that is, render the distribution of certain kinds of risk
both more efficient and more just in the bearing.
Bob's and Barbara's story also can help render concrete the les-
sons just rehearsed in Section 5, concerning the prospects for pri-
vately insuring against asset-value- and income-risk in current
markets: suppose now that Bob and Barbara had wished somehow
to insure, back in the late 1970s or early 1980s, against what now is
befalling them and their family. Of course, the unavailability of
such insurance as we have discussed and shall discuss would ren-
der it somewhat surprising for Bob and Barbara even to consider it.
The imaginative space in which demands are formed is itself in
part a function of what already is supplied - that is, invention is
the mother of necessity as much as necessity is the mother of in-
vention. But ignore that for the moment. The question here is,
why is there in fact no supply of such insurance as Bob and Bar-
bara might use even for them so much as to imagine or begin to
exploit? The reasons are rooted in those prerequisites to efficient
insurance discussed above.
A principal source of income-loss and asset-value-loss-
sectoral, regional or general macroeconomic downturn or obsoles-
cence, associated demographic trends, and so on as described in
connection with Bob's value-added, his particular occupation, his
home-valuation and so on-gives rise to a classic covariance prob-
lem. Unless Bob can access a risk-pool well beyond his local and
vocational environments, his insurance potential will be quite lim-
ited. For his neighbors and colleagues likely are suffering the same
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losses as he is suffering. Likewise for Barbara.
Insured event determinability and probable cost estimability
also are problematic in Bob's and Barbara's case. With respect to
determinability, notice that the would-be insured event is not some
singulary, salient, dramatic one-off affair-e.g. a fire or death-
such as would easily be cabined and verified in the occurrence. It
is a multi-factoral, protracted affair, rather like the case of the pro-
verbial frog in the gradually heating water. As for probable cost
estimability, the cost factor is not terribly difficult-it's simply the
lost income or asset-value-but probability is a different story. In
the absence of careful long-term trend-watching over a lengthy pe-
riod, the results of which watching are readily accessible both to
would-be insurers and to Bob, the risk here is going to be quite in-
definite as a matter of magnitude (at least ex ante, which is of
course the relevant temporal perspective from the point of view of
insurance). Were a market for such insurance already to exist and
be highly liquid, there would of course be incentives for the ferret-
ing-out and publication-at least in the form of observable prices
impounding it-of such information. But there is not yet such a
market (another case, like supply and demand, of "chicken and
egg").
The asymmetric information problems here are even worse:
Bob's prospective insurer, had Bob approached her in hopes of
purchasing a policy covering what is now happening to him and to
his family, would have been apt to wonder whether Bob knew
something that she did not. After all, that insurer would, in view
of the observation made just above at A, have to be located, or
have access to many others located, outside of Bob's locality, and
probably wouldn't be a small town lawyer. So Bob is of course bet-
ter situated than his prospective insurer to know what his town's
and his practice's long term prospects are. And the prospective in-
surer will know this. So that prospective insurer, recognizing a
possible adverse selection bias, will be reluctant to insure Bob.
The moral hazard problem is yet more acute, at least with re-
spect to Bob's income and perhaps to some extent even with re-
spect to the value of his home. After all, if the insurance policy is
drafted in terms of income and home valuation alone-which it
will have to be, absent a readily accessed locus of more "macro"-
oriented, fluctuating data such as small town lawyers' income
trends and small town homes' valuational trends more generally -
what is to keep Bob's income or home value from dropping simply
owing to Bob's own negligence? Our prospective insurer faces a
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classic moral hazard risk, the monitoring against which will likely
be prohibitively expensive both as a legal and as a logistical matter.
Notice that a private market for insurance against Bob's fate,
apparently rendered impossible by the factors just rehearsed, is
missing through no fault of Bob's or his prospective insurer's. Bob
is perfectly honest and diligent, his prospective insurer quite ready
to insure him, up to a point, if only she can trust Bob and her own
powers of assessing likely risks such as those that faced Bob, quite
remotely, in the later 1970s. (It is critical that we keep the temporal
perspective in mind. We now have "20/20 hindsight" with respect
to Bob himself. The present project is concerned more directly
with the Bobs of the future, whom we cannot now readily identify,
in order that they might avoid Bob's quandary when things begin
to unfold for them as they have done for Bob.) Our insurer, who
either bets directly on people like Bob or pools risks faced by many
diverse people together as a financial intermediary, is a person of
good will who is presumptively - because she is an insurer - much
better able to cover risks like Bob's than is Bob, if, again, she can
only trust Bob and feel relatively confident about the verifiability
and real probable cost of Bob's possible misfortune. Moreover,
were she able to be reimbursed by Bob were his prospects to im-
prove after initially dropping and bringing him an insurance pay-
out-e.g., after a popular "communitarian" movement and disillu-
sionment with metropolitan life begins to take people back to the
towns -she might be even more willing to insure Bob.
It begins to look as though what really is missing here, then, is
not good will or a willingness to trade risks from those less effi-
ciently to those more efficiently able to bear them, but rather, cer-
tain critical forms of information and a critical mass of prospective
participants who, were they to be made vividly aware of the possi-
bilities, would be willing themselves to constitute a market such as
would begin to "incentivize" both the generation and the institu-
tional concentration and deployment of that needed information
("chicken and egg" again). What we have here, that is to say, is
perhaps in crucial part a classic problem of inertia, of collective ac-
tion, predicated upon a set of long-settled informational expecta-
tions.
Patterns of expectation as to what is possible and what is not
have developed around long enduring-up to now-
understandings of what is technologically feasible (in both an in-
formational and in a legal sense) and what is not. We are accus-
tomed to thinking of information such as bears upon Bob's income
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and asset-value prospects as the sort of stuff that is gathered, if at
all, only with long periodicity, and which is, again, if gathered at
all, dispersed over varied, disconnected sites that do not "talk" to
one another. (Perhaps some government office keeps some of the
information -e.g., home value trends from decade to decade. Per-
haps the Department of Labor keeps other bits of it-e.g., lawyers'
income trends from 15-year period to 15-year period. Perhaps the
American Bar Association keeps yet other bits - e.g., trends in prof-
itable legal practice areas measured in 20-year increments.) And
the legal forms taken by our transactions tend to reflect those settled
expectations: we insurance-contract over singulary, highly salient,
one-off type events-events generally involving one or a fairly
small number of persons, not many people, and taking place at one
time, not over protracted periods. Paid insureds do not typically
point to countless others in order to verify what has happened to
them, or "give the money back" to insurers when their continu-
ously unfolding fortunes gradually pick up for the better.
But technological feasibility- in both the informational and le-
gal senses-has changed: it is now possible, quickly and repeatedly
over time, to gather, amass and centrally locate all manner of data
bearing upon peoples' wealth-prospects in a manner previously
unimagined. And legal technology has kept pace with information
technology: new kinds of contracts are continually being designed,
such as enable people to take opposite sides of transactions on the
basis of information that is of differential value-import to the coun-
terparties. If the only thing standing in the way of exploiting these
new technologies in order to supply currently missing markets is
inertia or collective action challenge -everybody waiting for the
others to act-then we might, quite simply, realize terrific Pareto
gains- everyone made better off-if we can but jump-start, collec-
tively, the instituting of such markets. And if the understanding of
justice offered above, according to which most of Bob's and his
family's sufferings were not reasonably foreseeable, hence not
chargeable to his "diligence account," and are in that sense unde-
served, then the supply of such markets will represent, not only a
substantial Pareto gain, but a critical justice gain. Let us now then
visualize, a bit more concretely, the sort of instruments and mar-
kets that might be of benefit to Bob and those like him -indeed, to
all of us.
Picture, if you would, a new kind of hedging instrument and a
new kind of market in such instruments. These instruments and
markets are not fanciful extensions of current markets in exotic de-
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rivative securities; they simply are designed more with people like
Bob than with large conglomerate firms with gargantuan portfolios
of "value at risk" in view. Here are three new derivative contracts
that Bob might use:
First, a "small practice lawyer's income" collar: assume the ex-
istence, for the moment, of an index of small practice lawyer in-
come. Perhaps the American Bar Association, perhaps the Labor
Department, perhaps the Internal Revenue Service, perhaps some
other institution tracks incomes of lawyers engaged in small pri-
vate practice, aggregates them, and expresses them in terms of
some arbitrarily selected base year, as is familiarly done with the
GDP, the CPI, and other such aggregates. Now imagine that we
design a contract, either between Bob and some financial interme-
diary which pools the savings and risk-provisions of multiple par-
ties, or between Bob and some other counterparty from whom he
purchases the contract on an organized exchange. The contract
provides that, when ever at the end of some predetermined pe-
riod - say a half-year, a month or a week - the index rises above
some pre-determined level, Bob must direct a payment toward that
intermediary. And it provides that, when ever the index falls be-
low some pre-determined level, the intermediary directs a pay-
ment toward Bob. (The "collar," is, as noted in Section 5, analyz-
able in familiar derivative terms as the simultaneous sale of a call
option and purchase of a put option on revenue generated by an
asset. Here the "asset" simply is the index tracking Bob's occupa-
tional prospects.) Bob and his counterparties are of course re-
quired to maintain margin accounts with the intermediary or the
broker on the envisaged exchange, to guaranty performance. If
clearing is effected frequently - e.g., daily per the "marked to mar-
ket" system -the margin accounts need not be prohibitively large.
Second, a "small town domestic product" collar: imagine the
instrument just described, but now with the pertinent index track-
ing the economic performance of Bob's town or of small towns
more generally, suitably defined. When the index rises, Bob pays
out; when the index falls, Bob's counterparty pays in.
Third and finally, a "regional [or "small town"] real estate
value" collar: As before, but now with the relevant index tracking
real estate values in the pertinent area or of the pertinent - e.g.,
"small town" -type. Again, Bob pays out or receives pay-ins,
which vary countercyclically with the performance of the aggre-
gate to which his net worth is tied. Bob's cyclical net worth is
"smoothed," "collared." He surrenders some "upside" gains in re-
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turn for lessening his "downside" losses. His counterparties do the
same.
We can imagine many other such instruments. We can imagine
parceling data in all manner of ways, all with a view to tying the
aggregate of prospects upon which Bob in effect "bets" more
closely to the prospects of returns upon his human capital, his so-
cial capital (that of his town), his real property, and so on -in sum,
to his full net worth. More such instruments will allow for a more
fine-grainedly customized, more fully optimized, portfolio. In so
far as there are willing counterparties, these effective "swaps" of
asset-value-stream will, by definition, result in welfare gains for
all. And in so far as they enable Bob to mitigate the ravages of for-
tune over which he lacks control, they will result both in justice
gains with respect to risk-allocation, and in chargeability, through
his "diligence account," of Bob both with some degree of responsi-
bility to insure and with some degree of "constructive knowl-
edge" - in the form of securities prices - of the likely longer term
income-consequences of his choices. In a moment we shall particu-
larize those observations a bit more, by reference to the prerequi-
sites to just and efficient insurance described above. First, how-
ever, we must exercise our imaginations one more time:
Imagine not only that instruments such as those just sketched,
and their associated indices, exist, but also that there is a well-
established, active trading market in such instruments -indeed, in
many state-contingent (in this case, derivative) claims upon some
(or even all conceivable) forms of wage- or salary-associated fluc-
tuating income aggregate-i.e., an active market in something (or
some things) that is (or are) correlated with precisely the sort of
variable that renders income risk what I have labeled "systemic"
and thus meriting, in justice, income-risk-sharing.
253 "Perpetual fu-
253 The notion of an aggregate-associated hedging instrument, in this case a
so-called "macro security," appears first to have been discussed in print by John F.
Marshall et al., Hedging Business Cycle Risk with Macro Swaps and Options, 4 CONT'L
BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 103 (1992). Marshall adds to this discussion in John
F. Marshall, Derivatives and Risk Management, in THE NEW TOOL SET: ASSESSING
INNOVATIONS IN BANKING 79 (1995). The idea is implicit, of course, in the failed
attempt, prior to the stock market crash of October 1987, to market a Consumer
Price Index ("CPI")-derivative instrument. See Brian R. Horrigan, The CPI Futures
Market: The Inflation Hedge That Won't Grow, Bus. REV. (FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA.),
May-June 1987, at 3. It seems likely that the market crash itself and subsequent
attenuation of inflationary threat would account for the failure of the CPI Futures
Market. A somewhat similar story, this one involving regulatory uncertainty, un-
folded in the case of another early consumer macro-derivative, the S&P-indexed
CD. See Joseph P. Ogden, A Strategic Analysis of Stock Index-Linked CDs, in
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tures contracts," for example, or vocational income-collars, or local
real estate value collars, tied to standardized measures (indices) of
a state's or region's GDP, a vocation's average income rate, or a lo-
cality's average real estate values, are purchased and traded
widely upon this market. Shorts in these contracts in effect direct
payments to longs whenever the underlying measure-the stipu-
lated index-rises above some predetermined ceiling level, and
longs compensate shorts when the underlying index falls below a
predetermined floor.254 There is, in effect, a sort of contingent-
DERWATIVES, REGULATION AND BANKING 193 (Barry Schachter ed., 1997); see also
ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 1-53, 136 ("One way of providing insurance
would be to have futures or options contracts based on output in a particular in-
dustry. This security would allow people to hedge their human capital risk. As
yet such securities do not, of course, exist. They could perhaps be synthesized by,
for example, shorting a diversified portfolio of stocks in an industry. The transac-
tion costs of doing this are large, however.").
Currently the principal champion of markets in hedging instruments tied to
macro-indices, at least in terms of publication volume, seems to be Robert Shiller.
See ROBERT SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING
SOCIETY'S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS (1993) [hereinafter, SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS],
which offers helpful discussion of the possible uses of such instruments and mar-
kets as well as substantial contributions to the theory of index numbers -a matter
which, as subsequently discussed, must ultimately be ironed out in order for the
proposed markets to get off of the ground. See also Stefano Athanasoulis et al.,
Macro Markets and Financial Security, FED. RES. BANK OF NY ECON. POL'Y REV. 21, 21
(1999) (discussing Shiller's "proposed... new set of markets that could in theory
provide better diversification opportunities"); Marianne Baxter et al., Synthetic Re-
turns on NIPA Assets: An International Comparison, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1141-72
(1998) ("us[ing] the constant-expectant return model of Campbell and Shiller as
our asset pricing model..."); ROBERT J. SHILLER & STEFANO ATHANASOULIS, WORLD
INCOME COMPONENTS: MEASURING AND EXPLOITING INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING
OPPORTUNITIES, at 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5095,
1995) (detailing "methods of decomposing the variance of world national incomes
into components..."); ROBERT J. SHILLER & RYAN SCHNEIDER, LABOR INCOME INDICES
DESIGNED FOR USE IN CONTRACTS PROMOTING INCOME RISK MANAGEMENT, at 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5254, 1995) (creating "indicies of
individual labor income"). Shiller, it should be noted, is not only a breathtaking
visionary and practical humanitarian, but a most generous interlocutor and col-
laborator as well. Cites to his work can scarcely do justice to his salutary influ-
ence.
254 Shiller proposes perpetual futures and real estate derivatives, along with
several variations. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS, supra note 253, at 38-46 passim; see
also ROBERT J. SHILLER, SOCIAL SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONS FOR INTERGENERATIONAL,
INTRAGENERATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 6641, 1998) (examining social security systems as a
method of risk-sharing). A conceptually similar perpetual contract has been pro-
posed as a means of affording more efficient and widely available health insur-
ance as a response to changes in health care markets. John H. Cochrane, Time-
Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1995).
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consol-swap, an iterated, ongoing bet between the parties.
255 Inso-
far as peoples' opinions as to, or stakes in, the underlying's fluctua-
tions differ, there is every reason to expect active markets in such
instruments, at least once the initial and inertial obstacles to their
establishment have been removed.256 Participants, of course, are
required to maintain margin accounts with a clearing authority or
broker, or in some other manner to guarantee payment, just as in
current derivatives markets; failure to maintain the required bal-
ance results in the closing of one's short position and required pur-
chase of a countervailing long position to cancel the short one.
257
Thus, there is a form of ongoing, continuous relational contract be-
tween the parties to this transaction, rather reminiscent of the on-
going, dynamic social contract posited in Section 2.3 in explicating
justice. If the instrument and market here envisaged (they need
not take precisely this form-as suggested by the examples listed
at the beginning of this Section and this paragraph, there are read-
ily constructed analogues to all those instruments discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2) are tied to the appropriate underlying index, it is easy to
see how trade in and on them can afford a more just and efficient
form of income-insurance than we currently find, by skirting the
obstacles classically facing development of a private income-
insurance market.
6.1.1. "Randomizing" Covariance
Not all sectors of an economy always covary with respect to
their prosperings. While airlines or trucking companies languish
in response to certain sector-specific shocks, for example, some
railways might be expected to flourish.25 8 Tire sales and associated
incomes, however, will fare as well or as poorly as automobile
sales fare. Returning to our Bob and Barbara story for a moment,
non-small-practice lawyers, for example, hoping to hedge their
own income risks, are likely to be among Bob's counterparties -
255 Consols are perpetual annuities not often found in the United States but
rather more familiar in Great Britain. On "swaps," see the discussion supra, Sec-
tion 5.2.
256 These, as will be seen infra in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, are both considerable
and addressable.
257 See Paul H. Kupiec, A Survey of Exchange-Traded Basket Instruments, 4 J. FIN.
SERV. RES. 175 (1990) (investigating "basket" financial instruments).
258 A now, alas, easily envisaged hypothetical would be a well publicized act
of terror which rendered large numbers of travelers skittish about airlines but
willing to drive or take passenger trains.
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they and Bob will in effect insure one another, each faring better
when the other fares worse, and each directing payments to the
others precisely when those others are more needful and they
themselves less. Likewise Bob's non-small-town-dwelling coun-
terparties, and so on. It is easy to enumerate pairs and n-tuples of
complements and substitutes within most economies, and would
likely become even more so if there were to be an active market in
state-contingent claims deriving their values from indices of the
values of such statistically-associated goods. (More on this infor-
mation-generation infra, as, again, at Section 2.3, supra.)
Beyond complementary and substitute sectors and industries,
entire regions, nations, and even trading blocs often will vary
countercyclically in their income-growth and -contraction phases.
Germany and Japan, for example, often seem to have flourished
precisely when Britain and the US have fared poorly, and vice
versa. And even when countercyclicalities are not so dramatic,
there are nonetheless partial countercyclicalities, degrees of coun-
tercyclicality and lag times between even merely partly covarying
fortunes among sectors, national economies and regional econo-
mies. The more sophisticated our econometric modeling, the more
precision we can bring to bear in exploiting differential variances.
And again, if a price-mechanism were established in derivative in-
struments deriving their values from such measures, we would
expect pricing itself to provide much if not all of the information
that we need. (More on that, again, infra.) If, then, people were
able to hedge their incomes against countercyclically varying, par-
tially cross-varying or laggingly varying sectoral, national or re-
gional income aggregates, insurance-vitiating covariance would
decline in importance and portfolios would draw significantly
closer to optimally diversifiable.259
6.1.2. "Symmetricalizing" Asymmetric Information
Now suppose that wage- and salary-incomes could be insured
not directly, but indirectly, by proxy, by insuring against larger,
aggregated income-components with which individual incomes
were predictably correlated or anticorrelated, but over which pro-
spective insureds enjoyed no particular informational or manipula-
259 "Derivative securities expand traders' message space and render the mar-
ket less incomplete." Shyam Sunder, Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey, in
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra note 102, at 445 (1997).
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 227
tional advantage vis-A-vis prospective insurers, particularly once
prices impounded all such information and rendered it publicly
available.260 Under such circumstances, there would be no prob-
lems of hidden information (concealed want of diligence) or moni-
toring costs. We would have eliminated most adverse selection
and moral hazard challenges to privately offered income-
insurance.261 In the idiom of our Bob and Barbara story, prospec-
tive insurers of Bob would worry less that he knows something
that they do not. And they would no longer need worry that Bob
might actually bring about the eventuation of the risk that he was
seeking to insure.
Now query: what would those larger, aggregated income-
components to which nobody enjoys privileged access likely be?
The answer seems clear: what better candidate than those very sec-
toral, national, and regional income variables considered in con-
nection with covariance -variables also associated with what, in
Sections 2.4 and 3, we called "systemic risk," the bearing of which
ought, in justice, to be rendered as widely (as equally) shared as is
the information that is associated with it? Is any variable, apart
from the income-earner's own diligence (which is not publicly
knowable), likely to bear a fuller or more direct impact upon an in-
dividual's income stream than the health of the industry, or of the
national, regional or local economy in which she is employed?
262
Perhaps sunspots, or Zodiac phases, bear the requisite degree of
countercyclicality; it's really not important. The real point here is
260 See Sunder, supra note 259, at 456 ("The [empirical] studies ... demon-
strate that it is possible for markets to disseminate information from perfectly in-
formed insiders to the uninformed. Is it also possible for a market to perform the
more subtle and difficult task of aggregating the less-than-perfect, diverse infor-
mation in possession of individual traders, and disseminating it to all traders? If
this were to happen, such a market would function as if every individual trader
has access to all the information in possession of all individuals.") (emphasis
added). Sunder answers his own question with a qualified affirmative -it seems
that markets must be well regulated and as complete as possible. Id. at 461.
261 Of course, as the notion of "partial countercyclicality" adduced in the pre-
vious paragraph suggests, insurance in such case would only be partial, insofar as
the correlation between income and aggregate were less than perfect. But the
point is that this would be a considerable improvement upon the near complete
lack of systemic income-risk insurance that is on offer presently.
262 I, of course, leave to one side the employee's own, physical, health. That is
covered in the more complete "just insurance" theory offered in Hockett, Market-
Able Justice, supra note 17, at 4, which considers such matters as "gene insurance,"
"time-consistent health insurance," and many other new theoretically available,
and justice-reflective, forms of insurance that we might place on markets.
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that there are likely to be a variety of phenomena that are suffi-
ciently "macro" as to be unaffectable by individual action by most
parties (particularly once markets are established and prices im-
pound the information) and unlikely to be the object of privileged
information ty most parties as to constitute good surrogates for
individual employment itself, provided only that they vary or co-
vary in some predictable degree with the employment in question
and can be bet upon in some market, so as to constitute opportuni-
ties for hedging employment income.263
6.1.3. "Estimabilitating" Inestimability
Now consider one further likelihood: If a market in hedging
instruments that derived their values from underlying aggregate
values were to develop, is it not reasonable to expect that an active
complementary industry of predictors and analyzers of those val-
ues would grow in tandem with it, just as such an industry has de-
veloped alongside modem securities markets?264 Surely, it is en-
tirely reasonable to anticipate that eventuality; it would, in fact, be
unreasonable not so to anticipate. 265 Indeed, the would-be public
263 Particularly evocative in this connection is ARROW, Insurance, supra note
169, at 81 ("Suppose we could introduce into the economic system any institution
we wished for shifting risk instead of being confined to those developed histori-
cally.... [I]t is not hard to see what an ideal arrangement would consist of. We
would want to find a market in which we could insure freely against any eco-
nomically relevant event. (N.B. i.e., we would want a complete state-claims mar-
ket.) That is, an individual should be able to bet, at fixed odds, any amount he
wishes on the occurrence of any event which will affect his welfare in any way.").
264 Of course, because of the link between many such aggregate variables and
firm-profitability and consequent -valuation, not to mention municipal solvency
in the case of municipal bonds, a large industry of such analysts already has de-
veloped in order to facilitate the accurate pricing of firm- and municipally -
issued securities. But, as is discussed in Section 6.2.1 infra, particular purposes de-
cisively influence the types of data that are collected and the weights that are as-
signed and interpretations that are placed upon such data. It would therefore ap-
pear likely that new forms of data, and certainly new means of interpreting some
of that data, would develop alongside of what we now see should an active mar-
ket in individual income-associated hedging instruments come into being. On the
history of the securities analysis industry and its methods of data-selection and -
interpretation, see, e.g., PETER BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS
OF MODERN WALL STREET (1993); BURTON GORDON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DOWN WALL STREET (1999).
265 Id. One purpose of this Article is indeed to motivate more detailed, tech-
nical work in the way of thinking through what additional forms of data, and
what additional forms of weighing and interpreting, might be sought. More on
this infra Section 6.2.
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good of such information would efficiently be privatized and in-
ternalized, in the sense that value could be gleaned by finding it,
after which it would be rendered public in the form of price-
adjustment. But such a development would perforce lead to sub-
stantial diminishment of the inestimability problem. Analysts
would busy themselves ferreting out all manner of information
bearing upon the present values of the income streams represented
by, hence the future prospects of, sectoral, national, regional and
local economies, as there would be significant prospects of gain (on
the part of hedgers and speculators alike) from the gleaning of
such information. 266 This information would, of course, impound
itself in the prices of the relevant hedging instruments, and thereby
be pooled and rendered effectively public to all.267 This would not
266 This is, of course, elementary. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 140 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]
([Slpeculation ... by giving people (speculators) a stake in forecasting prices cor-
rectly [that is, prices of the underlying] even though they are not involved in pro-
ducing or consuming the [underlying] commodity traded in the market [and in-
deed, even if they are], increases the amount of price information in the market.")
Insofar as price information is, per Section 2.3 supra, justice-pertinent information,
this activity of course assists in the working of justice. See also Hicks works cited
supra note 47 and accompanying discussion and text; Romano, supra note 244.
267 1 am of course appealing to the proposition that there is at least some de-
gree of truth in the well rehearsed "Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis"
("ECMH"), on which see, e.g., M. L. BACHtLIER, THEORIE DE LA SPtCULATION (1900);
F. A. Hayek, The Use of Information in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); Paul A.
Samuelson, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Foluctuate Randomly, 6 IND. MGMT.
REV. 41 (1965); Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of the Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (first distinguishing and discussing support
for "strong" (all price-relevant information impounded), "semi-strong" (all pub-
lished information impounded) and "weak" (all information as to past stock price
movements impounded) forms of the hypothesis); Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J.
FIN. 1575 (1991) (reoperationalizing the hypothesis through tests for "return pre-
dictability" (roughly corresponding to the "weak" form), "event studies" ("semis-
trong" form), and "private information" ("strong" form) and concluding, at 1602,
that "[e]vent studies are the cleanest evidence we have on efficiency .... With few
exceptions, [they are] supportive.") (emphasis added); Harold Demsetz, The Cost
of Transacting, 82 Q. J. ECON. 33 (1968); O'HARA, supra note 237, at 153-250. Ronald
Gilson & Rainier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Rev. 549
(1984); Lynn K. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988); MALKIEL,
supra note 264.
The hypothesis has come under rather exacting scrutiny over the past two
decades. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1981); Lawrence Summers,
Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986);
Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 209; ROBERT SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1989);
ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); ANDREW Lo & ARCHIE C.
MACKINLEY, A NON-RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1999). We seem to be
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only eliminate the final remaining barrier to efficient income-
insurance, it would offer at least two additional justice- and effi-
ciency-pertinent benefits as well.
Firstly, the development of such an industry could be expected
to bring about better economic forecasting even than that currently
done by fiscal and monetary authorities. While such forecasting as
is currently carried out by governmental and intergovernmental
personnel (e.g., the Conference Board in the United States, or the
International Monetary Fund on behalf of its Member Countries)
no doubt is of very high caliber, it seems reasonable to expect the
vaster armies of analysts whose own incomes directly would ride
upon the quality of their forecasting to make at least incremental
improvements in current methods of data collection and assess-
ment. Moreover, standardization wrought by a developing market
in the derivative securities here countenanced would lend itself,
feedback-style, to yet greater liquidity and meaningful pricing,
helping to optimize estimability. 268
Secondly, relatedly, and for present (justice-) purposes rather
more importantly, the development of informationally efficient in-
dividual income-hedging markets would take private income insur-
ance well in the direction of optimal justice. Recall that a principal
problem in sorting out the justice of income-risk-distribution is the
separating of "systemic" or "latent" from "individually prevent-
able" or "patent" such risks.269 Recall more generally my argument
that an adequate theory of justice must be informationally richer
and more nuanced, social-contractually more complete than those
theories currently dominating the field -the consequentialist and
entering upon a renaissance of sorts in the field of "behavioral finance," and a
fuller footnote would include cites to Professors Shefrin, Shleifer and Thaler in
addition to those authors just cited. This is not the place for such an excursus.
One needn't commit herself to optimal efficiency of securities pricing in accepting
the force of the present argument. Even ECMH skeptics will concede that securi-
ties prices in deep, liquid markets impound and convey a great deal of important
information which, in the absence of such markets, would not be widely available.
The same will likely admit that more effective regulation can curb the manic and
nefarious practices that undercut markets' rationality. See also next several pages
and citations for more on this, and, again, sources cited supra Section 2.3.
268 See supra note 201, and accompanying text on the salutary (and apparently
initially unforeseen) effects of FHA mortgage insurance on the standardization of
mortgage forms and the subsequent (indeed, consequent) liquidification of mort-
gages in the form of an efficiency-enhancing secondary mortgage market. See also
Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731 (1992), reprinted in
ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 309.
269 See supra Section 2.4 for a discussion of risk-sharing
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Rawlsian accounts -in order to correlate our countless justice-
implicative choices and actions, in particular our exchange relations,
with their justice-appropriate recompenses (what I called "justice-
accounting"). 270 Now an informationally efficient income-risk-
hedging market, it seems clear, would enable prospective job-
takers and job-retainers, not to mention job-income-hedgers, more
readily to trade their risks in accordance with the degrees to which
they valued - hence, in a sense, deserved - them; and more trans-
parently to assess the degrees of risk-an important form of social
opportunity cost-represented by their own and alternative occu-
pations. Hence, an income-risk-hedging market would aid their
choices to move into, stay out of, remain in or out of, or hedge in re-
lation to such occupations, simply by pricing the relative costs of
the hedging instruments associated with differing industries, lo-
calities, regions, countries, etc.271 It would then be more reasonable
270 See supra Section 2.3. See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 266, at 54 ("Speculation performs a valuable economic function by helping to
make prices accurately reflect the conditions of supply and demand."). Insofar as
supply and demand accurately reflect scarcity, social opportunity cost and social
valuation, active speculation in these markets would, again, per the terms of Sec-
tion 2.3, facilitate accurate "justice-accounting."
271 Recall the discussion at Section 2.3 of markets as information-processors.
Particularly interesting, in this connection, are the results of much empirical work
done on "experimental markets."
First, when spot markets (i.e., markets of goods whose values underlie deriva-
tive securities) are supplemented by futures markets, convergence to equilibrium
in the spot markets is considerably sped up, as would be expected in theory. See,
e.g., Robert Forsythe et al., Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market, 50
ECONOMETRICA 537 (1982); Robert Forsythe et al., Futures Markets and Informational
Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination, 39 J. FIN. 955 (1984); Jean-Pierre Danthine, In-
formation, Futures Prices, and Stabilizing Speculation, 17 J. ECON. THEORY 79 (1978);
David Friedman et al., The Informational Role of Futures Markets and Learning Behav-
ior-Some Experimental Evidence, in FUTURES MARKETS- MODELLING, MANAGING
AND MONITORING FUTURES TRADING (M.E. Streit ed. 1983); David Friedman et al.,
The Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349
(1984).
Similar results have been found in the case of experimental options markets.
See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, Rational Expectations and the Aggregation
of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1988)
(analyzing how Arrow-Debreu state-contingent options profoundly increase in-
formational and allocative efficiency of markets); Brian D. Kluger & Steve B.
Wyatt, Options and Efficiency: Some Empirical Evidence, 55 REv. QUANTITATIVE FIN.
AccT. 179 (1995); Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q. J. ECON. 75 (1976);
R. Jennings & L. Starks, Earnings Announcements, Stock Price Adjustment, and the
Existence of Options Markets, 41 J. FIN. 107 (1986); S. Manaster & R. Radleman, Op-
tion Prices as Predictors of Equilibrium Stock Prices, 37 J. FIN. 1043 (1982).
For more on the theory, see, e.g., sources cited at notes 252, 267, and 312, as
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than it is at present to say (at least given properly functioning mar-
kets and rough symmetry of initial endowment among market-
participants), of anyone taking a job attended by significant long-
term income-risk, "she could have anticipated and prevented or
hedged against the eventuation of that risk, for either there was a
readily available counterparty to whom she could cost-effectively
have transferred that risk, or the high price (or impossibility) of
hedging against it told her of that risk's presence and inefficient
(i.e., social-opportunity-over-costly) bearable magnitude; it was a
more patent, less latent risk." It would also be more reasonable to
say of that person, in a more detailed manner, "she could partially
have hedged against the income risk associated with that occupa-
tion by investing in a, 3, y, 6, or some combination thereof, the
prospects of which are (or were) variously inversely correlated
with the prospects of that occupation in which she chose to work;
that information also was patent, not latent." And of course it
would not in fact even be necessary to say such things at all; all of
the deserts or "penalties" implied would already have been imposed,
in the form of the market-produced price of the hedge. For such a
market and the information that it would impound, express, and
price would, if efficient, by dint of its very functioning (and, again,
commencing from a reasonable initial distribution of bargaining
power among participants in the first place), sort out systemic (or
latent) from patent (and hence voluntarily assumed, faultable)
risk-as only the latent (non-asymmetric information-associated)
risk would generally be able to be hedged, at least at reasonable
rates. And insofar as the patent risk was able to be hedged, it
would be due to the presence of mere speculators in the market,
who also would likely be frequent counter-parties in the case of la-
tent risk.272 (There would thus be a transformation of even patent
risk into something fairly insured too, if people wanted to insure it,
by dint of voluntary counter-gambling. This speculative opportu-
nity would make for what might be a socially useful channeling of
risk-taste alternatives to lotteries, in which the state is generally the
winner.) Risks, in short, would come to be dynamically, fairly, and
well as Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where
Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Sanford J. Grossman, The Ex-
istence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities,
44 REV. ECON. STUD. 431 (1977); Sanford J. Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory
of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 541
(1981).
272 See infra note 312 for a discussion of speculators in the market.
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socially optimally priced (assuming, of course, that market partici-
pants entered the market upon fair and equal terms) over time in
view of available and ever-changing social knowledge.
In sum, then, and again returning once more to our Bob and
Barbara story, people situated as was Bob in the later 1970s would
be better able to assess the prudence of making Bob's own voca-
tional, locational, and real estate-purchasing decisions-and, of
course, better able to hedge such bets as they made. (The earlier
mentioned process of "justice-accounting" would thus be eased, at
least with respect to many risks.) People situated as Bob's prospec-
tive insurers would be likewise advantaged. Contracts between
such parties would be more readily made with confidence about
what was being "bet" upon, and the contracts themselves would be
amenable to more temporally-flexibly defined-indeed, valuation-
ally fluctuating - "bets."
6.2. From Woulda and Shoulda to Coulda: A Brief, Constrative Excur-
sus on Dworkinian Social Insurance. More Risk-Attitude Pre-
sumption and the Central Problem Left Unsolved
A brief stock-taking 273 and summing-up might be in order. It
was noted before274 that Dworkin uses a "hypothetical insurance
market" to stimulating effect in, first, explicating his theory of jus-
tice as "equality of resources," and, second, concluding that pro-
gressive income taxation can be regarded as a sort of underem-
ployment insurance premium.275 Dworkin's approach to the risk-
justice problem deserves separate consideration as a (somewhat)
competing proposal to that which I am offering (I say "somewhat"
because one way of characterizing what I propose is as a sort of
"real," rather than merely Dworkinian "hypothetical," Dworkinian
insurance).
Dworkin's proposal, like utilitarian and Rawlsian justice, rests
upon risk-taste assumptions that we ought to avoid if possible;
does not actually, in the end, address the problem which he (and I)
wish to address; and recommends a policy-orientation which, alas,
appears destined to be politically infeasible (at least in the United
States) for some time to come. My own proposals, by contrast,
273 Pun foreseen but not intended.
274 See discussion supra note 164.
275 That theory shares some perspective with my own, as explicated supra,
Section 2.3, in its "ambition-sensitivity," see supra note 84, and in its concern with
dynamic equality, see supra note 90.
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come closer to the real target implicated by our sense of justice (at
least if we begin, like Dworkin, at a reasonable starting endow-
ment), and are likely to be more appealing to a public that remains
suspicious of taxation and enamored with "the magic of the mar-
ketplace."
The key insight of Dworkin's work is that an ideal picture of a
just distribution of resources over time-a picture that is "ambi-
tion-sensitive" without being "endowment-sensitive"276- includes
state-claims among the goods for which individuals are able to
trade. More specifically, the idea is that "underemployment insur-
ance" would be ideally purchasable from behind the veil in order
that peoples' own risk-preferences and willingness to expend ef-
fort- before they realized what the market for their particular tal-
ents might be-would determine the compensation they receive
for any lack of marketability they experience in the ensuing post-
veiled labor market. In this way, peoples' lots in the labor market
would be rendered attributable to their own preferences and
choices (their "ambitions"), rather than to the slings and arrows of
outrageous fortune (their "endowments"). 277
Now the proverbial rub here, of course, is that this particular
"hypothetical insurance market" does not, and cannot, exist.278
There simply is no way actually to situate people behind a veil
which screens from them all knowledge of what their abilities and
marketabilities will be in the post-veiled market. Nor is there any
means for insurers to determine, once the purchasers come out
from behind the veil, to what degree any want of marketability
stems from want of "ambition," and to what degree it stems from
want of "endowment." Lacking that ability, we are faced with the
same central problem noted before that challenges the instant and
any other effort to theorize, then implement, distributive justice -
namely, how to sort out talent ("endowment") and effort (or dili-
gence, "productive virtue," Dworkinian "ambition"). 279 As the dis-
276 See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 108. The distinction, to
an important degree, tracks my own between "patent" and "latent" risk as well as
that between choice and circumstance, effort and talent. On these latter, see supra
Section 2.3.
277 The availability of insurance converts "brute luck" to "option luck."
278 Actually, there is another rub as well. As described by Dworkin, even if it
could exist, it would not address the very need that has occasioned it: the parsing
of talent endowment from effort and occupational choice.
279 Note, again, that an analogous difficulty afflicts the theory of responsibil-
ity (fault) in the tort and criminal contexts. See generally supra note 96.
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/3
2004] JUST INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 235
cussion notes in Section 2.3, this is, of course, a particularly sharp
and important information problem. Insurance is a standard
means of dealing with some information problems -those regard-
ing one's own risks when the general incidence of risk is at least
known. But here it is insurance itself that faces an acute problem
of asymmetric information, the very one that prevents private
markets in standard income-insurance contracts (noted in Sections
4 and 5) from coming into being in the first place. We are thus
compelled either to come up with a means to circumvent that prob-
lem, or to come up with a sort of compromise to the ideal Dwork-
inian underemployment insurance.
Dworkin, of course, takes that second route. The key as
Dworkin sees it is to exploit certain advantages enjoyed by gov-
ernment over private actors- in particular, its capacity to coerce
participation in the insurance market-and then to "mimic" the
"hypothetical" insurance market. He thus imagines entering cer-
tain crucial bits of data that might somehow be collected-in par-
ticular, goods-and-services -demand-schedules and data regarding
the total distribution of talents among the population -into a mar-
velous computer,280 out from which, VoilA, issues the market-
structure and income-strata that would be produced from that tal-
ent- and tastes-distribution. The government then performs a sort
of Gedanken experiment concerning what the average citizen be-
hind a "thin" veil of ignorance (where one knows her tastes but not
her talents) should 281 purchase in view of that market-structure
and income-stratification. The government then taxes the citizenry
accordingly by way of premium-collection, and provides under-
employment insurance with the proceeds. In order to avoid moral
hazard and to ensure solvency, the government places the burden
of proof upon the underemployed to show that they really are un-
able to earn at the salary levels to which the government insurance
is to raise them. This effectively requires the beneficiaries to prove
a negative.
Requiring that beneficiaries prove a negative, of course, places
a remarkably heavy burden upon their shoulders. But there are yet
more formidable difficulties with Dworkin's proposal. These in-
clude the following: a) there is no means of acquiring data on the
280 See discussion supra note 131 (discussing Oskar Lange, whose interest in
cybernetics we noted in connection with the "great socialist calculation debate").
281 Hence "would" because Dworkin, as well as Rawls, denotes "should" as
"would."
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actual, innate talents (as opposed to diligences) of the citizenry;282
b) there is no marvelous computer or means other than the market
itself of calculating the demand schedules proceeding from con-
sumer tastes; 283 c) the government is not able actually to generate
the market-sf-"ucture data and income-stratification schedules in
question; and d) the single premium arrived at which Dworkin de-
cides that people "should" (hence "would") actually pay 284 is of
course question-begging, coarse-grained ("one size fits all"), theo-
retically underdetermined (by dint of a, b, and c) hence implausi-
ble, and, finally, practically unimplementable. It appears, then,
that this second alternative-the "second best" solution- actually
is no alternative at all. The informational problems that give rise to
the Dworkinian "first best" and "second best" solutions, along
with the problem of an assumed universally predictable degree of
risk-aversion, afflicts the "second-best" itself, and just as acutely.
We return, then, to the first solution-type noted before - how
might we circumvent the fundamental information problem of pars-
ing diligence from fault? This is precisely what the actual markets
that I have here proposed are meant, to some extent, to do. We fo-
cus on surrogates (or proxies) for what is hidden (effort, lack of fault,
Dworkinian "ambition"), and then offer real (not "hypothetical")
markets in those surrogates. In effect, we enable people to bet on
the prospects of their own and other industries, regions, and na-
tions, by dealing in state-claims contingent upon those states.285
Most individuals will not have superior knowledge or greater
abilities than anybody else to manipulate the prospects of such
states; where they might, we subject them to insider-dealing regula-
tion. We are therefore able to avoid the general information prob-
lems afflicting insurance markets of which Dworkin, in his thought
experiment, appears ultimately to have lost sight. And in the very
creation of such markets there results a sort of information-
282 See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 93; discussion supra note
61. This problem is the entry point of the "hypothetical insurance market"
thought experiment.
283 See discussion supra note 131 (concerning the "great socialist calculation
debate").
284 The latter arrived in part because of the impoverished information that
Dworkin is actually able to bring into his calculations, and in part, oddly, because
of assumptions that he makes as to the risk-preferences of his hypothetical would-
be insureds. Recall that assumptions regarding risk-aversion acutely plagued
Rawls's account of justice. See discussion supra note 78.
285 See discussion concerning ARROW, Insurance, supra note 169, at note 263.
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generating and processing "machine" which better informs those
seeking, as well as those providing, insurance themselves- one that
does so rather more plausibly, and rather less fancifully, than
Dworkin's deus ex machina, the "super computer." 286 We achieve
justice (symmetry), in this case, not through simulated shared
opacity-a veil of ignorance-but through actual shared knowl-
edge.287 And in so doing we achieve greater diligence-(or at any
rate, faultlessness)-sensitivity, hence lower relative endowment-
sensitivity. The better betting market is the potential actual one-
the perfectly real, non-hypothetical income-proxy market.
These markets need not be treated as if solely for isolated indi-
viduals' ability to trade. As explored further in Section 6.3, we
might see them traded in by institutions currently constituting part
of the vast infrastructure of financial intermediation that has de-
veloped over the past twenty years.288 Or we might reconceive and
redesign, if only in part, the federal unemployment insurance pro-
gram itself as such an intermediary -one that might even create
markets themselves just as the Federal Housing Authority ("FHA")
ultimately created the secondary mortgage market pursuant to its
innovative, economy-stimulating, more just and efficient mort-
gage-insurance program in the 1930s. 289 The program might even
offer a menu of options to prospective insureds, rather as the fed-
eral employee pension plan does to federal employees today.290
If one could but bring about the creation of a more complete in-
come-aggregate-associated state-contingent claims market, then,
that would insure against systemic income-risk both more effi-
286 See generally discussion supra Section 2.3 (discussing the "super com-
puter").
287 A veil, a simulated shared opacity, would of course remain necessary for
the case of genetic traits, unless some truly magical form of "gene insurance" is
developed, a prospect explored more in Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note
17.
288 In fairness to Dworkin, it should be pointed out that this infrastructure, as
well as many of the developments in financial markets and financial market tech-
nologies that I urge should be exploited, came along well after Dworkin made the
proposal here discussed. Though his monograph is but two years old, the cited
pages are reprinted essays dating to 1981. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part
I: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald M. Dworkin, What is
Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
289 See generally discussion supra notes 201, 202. By analogy with supplemen-
tary rather than full "privatization" of Social Security (such as proposed by Vice
President Gore in 2000), we might call this "AFDC Plus."
290 On this system, see Hockett, Pension Insurance, supra note 225.
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ciently and more justly, 291 there would be more information, more
symmetry wrought by means other than opacity, and thus greater
efficiency as well.292 And it seems that in so doing, we would come
rather closer to full income-risk justice in practice than the most ef-
fective thinker on the subject thus far293 has been able to do even in
theory. What, then, stands in the way?
6.3. Why the Better Betting (Hedging) Market Does Not (Yet) Exist
So why does the better betting market that I have described not
currently find a place among our risk-valuing and -trading institu-
tions? The answer seems to be that we face a variety of obstacles
on both the supply and demand sides to the creation of hedging
markets in macro-aggregates. Many of these barriers are of course
symbiotically related -there is a forward-looking chicken and egg
problem with each side of the potential market in effect saying to
the other, "after you." On the supply side, there lacks the sort of
measurements (income aggregates or indices), instruments with
values derivative upon those measurements, and institutions nec-
essary in order for an aggregate-income-risk "stock market" to
291 To generalize somewhat more theoretically, what we are envisaging here
is an income-market instance of the more general phenomenon of equilibrium in a
market for ("spot") commodities and contingent claims ("Arrow Securities"), ef-
fectively covering all preference-relevant states of the world. See JOHN HicKs,
VALUE AND CAPITAL 130-140, 136 (2d ed. 1946) [hereinafter HIcKS, VALUE AND
CAPITAL] (describing a system of private enterprise with no forwarding trading
and "spot," immediate delivery of all transactions); discussion supra note 252 (dis-
cussing "Arrow Securities"). It is well established that where Arrow-contracts
paying out purchasing power for any date/event pair are available alongside
commodities, trading equilibrium in the resultant commodity/securities market
both exists and is Pareto-efficient. See discussion supra note 252; GOLLIER, supra
note 61, at 195-202. It is also well established that, assuming a starting point of
equal initial endowments, the resulting EEWE will instantiate an attractive con-
ception of fairness in allocation. See id. at 307-23. Hence, we are looking here at
something that would be both more just and efficient than what we have at pre-
sent.
292 See discussion supra Section 4.3 on the possible efficiency benefits of "lev-
eling up" rather than "leveling down" in information-equalization.
293 It should be clearly emphasized, despite my criticisms here, how illumi-
nating I feel Dworkin is in dealing with the general problem. Dworkin's solution
is both theoretically and practically inadequate, but in leading up to it, he is, quite
simply, masterful in his exposition of the problem. It strikes me as quite remark-
able that economists have spent the time that they have discussing Rawls, and not
moved on to Dworkin and Dworkin's antecedents, the "fairness" mechanism de-
signers discussed supra, note 54. Had they done so, it might well have solved
many of our general problems long ago. It is my sincere hope that this Article and
Hockett, Market-Able Justice, supra note 17, renew the walk along that path.
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function. While GDP measures are well tracked, to be sure, index
numbers are lacking for many sectoral, regional, and labor income
aggregates and their fluctuations. Also, missing are the same in-
dex numbers for more aggregates that more partially correlate with
labor incomes. Such indices, and information from which they
might be constructed, that are maintained are not in the public
domain or have not been gathered or constructed with a view to
the specialized purposes countenanced in this Article.294 More im-
portantly, absent concerted public action (governmental or other),
we are unlikely to find such data, measures and indices sufficiently
forthcoming, for there are both well known theoretical difficulties
attendant upon their construction and insufficient payoff to any
one inventor prepared to undertake the arduous constructive task.
Supply-side inertia, then, stands in our way.
Such being the case, demand is prevented in its very tracks
from being so much as broadly entertained, let alone effectuated,
by potential consumers of the prospective products. Yet the de-
mand side of this potential equation also faces additional inertial
obstacles of its own, reinforcing the inertial challenges on the sup-
ply side. Not least of these is the very unfamiliarity of the possi-
bilities- and hence potential markets- that this Article is meant in
part to place on the agenda.295
In order to fully describe the obstacles and how we might sur-
mount them, it will perhaps be convenient simply to lump the
supply- and demand-side challenges together and discuss them en
suite.
6.3.1. The Trouble with Index Numbers
Indexing-the representation of vector by scalar quantities-
probably constitutes the consummate act of oversimplification rou-
294 See Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in
POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 59-60
(Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) (noting with "embarrassment" that "the National Bu-
reau has carried out very little research directly concerned with problems of in-
dustrial organization"); discussion infra note 299. More on this matter of indices
and the significance of the purposes for which they are constructed infra Section
6.3.1.
295 They are, of course, partly on the agendas of some of the financial theo-
rists. But they are not yet on the public agenda, and their justice significance does
not appear to have been dealt with, or understood by, anybody with any degree
of sophistication.
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finely carried out by economic agents and agencies.296 Consider
the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") a measure of consumer price in-
flation in the goods and services markets. Any economy modern
enough to have raised interest on the part of its watchers in the
general level of prices is bound to feature a practical infinitude of
goods and services in circulation. Each of these submarkets will be
subject, most of the time, to fluctuating prices-i.e., fluctuating
rates at which the goods and services trade for money.297 The like-
lihood that such fluctuations would at all times be temporally syn-
chronized and equal across products, services, and sectors is, quite
simply, too miniscule to warrant consideration as a serious possi-
bility. Moreover, a) changes over time of the relative compositions
of products in markets, and b) "substitution biases" (underestima-
tion of the impact of price changes because people substitute other
goods for those whose prices change most) complicate the in-
tertemporal accuracy of indices.298 Given these facts, a general
measure of price (or labor-income) fluctuations is, of necessity, a
very coarse-grained, rough-and-ready, reductionistic simplification
which, it is hoped by those who formulate it, will be "close enough
for government [or other quotidian] work." 299 Yet such measures
296 There is, not surprisingly, vast and technically sophisticated literature on
the theoretical and practical issues involved in indexing. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER,
THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS (1922); FIFTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC MEASUREMENT
(Ernst R. Berndt & Jack E. Triplett eds., 1990); CHANG HSIAO, ANALYSIS OF PANEL
DATA (1986); MEASUREMENT IN ECONOMICS (Wolfgang Eichhorn ed., 1988); THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INDICES (Wolfgang Eichhorn et al. eds., 1978);
JEFFREY M. WOOLRIGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTION AND PANEL DATA
(2002); see also SCHUMPETER, supra note 39, at 1091-95 (noting the preeminence of
economists in the development of the theory of index numbers).
297 Arbitrage opportunities opened by such fluctuations limit the prospects of
such fluctuations not rationally reflecting underlying opportunity costs.
298 Similar difficulties of course beset the construction of labor-income indices,
particularly in view of changes to relevant characteristics of laborers tracked over
time, which render observations of the same or comparable earners over time
more fuzzy and less accurate.
299 Indexing is also important for my term "justice-accounting," particularly
in equalizing initial endowments of the relevant equalisandum (Rawlsian "pri-
mary goods," Senian "functionings," Dworkinian "resources," opportunities)
when the latter is not homogeneous like "utility" or income. Note that Dworkin's
"hypothetical insurance market" is, in effect, a means to monetize and render
commensurable both external and physiological resources, although Dworkin
does not speak of it this way. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at
73-109; see also RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 22.
The justice-theorist who has probably given most thought to indexing as such
is Sen. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); SEN,
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are developed and tracked for specific reasons; public and private
policy choices will hinge decisively upon their movements. The
developers of indices, therefore, must strive for as much accuracy
as is pragmatically possible consistent with their purposes in the
construction. That desideratum, in turn, necessitates a good deal
of theoretical -generally, statistically and econometrically sophis-
ticated -reflection and adjustment.300 It also, of course, requires
the collection of vast quantities-and many types of data. The
greater, more complex and inclusive that aggregate tracked along a
univariate, scalar metric, the greater the variety of data and the de-
gree of mathematical sophistication required in the construction of
that metric.301
Moreover, because the inevitable fudging that will attend any
such Procrustean exercise will tend to benefit different interests ac-
cording to the particular uses to which the index is to be put, and
accordingly as the fudging falls to one or another side of accuracy,
the general purposes of the exercise must be kept firmly in view
throughout by those engaged in it.302 An index conceived and
formulated by company-sponsored or -enlisted financial interme-
diaries, for example, might be expected to differ in its income-flow
implications from a counterpart index conceived and created by,
say, agents working for an auto-workers' union.
What all of this means for present purposes is that no single,
private party is likely to gather and assimilate the requisite data
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 22; SEN, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 18; AMARTYA
SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); SEN, STANDARD OF LIVING, supra note 52;
Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum
& Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Amartya K. Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM,
supra note 22, at 307-30. Sen's work in this area probably has been the chief impe-
tus behind, and informer of, the United Nations Development Programme's
"Human Development Index" used to ascertain a more nuanced sense of the de-
gree to which various nations are developing (in the human interests of their citi-
zens) than is possible by means of GDP measures alone. Often nations score
rather differently on one index than they do on the other. See generally SEN,
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 22.
300 The classic work on the special theoretical issues involved in constructing
a consumer price index is A.A. Kontis, The Problem of the True Index of the Cost of
Living, 7 ECONOMETRICA 10 (1939) (translating the original German of 1924). See
also generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The Measurement of Price Changes, in 3 ARROW,
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 173; R. A. POLLACK, THE THEORY OF THE COST-OF-
LIVING INDEX (1989).
301 See generally discussion and works cited supra note 296.
302 Id. Martin Shubik makes the point graphically, frequently, and entertain-
ingly in conversation.
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and to construct the macroindices to which derivative instrument
prices can be tied. Unless that party is able to capture the rents
that such collecting, interpretive and ultimately inventive activity
will engender, which in turn entails that which is invented, runs a
significant chance of turning out indices entirely too skewed in fa-
vor of the inventor to end up being broadly marketable absent
some guarantee that a more "objectively" formulated index will
generate sufficient revenue to the same. This poses, of course, a
classic collective action problem; however, there are others.
6.3.2. A Surfeit of Inertial-cum-Collective Action Challenges
A truly objective, maximally useful macroindex would be a
public good as would be the data used to construct it. The classic
indicia of public goods, of course, are their general utility and prac-
tical nonexcludability. 303 Macroindices and their constitutive data
would bear such properties: they would be eminently useful in the
fashioning of instruments useable by broad populational swathes
to hedge against systemic income risk, and then-if rendered
transparent enough to be credible -readily appropriated, mim-
icked, or incrementally improved upon by "Johnny come lately"
instrument-designers who have contributed little or nothing to the
initial exercise of data-collection, index-construction, and instru-
ment-invention. The upshot, of course, is that macroindices and
their associated data and derivative instruments will tend to be
underprovided, if at all, by private actors. The ease of rent-
expropriation by strangers at tn results in suboptimal investment
at tm<n.304 (Recall here the "rent-dissipation" problem noted in
303 The literature on public goods, collective action problems, and coordina-
tion failures is vast. Obligatory canonical cites include: RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE,
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 43-57 (1959); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-10, 51-81 (1981); and
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1971). A useful recent stock-taking of the field up to the mid-1990s is
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS
AND CLUB GOODS (1986).
304 Some telling statistics on the magnitude of this problem, as it afflicted the
development of new hedging instruments up to the early 1990s, are reviewed and
discussed in Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First Mover Advantages, 6 J. APP.
CORP. FIN. 83 (1992), and Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First Mover Advan-
tages II, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 219 (1989). See also Dennis Carlton, Futures Markets: Their
Purpose, Their History, Their Growth, Their Successes and Failures, 4 J. FUTURES
MARKETS 237 (1984) (detailing how exchanges themselves can be done in by in-
crementally-product-improving competitors).
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discussion supra Section 3.1.)
A demand-side counterpart to this supply-side underincentivi-
zation is simple consumer-cum-cultural inertia.305 Many unfamil-
iar new products face risks at the outset of their introduction that
the public will view them skeptically -after all, "we've done well
enough without it until now." The fact that so many new products
are introduced into and thrive within dynamic economies obscures
the fact, unknown to most, that for every such success there is a
great multitude of failures.30 6 (Again, note the discussion in Sec-
tion 3.1.) In the case of hedging instruments, the risk of demand-
side failure is likely to be particularly acute -at the onset. The rec-
ondite nature of hedging, and the comparative financial illiteracy
of the general public, renders the introduction of individual in-
come risk hedging products a particularly "dicey" business.
307
The financial press, unfortunately, often compounds the prob-
lem here. The sensation generated by the comparatively small
number of spectacular hedging debacles (e.g., the collapse of the
Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM") hedge fund) 30 8 renders
an ignorant public all the more skittish, particularly in cases where
entire municipalities are big losers (e.g., Orange County, Califor-
nia, the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history)3 0 9 and teams
of Nobel Laureates (as was the case with LTCM). If cities, "rocket
scientists" and "geniuses" can lose their shirts, reasons the pro-
spective individual income risk hedger, what might happen to
me?310 Even where the probabilities solidly have it that you face
more risk through not hedging than through hedging, the devil
that you know might well be preferred to the devil that you don't
know -particularly when the latter devil, according to the press
reports, is scarcely tamable even by the hordes of Ph.D.-bearing
305 Cochrane offers a similar sort of path-dependency, now-obsolete, local-
optimum speculation by way of explaining why time-consistent health insurance
is not yet available. See Cochrane, supra note 254, at 468-69.
306 See also ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 3-41, 157-97.
307 Pun intended.
308 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIus FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
309 Laura Jereski et al., Bitter Fruit: Orange County, Mired in Investment Mess,
Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
310 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-
Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 2-3 (1997) (describing
the magnitude of the bankruptcy of Orange County of California); Romano, supra
note 244, at 4-5 (noting that "in the popular press and to the average citizen, 'de-
rivatives,' much like speculation, has become a dirty word").
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mathematicians and theoretical physicists until recently being
hired by financial intermediaries. 311 Add to this the fact that de-
rivative instruments typically are vulnerable to high short-term
volatility -meaning that the hedger must be particularly iron-
willed and cool-headed-and it might look as though "consumer
derivatives" are destined to remain a practical impossibility for
some time to come.312
311 See Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1459 (1993)
("This market [for over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives] serves as a hothouse for
world financial innovation; complex state-of-the-art products of Wall Street
"rocket scientists" often emerge here to appear later in standardized form on or-
ganized exchanges."); Romano, supra note 244, at 5 (noting that "investment firms
hire Ph.D.s in mathematics and physics as well as in financial economics to ana-
lyze products"); see also Henry T. C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality"
and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985 (1995) (focus-
ing on problems interfering with corporate analysis of hedging benefits which
then stifles the development of hedging policies).
312 But see Carolyn H. Jackson, Note: Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable
Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3207 (1999) ("Retail de-
rivative activity is inevitable. Risk management benefits of derivatives are too
substantial to be kept from consumers.").
A related inertial problem, as well its possible solution, should perhaps be
flagged. HicKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL, supra note 291, at 137 n.1, finds that "in all
forward markets there is likely to be a tendency for hedgers to predominate on
one side or the other over long periods." Hence, "[n]o forward market can do
without [outright speculators]." Id. Hicks bases his observations in part upon
those made by Keynes in the latter's TREATISE ON MONEY, VOLUME II: THE APPLIED
THEORY OF MONEY 152-55 (1930), where the author notes that in "normal" condi-
tions supply and demand can be expected to remain the same, and spot prices are
expected to stay the same, too. In such cases forward prices must be lower than
spot prices, the margin between them being called, in the parlance of the day,
normal "backwardation." Hicks observes apropos backwardation that
[Ilt measures the amount which hedgers have to hand over to specula-
tors in order to persuade the speculators to take over the risks of the
price-fluctuations in question. Ultimately, therefore, it measures the cost
of the coordination achieved by forward trading; if the cost is very
heavy, potential hedgers will prefer not to hedge.
HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL, supra note 289, at 138-39. Intriguingly, in connection
with employment in particular, Hicks goes on to say that
It is usually in the interest of an employee to 'hedge' future sales of his la-
bor- as he would do, if he could secure engagement for a long period.
But it is not in the interest of his employer to make such contracts, unless
he derives some particular advantage from so doing -as he would do, if
this particular employee were difficult to replace.
Id. at 139 (emphasis added). Hicks concludes: "Generally, then, it is uncertainty
about the future, and the desire to keep one's hands free to meet uncertainty, which
limit the extent of forward trading under capitalism." Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, a variety of potential problems beyond those plagu-
ing prospective instruments plague the establishment of new mar-
kets on which such instruments might be traded. It is costly to es-
tablish a securities exchange, and certainly not costless to add new
securities to the markets provided by established exchanges -
particularly if the new securities differ in significant respects from
the more customary instruments already traded.
313
It bears noting again that the demand-side inertia here consid-
ered, and the supply-side inertia discussed above, are mutually re-
inforcing. Potential suppliers see prospective future profits as par-
ticularly unlikely given a skeptical prospective hedging public.
The latter public, in turn, will view the instruments potentially of-
fered them with greater ignorance and skepticism until they and
their uses become more widely distributed and engaged. The up-
shot is a sort of financial analogue to the nineteenth century rail-
ways, which apocryphally operated in one U.S. jurisdiction under
a law requiring of two trains, when their conductors found them-
selves approaching one another from opposite directions, that each
The implications for our present project are more or less straightforward.
First, it might not be reasonable to expect there generally, at least under "normal,"
stable conditions, to be a roughly equal number (or value) of risk-averse interests
on either side of the intertemporal bet that constitutes the sort of long term macro-
aggregate-associated hedging instruments contemplated here. Second, however:
a) the story will be different in periods of volatility, which of course are precisely
the periods in which all (and indeed, employees in various occupations whose
fortunes might well differentially vary) shall be most concerned to insure em-
ployee incomes; and b) insofar as risk-embracing (simple wagering) motives are op-
erative in the market (even during "normal" times of lower volatility), the instru-
ments we envisage might indeed find counterparties, effectively offering risk-
embracers the opportunity to bet against employment risk-averters. (It is such
people, rather than the employers whom Hicks countenances, whom generally
should be expected effectively to insure employee incomes.) Such is, of course,
precisely the sort of "speculative element" that Hicks envisages, and there is copi-
ous evidence that this element is quite active in today's hedging markets. See, e.g.,
Romano, supra note 244, at 5 (finding that "spectacular losses borne by certain in-
vestors" do not detract from the continued importance of derivatives and that
"[tihe largest derivative losers in the recent past [approximately 1989-19921 were,
indeed, speculating."). Moreover, inasmuch as governments seem increasingly to
be entering the business of financing municipal needs through encouragement
and exploitation of gambling tastes via public lotteries, we might foresee govern-
ment itself offering employment risk-hedging instruments as gambling vehicles to
precisely the same speculative elements to whom they appeal via lotteries -again,
for public purposes.
313 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Incomplete Markets and Incentives to Set
Up an Options Exchange, in 15 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 17 (Special
Issue, Herakles Plemarchakis ed., 1990), reprinted in ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157,
at 233.
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stop and await the other's passage.314
6.3.3. Who's in Charge Here?: Regulatory Uncertainties
Buttressing the mutually reinforcing problems of supply-side
and demand-side inertia in new income risk hedging instruments
and markets, at least in the United States, is the continuing uncer-
tainty as to what regulatory authority -the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") or the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC")-is charged with jurisdiction over many
hedging instruments. 315 This has been a problem on the American
scene for some time, and only recently has it been temporarily set-
tled with respect to current instruments.316 Unfortunately, innova-
tion in the matter of instrument-design continues and even seems
to be occurring along an accelerating trajectory at present,317 and
nearly every new instrument or "hybrid" seems to resurrect the ju-
risdictional conflict.
It has been observed that market actors would not object to a
90% transaction tax rate as much as they would to a fluctuating
rate.318 How much more exceptionlessly must it be true that securi-
ties and derivative traders will not generally abhor regulation 319
nearly so much as they will abhor regulatory uncertainty. Virtu-
ally any set of rules - and a definite rule formulator and enforcer -
might be tolerated and worked with so long as it can be expected
to remain essentially invariant upon the landscape for some time
into the future.320 Unfortunately, such has not been the case with
respect to hedging regulation in the United States; until it is,
314 See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORT
CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 2000) (recalling the "legendary" statute in Notes
and Questions).
315 See Jackson, supra note 312, at 3235-47 (discussing application of
SEC/Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") regulation to retail
swaps"); Romano, supra note 244, at 21-31, 43-45, 55-64 (discussing the SEC regu-
latory regime, the CFTC regulatory regime, and swaps under the CFTC regulatory
regime).
316 Again, see Jackson, supra note 312, at 3235-47; Romano, supra note 244, at
21-31, 43-45, 55-64.
317 ALLEN & GALE, supra note 157, at 36.
318 Interview with Martin Shubik, Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathemati-
cal Institutional Economics, Yale School of Management, in New Haven, Conn.
319 Probably all honest parties would concede regulations to be necessary in
some form or other in order for any market to function properly rather than de-
generate into general expropriation and/or civil strife.
320 Interview with Professor Shubik, supra note 318.
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"hedging democracy" is all the more likely to remain in nucleo.
321
Such is all the more true where there is essentially no regulator
with authority at all, as on the international scene.
322
6.3.4. International Cooperation?
Because what we are envisaging is an optimization or maximal
expansion, of the income risk pool, ideally a "globalization" of risk-
management commensurate with the globalization of risk itself, it
will be necessary for optimal hedging markets of the sort here con-
sidered to get off of the ground to facilitate the enforcement of con-
tracts between nationals of different jurisdictions. If one takes a
short position in their country's GNP and another is long in the
same, it will be necessary for both to periodically settle as that in-
dex fluctuates. Yet what is to prevent either, should the measure
consistently rise over some lengthy duration, from simply reneging
on their commitment to make payments? Will the state or nation
enforce those rights? Will/can the state or nation do so one might
refuse? Which jurisdiction's law of contract, or commercial code,
governs our transaction? In what forum is our dispute settled or
disposed and enforced? 323
The problem here goes beyond the laws of contract and com-
merce alone, of course. What is to happen should I simply go
bankrupt and be altogether unable to discharge my obligations to
you? 32 4 Under what bankruptcy code (federal, state, or local)
should our altered relation be worked out? How about the matters
of fraud, deceit and market manipulation-if there is uncertainty
even within a jurisdiction (such that of the United States) as to
321 Similar concerns are raised by Cochrane as another possible reason for the
non-existence thus far of time-consistent health insurance contracts. See
COCHRANE, supra note 254, at 469-70.
322 There is of course international contract enforcement of a sort, and arbitra-
tion, as discussed further infra, but this machinery remains very costly to operate,
uncertain in its result, and underdeveloped. See generally MICHAEL REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2001).
323 Id.
324 See JACOB S. ZIEGEL, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (1994) (presenting the philosophical
debate regarding changes in bankruptcy under topics of voidable transactions,
director and officer liability, international solvency, and international perspectives
on business bankruptcy law); Arrow, Limited Knowledge, supra note 181, at 8 ("The
ability to make enforceable contracts is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
a market. However, there is no way to ensure complete enforceability. An indi-
vidual may make a contract which he cannot in fact fulfill.").
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which regulatory authority is properly charged with the mainte-
nance of market order, how much greater must be the uncertainty
when we are talking about a variety of national markets or one su-
pranational market subject to no single authority?
All of these problems can be overstated, of course. Not only do
trust and reputational pride and intermediation buttressed by new
communications do much to grease the wheels of international
trade even in the absence of an all-purpose supranational author-
ity, but treaty arrangements, 325 the formation of "epistemic com-
munities" among oft-convening regulators from various jurisdic-
tions, 32 6 and consequent "regulatory convergence" 327 all do a great
deal to harmonize trading norms among citizens of many different
states. But the facts would seem to remain both that there remain
many gaps and that in the absence of something more solid, skit-
tish market participants are likely to remain cautious about new-
fangled international hedging transactions even if they are not en-
tirely averse to trade in goods.
6.3.5. Is the Matter Then Hopeless?
The prospects for just income risk hedging through "macro
markets" might, then, in light of all of the foregoing, look rather
dim. If mutually reinforcing collective action and inertial chal-
lenges face both the demand and supply sides of these prospective
markets, and are rendered yet more acute by both national and in-
ternational jurisdictional and coordinational uncertainties, what
chance, really, is there that this theoretically promising and poten-
tially just, efficient, ex ante form of systemic income risk sharing
325 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("Vienna Sales Convention"), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18
(1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
326 Such as, for example, the International Organization of Securities Com-
missioners ("IOSCO"), a forum for cooperation among securities regulators. See
BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A
PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 25-27 (1998). On epistemic regulatory communities
more generally, see IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993); JOHN
GERARD RUGGIE, WINNING THE PEACE: AMERICA AND WORLD ORDER IN THE NEW ERA
(1996).
327 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COOPERATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Wil-
liam Bratton et al. eds., 1996); REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTWvES (Daniel C. Esty & Daniel Geradin eds.,
2001).
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will ever get off of the ground?
As it happens, all of the listed challenges constitute classic can-
didates for concerted public address. The final Section of this Arti-
cle, accordingly, proposes a number of possible governmental ac-
tions, and collective action falling short of full public action
("public spirited action") that might eliminate or substantially miti-
gate the obstacles and thereby facilitate the development of this
promising form of just and efficient, market-based social insurance.
6.4. There is Hope: Means of Collective (Though Not Always Public)
Address
Collective action problems and coordination failures of them-
selves constitute justifications for state action par excellence.
328
What seems to be less frequently observed is that they also recom-
mend public-spirited action by sub- or non-governmental collectiv-
ities comprising members who are not actuated solely by desire for
private pecuniary gain-e.g., universities, nonprofit organizations
(more generally), professors, lawyers, etc. It requires but little
imagination to envisage means by which governments and such
other, nongovernmental agents might begin to address the previ-
ously discussed challenges to market-formation.
To begin, government, or an entity such as the National Bureau
of Economic Research ("NBER"), or a university-established insti-
tute or "think tank" staffed by academics and/or past or present
(disinterested) financial market professionals, might at least pre-
liminarily construct suitable macroindices and prototypical index-
tied hedging instruments. This could simultaneously address the
objectivity problem inevitably afflicting any coarse-grained scalar
metric meant to aggregate a stunning complexity of product and
service prices, and the incentive problem afflicting any purely
profit-seeking prospective data-collector, index-fashioner or in-
strument-inventor unable to realize the rents generated by her ac-
tivities or innovations.329 Accordingly, it seems to be worth at least
328 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF
THE STATE (2d ed. 1962) (1952); HYMAN, supra note 98, at 64-66, 93-161; MUSGRAVE,
supra note 303, at 43; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 303, at 1-10, 51-82; ROSEN,
supra note 164, at 61-116; STIGLITZ, supra note 98, at 76-90, 127-50, 214-40.
329 The constructing authority would have to be insulated from the undue
influence of lobbying parties, as per the insights of the public choice literature. See
HYMAN, supra note 98, at 163-205. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); DENNIS
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK
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considering government's or other public-spirited organizations'
direct accumulation and/or interpretation of the requisite data and
construction and design of the requisite indices and instruments -
as well as partial or piecemeal incentives proffered by govern-
ments, or by other public-minded agents (maybe George Soros!),33
to others.
Such might be effected through, say, a "Macro-Indices Advi-
sory Board" operating under the tutelage of the Federal Reserve or
a consortium of various nations' central banking and/or securities-
regulatory authorities. It might also involve academic and practi-
tioner members of the broader financial and legal communities. It
is not unreasonable to expect that a private provider, discerning fu-
ture possibilities once things were underway, would usefully par-
ticipate. 331 A related point here is that international and govern-
ment agencies already produce, process, and retain a host of
statistics on all manner of economic data for individual departmen-
tal purposes- data which, were it simply to be made public, might
itself facilitate the development of suitable indices and instru-
ments.332 Some such data -e.g., the World Bank's System of Na-
(Dennis C. Mueller, ed., 1997); CAss R. SUNSTErN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(1990). But there seems no more reason to be pessimistic about prospects here
than in those spheres where public authorities already construct indices, such as
the CPI.
330 Soros seems to be quite exercised by the dangers posed by the present
global financial system. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION
(2002); GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SocIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2000);
GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCIETY ENDANGERED
(1998). Perhaps, then, he or others like him would be similarly engaged by the
prospect of exploiting some of that system's own features (its information, trading
and hedging technologies) in order to better insulate those who are most harmed
by its volatile fluctuations.
331 One thinks to the human genome project in this connection. The program
at first was run by the government, until two private firms, seeing the potential
being revealed by the government research, entered the field. See, e.g., Mark
Henderson, Destiny is in Our Grasp, Say Scientists, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 9,
2001, at 1.
332 In this connection, see Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal
for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 59-70 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972); Ronald H. Coase, The Institu-
tional Structure of Production, Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic
Sciences (1991), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND
ECONOMISTS 3, 10-14 (1994) [hereinafter COASE, ESSAYS]. Note that such data also
might be directly useful for "justice-accounting" along the valuational lines
sketched in Kenneth J. Arrow, The Measurement of Real Value Added, in NATIONS
AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 3 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds.,
1974).
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tional Accounts, 333 and the International Monetary Fund's ("IMF")
now electronically gathered and published national income
data334- already is public but apparently not yet ripe for the uses
here contemplated. Likewise, national income and product ac-
counts, as well as panel data on household incomes, published by
most governments of OECD member countries, face similar chal-
lenges.335
Like the data just mentioned, new technologies -many of them
importantly constitutive of the new economy itself -are now rap-
idly coming into being, technologies that enhance opportunities for
new, and more rapid, more efficient, trading.336 There is no reason,
in principle, why such trading cannot include the trading-and,
consequently, the pricing -of previously untraded risks, with all of
the justice and efficiency benefits that this would entail.337 For ex-
ample, electronic communications networks ("ECNs"), including
Bloomberg, Instanet, and the New York Stock Exchange's "Super-
dot" system, are lowering trading costs and thereby both opening
the door to trade in new contracts and extending the range of effi-
cient marketability.338 Relatedly, new methods for trading baskets
of assets- e.g., Standard and Poor Depository Receipts and their
progeny "Exchange-Traded Funds" ("ETFs") are emerging, mean-
ing that trade in macro-correlated derivative instruments like those
here envisaged will be growing easier to carry off. Insights rooted
in the advances being made by auction theory and market micro-
structure theory are paving the way to development of new and
333 See generally The World Bank Group Website, at http://www. world-
bank.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2004) (providing background information on the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), another name
used to identify the World Bank).
334 See generally The International Monetary Fund Website, at
http://www.imf.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
33 See, e.g., the SEC's "EDGAR," the Bureau of Economic Analysis's "Nat'l
Income Product Accounts," U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics's "U.S. Panel Study of
Income Dynamics" ("PSID"), and the PSID website, at http://www.iss. um-
ich.edu/ src/psid/panelstudies.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
336 See generally DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 15; BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD
(1995); NICHoLAs NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1996).
337 Owing, again, to the centrality of information to efficiency- and justice-
accounting. See discussion supra Sections 2.3 and 4.1.
338 See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World: The Impact(s) of the Internet on
Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1198 (1997) ("Reduce [information-
acquisition] costs, and the boundaries of the efficient market expand."). On these
effects generally, see Demsetz, supra note 267; O'HARA, supra note 237; Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 267.
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more efficient means of matching buyers and sellers, as well as
means of streamlining trading via communications and informa-
tion technologies.339 J.P. Morgan and Deutsche Bank have recently
adopted a new trading system based upon these insights in order
to enable institutional clients to trade in an array of economic
macro-indices.40
An alternative means by which governments in particular
might address collective action inertia on the supply side is by af-
fording expanded patent protection to newly formulated, invented,
or instituted indices, instruments, trading technologies, or mar-
kets.341 This is, of course, the classic means of encouraging publicly
beneficial innovation, the theory being that a limited monopoly
will generate sufficient rents to incent otherwise dissipated in-
vestment in new products.342 Of course, a certain degree of fine-
tuning would be necessary in this case: competition policy always
represents a tradeoff between innovation protection on the one
hand, overexploitation and innovation-stifling on the other.343
To address inertia on the demand side of these prospective
markets, government might conduct public information cam-
paigns, and perhaps even sponsor or partially subsidize broad-
based financial counseling, to educate citizens in the benefits of di-
versification in new instruments and markets. This would seem to
constitute a public good of the first order, given the surprising de-
gree of ignorance that characterizes a public whose incomes in-
creasingly are at risk in face of the forces of "globalization." One
339 See generally O'HARA, supra note 237; John H. Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of
Experimental Research, in EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra note 102, at 501. A
seminal article from which much of the more recent work derives is Lloyd
Shapely & Martin Shubik, Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment, 85 J.
POL. ECON. 937 (1977). See generally DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 15; GATES, supra
note 336; JOHN HAGEL, III & MARK SINGER, NET WORTH xii (1999) (noting that one
of the Internet's greatest values is its capacity to connect people in a timely fash-
ion); NEGROPONTE, supra note 336;.
340 See, e.g., Jeffrey Lagge & N. Economides, A Parimutuel Market Microstruc-
turefor Contingent Claims Trading (Longitude, Inc. Working Paper, 2001).
341 On the role of patents in financial innovation, see ALLEN & GALE, supra
note 157, at 47-50. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention [hereinafter Arrow, Economic Welfare], in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (R. Nelson
ed., 1962) [hereinafter Arrow, Economic Welfare]. Professor Shiller and two col-
leagues have recently patented an instrument. See Macro Securities Research An-
nounces New Financial Security, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 17, 2000.
342 See Arrow, Economic Welfare, supra note 341, at 615-22.
343 See Arrow, Economic Welfare, supra note 341.
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can imagine public service announcements, websites, and even
courses designed to raise the general level of financial literacy
among the currently risk-bearing public. Government might di-
rectly produce and provide these goods, or offer inducements of
one sort or another to, say, "streetcorner H & R Blocks" and in-
vestment companies.3"
Particularly promising in this connection is the vast infrastruc-
ture of financial intermediaries - pension funds, mutual funds, and
related institutions -which have proliferated over the course of the
past two decades. Growing numbers of citizens in advanced
economies have elected to participate more actively in their home
and, indeed, to some degree in global-financial markets. 45 More-
over, should the United States or other governments, like Chile
and others, implement a system of nation-wide Social Security
"private accounts," this infrastructure itself would offer a route
through which governments could "jumpstart" the use of new in-
struments and markets.
346
344 1 discuss the many possible salutary uses of such institutions at greater
length in Hockett, Assets & Stakes, supra note 162.
345 On this profound and developing trend, see generally BERNSTEIN, supra
note 264; MALKIEL, supra note 264; JEREMY SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN (1998).
346 There is vast literature on these developments, and the issues surrounding
them as well. See generally HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN
TO REFORM: THE GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE (2001); HENRY J. AARON & JOHN B.
SHOVEN, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PRIVATIZE SOCIAL SECURITY? (Benjamin M.
Friedman ed., 1999); DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM (Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman eds., 2002); FRAMING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS (R. Douglas Arnold,
Michael J. Graetz & Alice H. Munnell eds., 1998); GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note
182, at 69-111, 188-226, 255-278; ISSUES IN PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: REPORT OF
AN EXPERT PANEL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (Peter A. Dia-
mond ed., 1999); PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998);
PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999);
SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE
OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1999); Bodie, Financial Engineering, supra note 248, in RISK
ASPECTS, supra note 248, at 291; Hockett, Assets & Stakes, supra note 162; Estelle
James et al., Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments: What is the Most Efficient
Way to Set Up Individual Accounts in a Social Security System?, in ADMINISTRATIVE
ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 72 (John B. Shoven ed.,
2000). In addition, there exists a great deal of literature on private pensions, pri-
vate pension funds, developments in relation thereto over the past several dec-
ades, and their significance for the economy. Insofar as they are relevant to our
present concerns, however, they are adequately treated in the sources cited here.
Three additional useful surveys with an international scope are: E. PHILIP DAVIS,
PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME SECURITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995); THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Salvador Vald~s-Prieto ed., 1997); THE
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A related, and perhaps somewhat more ambitious, proposal
would be to convert-or partly convert -the welfare administra-
tion itself into a sort of financial intermediary. The office or its
relevant suboffice would actually design -or contract out for the
design of -the requisite hedging instruments, and might provide a
sort of "electronic trading floor" (largely what the stock markets
are currently becoming) for them, enabling citizens to trade-and
thus share according to their tastes and aversions -employment
income risks with one another. This might not only provide such a
market, but, through the standardization of contracts and proce-
dures and consequent liquidification of pertinent instrument-types
in a market initially too thin and inertia-impeded to do so unaided,
spur an even broader private market in the fullness of time -just as
what happened in the case of the secondary mortgage market and
its eventual securitization through the workings of FHA, Fannie
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac.347 Moreover, given the loads of
data noted earlier that appear to be locked away in government of-
fices,348 such a development would appear likely to bring about the
release, dissemination and use (first within the government itself
and then quite possibly more broadly) of such data, a public good
not yet fully in the public domain, for a highly salutary public pur-
pose - namely, just and efficient income insurance for all.
Of course, neither the supply-side nor the demand-side public
actions just considered are likely to bring much change in the ab-
sence of a proper market-regulatory backdrop. Government
would have to redouble its efforts to prevent fraud, manipulation,
insider dealing and the like in the new hedging markets just as (or
better than) it currently does in existing securities and derivatives
markets. Indeed, the need would be all the more pressing here ow-
ing to the well known short-term volatility to which derivatives
markets are subject.349 It would also be more pressing in view of
the fact that new technologies, consequent new trading methods
and new markets proposed would of themselves render obsolete
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK),
AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH
(1994).
347 See supra note 201 and accompanying text on the relevant history.
348 See COASE, ESSAYS, supra note 332.
349 See, e.g., ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE -A
PATH TO EFFECTIVE GLOBALISATION? 108-09, 183-94 (2000).
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many current regulatory methods, modes and requirements.
350
A prerequisite to effectiveness -and a necessary prerequisite to
market confidence in its own right-will of course be the sorting
out of jurisdictional uncertainties. At some point, the United States
is simply going to have to decide, one way or the other, which
regulatory authority bears jurisdiction over new macrohedging in-
struments and macromarkets. 351 To the degree that other nations
suffer from similar regulatory ambiguities, they too will have to
iron them out. Quite probably, however, public decision to take
the previous measures just contemplated will issue this decision in
this public action as well.
Finally, and relatedly, the nations of the world will have to co-
operate in forging a more or less unified global macro-hedging
market-regulatory regime if such markets are to operate with op-
timal efficiency. The process might begin with a series of intergov-
ernmental conferences -perhaps hosted by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Cooperation
and Development ("OECD"), or G-10 group of industrialized
states - addressing the problems of systemic global income risk
and the prospects for macro-aggregate proxy-markets in which
such risk can be hedged. The next step might be the instituting of a
"Global Macro-Hedging Advisory Board" charged with facilitating
the development of a suitable global macro-hedging market archi-
tecture. To some extent this could simply piggyback upon the
broader efforts, already well underway, to construct a "New Inter-
national Financial Architecture" ("NIFA").352 Finally, a unified set
of clearing, settlement, general contract and bankruptcy rules, as
well as of market-regulatory norms more generally (e.g., what shall
constitute market "manipulation") will have to be worked out, or
at least striven for, in order that these markets might function
smoothly (without undue regard for jurisdiction) as possible. To
name but two conspicuous cases of noteworthily successful regula-
tory "convergence," the Basel Committee in unifying capital ade-
350 See Coffee, supra note 338; Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenge
for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263 (1999); G.
Phillip Rutledge, The Internet and U.S. Financial Markets, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 563
(1998).
351 See discussion supra note 312 (especially Jackson) (presenting an argument
as to how these jurisdictional turf conflicts should be resolved.). I resist the temp-
tation to defray here; that must await another article.
352 On the New International Financial Architecture ("NIFA"), see Hockett,
From Macro to Micro, supra note 6.
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quacy standards among banks, 353 and of International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") in regularizing rules
and enforcement action against market fraud and money-
laundering,354 there would seem to be cause for optimism on this
score.355 Ultimate success with the full NIFA will be cause for even
greater optimism.
In sum then, for every collective action problem there appears
to be at least one plausible prospective collective action solution. A
public-spirited Isaac Newton should be pleased. Those envisaged
in the immediately foregoing paragraphs are but sketches of the
general shapes that some such solutions might take.
7. CONCLUSION: FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
EXPERIMENTATION, MORE DETAILED INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The new, global economy currently taking shape already has
brought, and no doubt will continue to bring, many material ad-
vantages to the world's inhabitants. It also brings, however, con-
siderable risk to most inhabitants' incomes; many of these risks are
systemic in nature and are neither wrought nor adequately ad-
dressable by individuals' diligent foresight or productively virtu-
ous actions alone.
Justice and prudence alike dictate that morally arbitrary, sys-
temic global income risk be conceptually isolated from individu-
ally preventable risk, then catalogued and distributed over the
widest possible pool of risk-bearers. Efficiency largely dictates es-
sentially the same desideratum. Currently, private markets simply
are inadequate to that task. The absence of suitable and publicly
available data-sets, aggregate-indices, hedging instruments tied to
fluctuations in the same, and markets in such instruments bring it
about that efficient private hedging against individual income risk
simply is not (yet) a practical possibility. Classic collective action
and related inertial obstacles stand in the way to collection, publi-
cation, construction, invention and establishment of such data, in-
353 See, e.g., EICHENGREEN, supra note 326, at 24-25.
354 See id. at 25-27.
355 For more such success stories, as well as cautionary tales, see generally
EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 7; EICHENGREEN, supra note 326, at 25-27; BARRY
EICHENGREEN, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(1994); RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE: WHAT'S NEW? WHAT'S MISSING? (2001); PETTIS, supra note 15.
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dices, instruments and markets.
Classic collective action problems are readily and appropriately
solved, however, through classic collective means, namely, public,
quasi-public and/or public-spirited private provision of public
goods, subsidy and/or rent-protection with a view to the same
end, and regulation of that most bounteous of public blessings, the
market in publicly desired goods, services and financial instru-
ments themselves. This Article has proposed, schematically, a
number of such public policies (or public-spirited activities on the
part of non-governmental organizations) that can facilitate the de-
velopment of public-benefiting hedging markets.
More work, nonetheless, both of the suggested and of a more
preparatory nature (both theoretical and practical) can and should
be undertaken. Some already are undertaking it, I plan to continue
with it, and it is hoped that the present essay will have motivated
yet more such effort. Financial engineering is not solely a matter
for inordinately wealthy high-stakes gamblers looking for a thrill,
or for business firms looking to reduce their exposures to financial
risk; it can be harnessed to the purposes of justice, and indeed now
offers itself as an instrument of far more perfect (and efficient) in-
come-risk-justice than we have managed in the West (certainly in
the United States) thus far. The remarkable possibilities being
opened by the new financial economics, new information tech-
nologies, and consequent new financial practices are only begin-
ning to be explored-even by the comparatively wealthy and so-
phisticated. There seems little reason why, at the very least,
piecemeal experimentation along some of the lines here envisaged
should not be tried, with further theoretical modeling and design
work to be subsequently refined in light of the results.
The overriding message taken from this Article, I hope, will be
one of both optimism and determination. Systemic income risk
wrought through no fault or want of diligence on the part of its
bearers is unjust, untenable, and, it seems, unnecessary. If we can
but summon our collective attention and collective will to address
the problem, we shall solve it. And all of us -the world itself -
will be much the better for it.
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